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INTRODUCTION
The American federal system combines interstate diversity
of norms with overlapping jurisdiction, producing inevitable
uncertainty about which jurisdiction's law governs multijuris-
dictional conduct.1 For most of our nation's history, lawyers
1. That modem choice-of-law doctrine fails to offer a significant remedy
to that uncertainty is beyond dispute. See LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF
LAWS xiv (2d ed. 1995) ("The field of choice of law may suffer from more con-
fusion today than ever before."). Dean Prosser's famous 1953 description of
conflicts law as "a dismal swamp, filled with quaking quagmires, and inhab-
ited by learned but eccentric professors who theorize about mysterious mat-
ters in a strange and incomprehensible jargon," William L. Prosser, Interstate
Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953), still retains some descriptive
force. See also EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 42-44
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have addressed that uncertainty not on their own account, but
on behalf of their clients.2 Two relatively recent trends, how-
ever-the increasingly multijurisdictional character of law
practice and the increasingly disparate ethical norms of those
jurisdictions-have conspired to put lawyers in the same un-
comfortable position often occupied by their clients. As lawyers
more commonly cross state lines in the course of their practice,
their conduct has become subject to the norms and authority of
multiple jurisdictions.3 Further, individual states have made
significant modifications to the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct or have rejected them altogether, thus increasing the likeli-
hood of conflicts in professional standards.4 These conflicts have
potential significance not only in terms of professional disci-
pline but also in nondisciplinary contexts, such as malpractice
liability and disqualifications for conflicts of interest.5
(2d ed. 1992) (discussing the lack of predictability for the parties and the lack
of guidance for judges in much modem conflicts law); Larry Kramer, On the
Need for a Uniform Choice of Law Code, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2134, 2135 (1991)
("[Clourts today are plainly confused about how to handle choice of law
cases."); Willis Reese, Conflict - Laws and the Restatement Second, in
PERSPECTiVES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS: CHOICE OF LAW 42, 54 (James A. Mar-
tin ed., 1980) (noting that in the contracts area, "uniformity of result is not
easily attainable and the parties are unlikely to have had clear expectation
with respect to the governing law").
2. When legal practice was largely confined to a single state and lawyer-
conduct standards were essentially uniform across jurisdictions, lawyers
rarely needed to be concerned with interstate conflicts in the law governing
their conduct.
3. See infra Part IA (discussing the increasingly multistate nature of
the practice of law).
4. See infra Part I.B (tracing the evolution of legal ethics regulation).
5. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct expressly disclaim their
applicability to legal malpractice and other nondisciplinary contexts:
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor
should it create any presumption that a legal duty has been
breached. The Rules are.., not designed to be a basis for civil liabil-
ity... Accordingly, nothing in the Rules should be deemed to aug-
ment any substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary
consequences of violating such a duty.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope, para. 18 (1995).
The Model Code contains a somewhat less emphatic disclaimer: "The
Model Code... [does not] undertake to define standards for civil liability of
lawyers for professional conduct." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1979). Despite such disclaimers, courts
not surprisingly look to the profession's self-described obligatory norms as
evidence of the relevant legal standard of care. See generally Ann Peters, The
Model Rules as a Guide for Legal Malpractice, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 609
(1993) (studying the reaction of the legal community to adoption of the Model
Rules as a measure for determining civil liability, presumptions of negligence,
and standards of care); Charles W. Wolfram, The Code of Professional Re-
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Recently, commentators and the organized bar have begun
to note with alarm the problems of uncertainty posed by in-
consistent and conflicting professional standards. 6 Some com-
mentators have suggested a solution to these problems that is
both obvious and radical: the creation of uniform national
standards by some component of the federal government.7
Such a uniform code, the argument runs, would end the confu-
sion for lawyers generated by the combination of multistate
practice and disparate standards, and indeed enhance the
public perception of lawyers.8 The American Bar Association,
uninterested in a federally imposed solution,9 responded in
sponsibility as a Measure of Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C. L.
REV. 281 (1979) [hereinafter Wolfram, The Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity] (explaining that the rules have been authoritatively adopted as rules gov-
erning lawyers in their professional capacities). Even more regularly, courts
look to the ethics codes when deciding motions to disqualify lawyers based on
a claimed conflict of interest. See CHARLEs W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS § 2.6.1, at 52 (1986) [hereinafter WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS].
6. See ABA Committee on Counsel Responsibility, Risks of Violation of
Rules of Professional Responsibility by Reason of the 1--:.reased Disparity
Among the States, 45 Bus. LAw. 1229 (1990) (discussing the new conflict-of-
law problems posed in disciplinary proceedings and other a "eas due to the ex-
pansion of multistate law practice and resulting variance among the states in
their rules of professional responsibility); Duncan T. OBrien, Multistate Prac-
tice and Conflicting Ethical Obligations, 16 SETON HALL L. REV. 678 (1986)
(examining the problem of how to decide which state's code of ethics controls
the conduct of a lawyer engaged in multijurisdictional practice); Geoffrey J.
Ritts, Professional Responsibility and the Conflict of Laws, 18 J. LEGAL PROF.
17 (1993) (evaluating the impact of a codified choice-of-law rule in instances of
conflicting ethical commands); Arvid E. Roach II, The Virtues of Clarity: The
ABA's New Choice of Law Rule for Legal Ethics, 36 S. TEX. L. REv. 907 (1995)
(advancing the new Model Rule 8.5 as the best available alternative for resolving
disputes concerning proper adjudication of ethics violations). For an early ex-
posure of the problem, see Samuel J. Brakel & Wallace D. Loh, Regulating the
Multistate Practice of Law, 50 WASH. L. REV. 699 (1975).
7. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, State Ethical Codes and Federal Prac-
tice: Emerging Conflicts and Suggestions for Reform, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
969, 974 (1992) (suggesting that "it is time to think seriously of a national bar,
governed by uniform federal norms of professional conduct in all practice con-
texts"); Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REv. 335
(1994) (considering the advantages and limits of adopting a uniform federal
code whose enforcement would largely be left to the states).
8. See infra Part I.D.1 (outlining the arguments for creating a national
standard for attorney conduct).
9. Cf David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 799, 802 (1992) (noting that "the ABA clings to the traditional view that
disciplinary agencies operating under the supervision of state supreme courts
should retain primary responsibility for ensuring that lawyers live up to their
professional obligations").
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1993 to the perceived problem by adding choice-of-law provi-
sions to Rule 8.5 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.10
In the emerging debate over the problems of and proposed
solutions to the diversification of ethics norms, scant attention
has been paid to the relevance of federalism principles. While
some commentators have observed that the setting of legal ethics
norms has traditionally been left to the states," no one has seri-
ously considered how federalism values should affect either the
evaluation of the problem or the selection of appropriate solu-
tions. 2 The principal focus of this Article is to analyze both the
perceived problems posed by the so-called balkanization of
ethics norms and possible solutions to those problems in light
of federalism principles. Perhaps the most important and ob-
vious point to be made is that the balkanization "problem" de-
scribed by commentators is inherent in the American federal
system. While the federal government has had an increasingly
expansive regulatory role, in most areas that most directly af-
fect American citizens states remain the primary norm setters
and enforcers. Moreover, no subject governed by state law is
uniformly regulated. Indeed, in state-dominated areas such as
torts, consumer fraud, and contracts, the interstate disparity in
conduct-regulating standards is probably far greater than in
legal ethics. Even in areas dominated by "uniform" statutes, such
as the Uniform Commercial Code, significant state variations in
language and interpretation preclude anything close to true
uniformity.
Not only is nonuniformity inevitable in a federal system, it
is one of the principal good-! of federalism. As a matter of his-
10. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 8.5 (1993); see infra Part
LD.2 (summarizing the purposes and scope of the new Rule 8.5); WoLFRAM,
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 5, § 2.6.4, at 62 (documenting the adoption of
the Model Rules by the ABA House of Delegates).
11 See, e.g., Mary C. Daly, Resolving Ethical Conflicts in Multijurisdic-
tional Practice-Is Model Rule 8.5 the Answer, an Answer, or No Answer at
All?, 36 S. TEx. L. REV. 715, 783 (1995) ("Te proposal [for a national, unitary
system of admission and discipline] intrudes upon fundamental notions of
federalism since state-based regulation is the only system for the admission
and discipline of lawyers the nation has ever known.").
12. A partial exception is Fred Zacharias, who anticipated that federalism
objections to his proposal might be raised, and sought to respond to those ob-
jections in advance. See Zacharias, supra note 7, at 373-76. But even
Zacharias' federalism analysis is relatively cursory, and misses or mischarac-
terizes the relevant federalism values. See infra Part mI.B.2 (arguing the
benefits of diversity outweigh those of uniformity in the system of attorney
conduct standards).
1997]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tory, politics, economics, and culture, the fundamental role of
states in the federal system is to permit diversity of normative
choices. Normative diversity, in turn, helps further the enduring
utilitarian principle that governments ordinarily should try to
satisfy the greatest number of individual preferences. Because
many individual policy preferences, including preferences con-
cerning attorney-conduct standards, are unevenly distributed
among the states, state-level decision-making can satisfy more
people than could a unitary national government. 13 State-level
diversity also fosters state competition for citizens and capital
and promotes innovation. 4 National preemption of state law
imposes a significant cost by eliminating normative variation
and its benefits.
In some areas, of course, the costs of disparate state regu-
lation and the benefits of uniformity may combine to warrant
national intervention. Perhaps the problems associated with
the regulation of lawyer conduct are sufficiently distinct to
overcome the federal system's presumption in favor of state
regulation. None of the most persuasive arguments for na-
tional intervention, however, apply to the regulation of lawyer
conduct. Lawyers are not like national defense, the interstate
highway system, the space program, or Yosemite National
Park-public goods that simply will not be supplied without
national policy-making and funds. 15 Lawyer regulation neither
produces significant negative externalities that would allow
one state to achieve the benefits of particular regulation while
imposing the costs on another state, nor involves the sort of
wealth redistribution that might attract needy recipients while
driving out wealthy taxpayers. 16 Nor does the history of lawyer
regulation offer evidence of the sort of interstate "race to the
bottom" arguably evident in the regulation of the environment
or corporations. 7 Finally, the case has not been made that
significant economies of scale would be achieved by nationalizing
administration of lawyer regulation."i In short, proponents of
across-the-board, nationally imposed lawyer-conduct standards
have failed to establish that the benefits of uniformity out-
weigh the benefits of diversity.
13. See infra Part III.B.l.a.
14. See infra Part III.B.l.b.
15. See infra notes 316-320, 366 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 366-369 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 365 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 370-371 and accompanying text.
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Federalism principles, together with insights from game
theory, also inform a reasoned assessment of the ABA
"resolution" of the problems posed by nonuniform attorney-
conduct standards. Choice-of-law rules enjoy no immunity
from the diversity-promoting forces inherent in the federal sys-
tem. The ABA's hope that amended Model Rule 8.5 will be uni-
formly adopted is thus no more warranted than its earlier
failed hope that the original Model Rules would be uniformly
adopted. Moreover, barriers to effective collective action vir-
tually ensure that neither the ABA rule nor a better-crafted
version of it will ever be widely embraced on the state level,
with or without individual state modifications. The only pros-
pect for a uniform choice-of-law rule governing conflicts in at-
torney-conduct standards rests with the national government.
Part I of this Article sets the stage for the federalism in-
quiry by first describing the increasingly multistate nature of
the practice of law and the recently developing disparity in
lawyer-conduct standards, and then outlining the resulting
problem of uncertainty for lawyers as perceived by the organ-
ized bar and commentators. Part I concludes by summarizing
the two existing proposed solutions to that problem of uncer-
tainty-the creation by the national government of uniform
standards for all lawyers, and the more modest promulgation
by the ABA of amended Model Rule 8.5, a choice-of-law rule for
matters of attorney discipline.
Part H examines the disparity in lawyer-conduct stan-
dards and the resulting uncertainty for lawyers through the
lens of federalism. Taking state variations on the Uniform
Commercial Code as an example, it explains that nonuniform-
ity is commonplace and indeed inevitable in our federal sys-
tem. Part IE concludes that the problems now faced by lawyers,
while potentially serious, are no more difficult or momentous
than similar problems faced much more often by their clients.
Part DI turns to the proposed creation of national stan-
dards of attorney conduct. It begins with a brief evaluation of
congressional authority, concluding that while Congress has
the power to preempt state standards, it does not, under cur-
rent Supreme Court doctrine, have the power to require state
agencies to enforce those standards. The bulk of Part Il is de-
voted to a critical examination of the claim that federalism
values pose no serious obstacle, in terms of policy, to a national
takeover of norm setting and enforcement. It both delineates
the critical role of normative variation in the American federal
1997]
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system, explaining that such variation promotes individual
preference-satisfaction and fosters efficiency- and innovation-
generating interstate competition for citizens and capital, and
describes the significant limits on the value of state-level norm
setting. Part III then measures the articulation of attorney-
conduct standards against the benefits and limits of state-level
responsibility, and concludes that they strongly suggest leaving
standard-setting in the hands of the states.1
9
Finally, Part IV considers the alternative approach to
ameliorating the costs associated with diverse state norms-a
uniform choice-of-law rule for attorney ethics. This Part first
examines the ABA's amended Model Rule 8.5, noting the le-
gitimate criticisms of the Rule's substance and scope but em-
phasizing the collective-action obstacles to the rule ever being
widely adopted. It then briefly explores the possibility of a fed-
eral choice-of-law rule as a solution to those collective-action
problems, explaining that the federalism objections to national
standards of attorney conduct would not apply to a national
choice-of-law rule, and that such a rule would be fully consis-
tent with the federal government's role as interstate umpire.
19. Setting lawyer-conduct standards comprises only one piece of the law-
yer-regulation mosaic, which also must include interpreting rules, detecting rule
violations, and prosecuting and punishing violators. See Ted Schneyer, Legal
Process Scholarship and the Regulation of Lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 33,
38 (1996). Beginning with David Wilkins' seminal article in 1992, see Wilkins,
supra note 9, a substantial body of scholarship is developing that addresses
the proper allocation of both enforcement and standard-setting authority
among various institutional actors, including judicial agencies and bar asso-
ciations, the system of civil liability, the courts and agencies before whom
lawyers appear, legislatures, law firms, and liability insurers. See, e.g., Jef-
frey A. Parness, Enforcing Professional Norms for Federal Litigation Conduct:
Achieving Reciprocal Cooperation, 60 ALB. L. REV. 303 (1996) (discussing dif-
ferent norm-enforcement systems and offering ways to achieve better coordi-
nation among them); Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: Reforming Law-
yers and Law Professors, 70 TUL. L. REv. 2583 (1996) (calling for the
elimination of ineffective ethical regulations and for increasing the use of legal
malpractice litigation as a means of regulation); Special Issue, Institutional
Choices in the Regulation of Lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (1996). My fo-
cus is on the distinct (though obviously related) issue of the impact of federal-
ism principles on the choice between state and federal institutions as princi-
pal norm-setters, not on which particular institutions within a level of
government are best-suited to set those norms.
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I. THE PERCEIVED PROBLEM, ITS CAUSES, AND
EXISTING PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The apparent alarm over the diversification of ethics
norms seems to rest on the belief that lawyers now face a wide
array of conflicting and potentially applicable conduct stan-
dards, with no meaningful way of determining which standard
applies to what conduct. In order to evaluate either the war-
rant for that alarm or the proposed methods of quieting it, a
review of the relevant history and current reality is in order.
A. THE INCREASINGLY MULTISTATE NATURE OF THE PRACTICE
OFLAW
The latter half of the Twentieth Century has witnessed the
development of national markets for many goods and services.
Not surprisingly, this developing integration of the American
economy has had a noticeable impact on the legal profession.
As early as 1975, commentators began to observe that law
practice was becoming increasingly multijurisdictional, 20 creating
at least the possibility that a lawyer's conduct in a single mat-
ter might be judged by the standards of more than one juris-
diction.
That lawyers now regularly practice across state lines is
beyond dispute, despite the unfortunate dearth of useful em-
pirical data measuring the extent or nature of that practice.21
Personal mobility, the elimination of residency require-
ments,2 and the advent of the multistate bar exam all have
20. See Brakel & Loh, supra note 6, at 699.
21. See Daly, supra note 11, at 725 n.23 (describing the absence of statis-
tically useful descriptive data about the legal profession). As Professor Daly
notes, id., the principal source of such data is the periodically published Law-
yer Statistical Report, BARBARAA. CURRAN & CLARA N. CARSON, THE LAWYER
STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1990s (1994)
[hereinafter LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT].
22. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Mobility Status of the Population by
Selected Characteristics: 1992, reprinted in STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 31 tbl.32 (1994) (classifying the U.S. population according to
mobility status).
23. Before the Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Supreme Court of New
Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985), many states barred nonresidents
from admission to the bar. See WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note
5, § 15.2.3, at 852 (explaining that states commonly required applicants to the
bar to be residents). In Piper, the Court held that such discrimination against
nonresidents violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause, U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 2, cl. 1. Since then, the Court has invoked that clause to strike down a
1997]
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contributed to an increase in the number of lawyers admitted
in more than one state.24 Whatever the nature of their prac-
tice, such lawyers are subject to the authority of more than one
state's disciplinary authority. Multiple admission also increases
the likelihood of a practice that crosses state boundaries. Even
a lawyer admitted in just one state may obtain temporary dual
licensure by admission pro hac vice from a tribunal in another
state, and thereby be subject to more than one set of ethics
standards.
Perhaps more significant than multiple admissions are the
incredible growth in law firms with multistate branch offices 25
and a growing need for litigation and transactional legal services
state supreme court rule permitting state residents but not out-of-staters to
be admitted on motion without taking the bar exam, Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59 (1988), and a Virgin Islands district court rule
requiring one year's residence and a declaration of intent to remain a resident
as a precondition to admission, Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546 (1989).
See also Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987) (using supervisory authority to
strike down federal district-court rule imposing a state residency requirement
for admission to federal district court in that state). Some state restrictions
on nonresidents, however, have thus far remained intact, such as a New York
requirement that a nonresident lawyer maintain a bona fide office in the
state. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 470 (McKinney 1983).
24. See generally Brakel & Loh, supra note 6 (examining the rationale
and effect of regulations and restrictions placed on out-of-state lawyers); Daly,
supra note 11, at 725-42 (discussing the growth of multijurisdictional practice
and its implications). Professor Daly adds "the jurisdictionally untethered
character of contemporary legal education," Daly, supra note 11, at 731
(capitalization omitted), as another cause of multistate admission and multi-
jurisdictional practice, stating that "[1law school curricula unwittingly subvert
state-based regulation of the legal profession through materials and classroom
discussion that minimize or ignore state boundaries," id. at 725; see also id. at
731-732 (supporting multijurisdictional curricula but describing "unintended
consequence" that "law school professors are daily educating their students to
practice in a multijurisdictional environment"). While contemporary legal
education may be blamed or applauded for many things, I am not sure the
growth of multijurisdictional practice is one of them. I suspect that national
law schools had "multijurisdictional curricula" long before the relatively re-
cent growth in multijurisdictional practice. And if regional and local law
schools have only recently adopted such an approach, perhaps their doing so
is a reaction to, rather than a cause of, multijurisdictional practice.
25. Between 1978 and 1983, the number of out-of-state branch offices
tripled. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 190 (1989). In 1991,
nearly three-quarters of the law firms with more than 100 lawyers had offices
in more than one state. See LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 21, at
20. For extended analysis of the growth of the "megafirm" and the impact of
that growth on the practice of law, see generally MARC GALANTER & THOMAS
PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW
FIRM (1991); ROBERT L. NELSON ET AL., LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS'
PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION (1992).
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that cross state lines. Those phenomena, fueled by the continued
integration of the national economy, the mobility of clients, and
the increase in legal specialization,2 6 not only have fostered
multijurisdictional practice but indeed may have begun to cre-
ate a national market for at least some legal services. Moreover,
they create an even greater potential that the rules of multiple
jurisdictions will be applied to singular conduct. Even simple
transactional work or a straightforward piece of commercial litiga-
tion for a client with multistate contacts can have multistate
consequences. If it does, the lawyers involved face the prospect
that their conduct will be judged by the ethical rules of two or
more jurisdictions, whether they physically leave their home
states or not. Similarly, members of multistate law firms may
find their conduct judged not only by the rules of their state of
admission, but also by the rules of the states in which their
branch offices are located. 27
Most descriptions of the growth of multistate practice are
incomplete in that they ignore the fact that the work of many
(or even most) lawyers is confined to one state. The primary
players in the emerging multistate practice of law are large, of-
ten multistate law firms with large, multistate clients. The
lawyers in those firms inevitably engage in conduct with mul-
tistate consequences, and hence may be subject to the conduct
rules of more than one state. There is another "hemisphere" of
the legal profession, however, which consists of lawyers who
primarily represent individuals, not multistate entities.
2 8
Those lawyers are far less likely to engage in conduct with
significant multistate consequences, and hence are far less
26. See David Bradlow, The Changing Legal Environment, 74 ALBA_ J.
72, 73 (1988) (describing the trend toward specialization).
27. Cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
91-360 (1991) (stating that where a firm has one office in a jurisdiction that
permits partnerships with nonlawyers and another office in a jurisdiction that
prohibits such partnerships, lawyers admitted in the latter jurisdiction would
violate that jurisdiction's rules when their partners in the former jurisdiction
brought on a nonlawyer partner or principal).
28. See JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE
SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982). In studying the Chicago bar, Heinz
and Laumann identified "two hemispheres" of practice: lawyers who represent
large organizations and lawyers who represent individuals and small busi-
ness. Id. at 319. The hemispheres differed, the study found, in terms of "the
social origins of the lawyers, the prestige of the law schools they attended,
their career histories and mobility, their social or political values.... [and]
their networks of friends and professional associates." Id. at 319-20.
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likely to be concerned about the problems of uncertainty gen-
erated by multistate practice.
Of course, if the applicable ethical rules from the relevant
multiple jurisdictions are essentially the same, or if they are
too vague either to guide conduct or to form the basis for dis-
cipline, no serious problem arises even for regular multistate
practitioners. But if those ethical rules are both different and le-
gally enforceable, then prudent lawyers will try to determine in
advance of their conduct which jurisdiction's rules will ulti-
mately apply to that conduct. Such choice-of-law analysis be-
comes even more important if the different jurisdictions' rules
contain conflicting commands, for then compliance with one
state's rule means violation of the other, and potential disci-
pline.2 9
B. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE REGULATION OF LEGAL ETHICS:
THE DIVERSIFICATION AND LEGALIZATION OF NORMS
The so-called "balkanization" of legal ethics norms is a
relatively recent phenomenon. Until the adoption of the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969,30 statements of at-
torney ethics generally were not intended to be enforceable le-
gal rules, and perhaps therefore were embraced without sig-
nificant dissent. With the Model Code, and later the Model
Rules, ethics norms became legally enforceable, thereby raising
the stakes of their adoption and increasing the extent to which
individual states deviated from the ABA-expressed norms. As a
result, lawyers engaged in multistate practice have begun to
face the prospect of their conduct being measured against the con-
flicting ethical commands of multiple jurisdictions.
1. The Evolution of Professional Conduct Norms
The legal profession in the United States operated without
a code of professional conduct for the first century of this coun-
29. See infra Part I.B.2.a (discussing inconsistencies among states over
when a lawyer can or must disclose a client's intent to commit a crime).
30. The ABA originally adopted its 1969 ethics standards under the name
"Code of Professional Responsibility." Later, as part of the settlement of an
antitrust suit brought by the U.S. Department of Justice, the ABA added the
limiting term "Model" to the title. See WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcS, supra
note 5, § 2.6.3, at 57. This Article refers to the 1969 standards as, interchangeably,
the "Model Code of Professional Responsibility," the "Model Code," or simply the
"Code."
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try's existence.31 During that time, lawyer discipline was rare,
with control in the hands of local courts and discipline imposed
only sporadically, even for the most egregious conduct.12 The
American Bar Association was organized in 1878, but creating
a uniform set of standards to govern attorney conduct was not
on its early agenda.33 The first state code of ethics was not
adopted until 1887, when the Alabama State Bar Association
established a code based largely on the work of Judge George
Sharswood of Philadelphia and David Hoffman of Baltimore.
3 4
The Alabama Code, which in turn formed the basis for the
adoption of codes in ten other states after 1887, 35 was a largely
aspirational expression of shared professional values, not an
enforceable set of legal rules.
The ABA first attempted a common statement of profes-
sional norms in 1908, when it adopted the Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics.36 The 1908 Canons, drawn largely from the 1887
Alabama Code,37 consisted of thirty-two broadly written exhor-
tations to lawyers that were far more aspirational than pre-
scriptive.38 Indeed, the Canons were not originally adopted as
31. See WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICs, supra note 5, § 2.6.2, at 53-54
(discussing the historical development of the 1908 ABA Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics). As Professor Wolfram notes, several "codes" were written in
the mid-nineteenth century, "but those codes were generally intended for edi-
fication rather than enforcement and had only the authority of their individ-
ual authors behind them." Id. at 53.
32. See id. (citing ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO
MODERN TIMES 184-85, 242, 248 (1953)).
33. See id.
34. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
LAWYERING 13 (2d ed. 1994); WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note
5, § 2.6.2, at 54 n.21; Walter B. Jones, Canons of Professional Ethics, Their
Genesis and History, 7 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 483 (1932).
35. See WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICs, supra note 5, § 2.6.2, at 54
n.21; Jones, supra note 34, at 494.
36. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908).
37. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 34, at 13; WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS, supra note 5, § 2.6.2, at 54 n-21; Jones, supra note 34, at 496-98.
38. The Preamble to the Canons states that they were adopted "as a gen-
eral guide," ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Preamble (1908), and
even a casual reading demonstrates their general and aspirational character,
see, e.g., id. Canon 1 ("It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the
Courts a respectful attitude ... ."); id. Canon 2 ("It is the duty of the Bar to
endeavor to prevent political considerations from outweighing judicial fitness
in the selection ofjudges."); id. Canon 15 ("The lawyer owes 'entire devotion to
the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability'.. . ."); id. Canon 16
("A lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients
from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do .... "); id.
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enforceable legal standards forming the basis for disciplinary
enforcement,39 but rather as "moral and fraternal admonitions." 0
The ABA expanded the Canons to forty-seven by 1937, 1 and
later asserted that the Canons were to serve as "[gluides for
the basis of discipline."42 Throughout their existence the Can-
ons were criticized as too vague and general to be of much use-
ful guidance. Professor Tony Amsterdam offered one of the
more pointed criticisms when he described the Canons as
"vaporous platitudes ... which have somewhat less usefulness
as guides to lawyers in the predicaments of the real world than
do valentine cards as guides to heart surgeons in the operating
room."43 Despite, or perhaps because of, their vague and non-
binding character, the Canons were accepted with "virtually
unchallenged universality" by state courts and bar associations."
That "universality" was of limited import, however, because
the admonitory nature of the Canons left courts as the primary
source of the "law" governing lawyers.45
Canon 17 ("Whatever may be the ill-feeling existing between clients, it should
not be allowed to influence counsel in their conduct and demeanor toward
each other or toward the suitors in the case."); id. Canon 32 ("No client, corpo-
rate or individual, however powerful, nor any cause, civil or political, however
important, is entitled to receive, nor should any lawyer render, any service or
advice involving disloyalty to the law whose ministers we are, or disrespect of
the judicial office, which we are bound to uphold, or corruption of any person
or persons exercising a public office or public trust, or deception or betrayal of
the public.").
39. See WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 5, § 2.6.2, at 54;
see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J.
1239, 1250 (1991) (explaining that the Canons had "no direct legal effect").
40. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyers and Client Fraud. They Still Don't
Get It, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 701, 705 (1993). Professor Hazard describes
the 1908 Canons as "a professional credo but not a set of legal obligations,"
and states that "[ulntil the promulgation of the bar-sponsored Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility in 1970, the courts were the primary source of the law
governing lawyers." Id. at 703.
41. See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR
FOUNDATION ON CANONS OF ETHICS 6-7 (June 30, 1958) [hereinafter 1958
REPORT].
42. Id. at 9.
43. Professional Ethics: Charity & Perjury, TIME, May 13, 1966, at 81
(quoting Professor Anthony Amsterdam), cited in WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS, supra note 5, § 2.6.2, at 55 n.29. Justice Stone was somewhat more
circumspect in his criticism, describing the Canons as "generalizations de-
signed for an earlier era." Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar,
48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1934).
44. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 5, § 2.6.1, at 50; see
also HAZARD ET AL., supra note 34, at 13 (explaining how bar associations and
state courts widely recognized the Canons).
45. See Hazard, supra note 40, at 703; see also WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
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By the 1950s, complaints about the Canons' vagueness and
lack of legal effect led to calls for revision or replacement. 6 In
1964, responding to those complaints, then-ABA president
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., appointed an ABA committee to study the
Canons and suggest appropriate amendments.4 7 The committee
decided to abandon the format and approach of the Canons,
and offered a Preliminary Draft of the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility in January 1969, followed by a Final
Draft on July 1, 1969."8 The Final Draft was adopted with no
changes by the ABA House of Delegates on August 12, 1969.49
Recognizing that the Model Code could achieve the force of law
only when adopted in a jurisdiction by an arm of the state," the
ABA appointed a special adoption committee whose mission was
to persuade the states to adopt the Code. 1 The adoption
ETHICS, supra note 5, § 2.6.1, at 50 (noting that "the Canons were widely ig-
nored or superfluous for many regulatory purposes").
46. See, e.g., 1958 REPORT, supra note 41, at 96 (concluding that "the pre-
sent Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association do not
provide adequate standards of professional conduct for members of the Bar");
Philbrick McCoy, The Canons of Ethics: A Reappraisal by the Organized Bar,
43 A-B-AL J. 38 (1957) (explaining the American Bar Foundation's plan to re-
appraise the Canons).
47. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 34, at 13. See generally John F. Sut-
ton, Jr., The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility: An
Introduction, 48 TEx. L. REV. 255, 255 (1970) (discussing the deficiencies in
the Canons and the process by which they were revised between 1964 and
1969). On several earlier occasions, ABA committees had been assigned re-
sponsibility for evaluating and amending the Canons. See ABA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMILITY Preface (1976).
48. See Sutton, supra note 47, at 255. According to Professor Sutton, the
reporter for the committee that produced the Model Code, both the prelimi-
nary draft and the final draft were proposed by the committee without dis-
sent. See id. at 255 n2.
49. See id. at 255. The House of Delegates simultaneously repealed the
ABA Canons of Ethics. See id.; see also Association's House of Delegates
Meets, 55 A.B_ J. 970 (1969) (summarizing the annual meeting of the ABA
governing body, August 11-13, 1969).
50. This point was sometimes lost on ABA ethics committees, which from
time to time made "extravagant and insupportable claims" for the legal effect
of the Canons. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 5, § 2.6.2, at 55
n.31; see, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Grievances, Formal Op.
142 (1935) (stating that Canons override contrary state statutes); ABA Comm.
on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 203 (1940) (stating that
Canons prohibit lawyers who limit their practice to the U.S. Patent Office
from advertising, despite federal statute that permits such advertising).
51. See WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 5, § 2.6.3, at 56;
Sutton, supra note 47, at 256 n.8; see also Report of Special Committee to Se-
cure Adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 97 ANN. REP. ABA
268 (1972) (reporting the rapid acceptance of the Model Code by states).
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committee was enormously successful, and by 1972 it reported
that all but three states had taken steps to adopt the Model
Code. 2 Two of the three remaining states adopted the Model
Code in short order, and even California, which never adopted
the Model Code, borrowed from it heavily. 3 Although not all
states enacted the Model Code verbatim, and a few made
changes of some significance, 54 the ABA initially came close to
achieving its goal of national uniformity."
While the Model Code rested on many of the same princi-
ples as the Canons, its structure and intended import were
fundamentally different. 6 In particular, the Model Code made
the leap from fraternal aspirational norms to an enforceable
legal code, beginning what Geoffrey Hazard has described as
the "legalization" of the profession's governing standards.
While the Model Code included "Canons" and "Ethical Consid-
erations" that, like the 1908 Canons, were intended to be ad-
monitory, at its heart were the black-letter "Disciplinary
Rules," violation of which was to result in disciplinary adjudi-
cation and sanctions. The Preliminary Statement to the Model
Code stated: "The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Con-
siderations, are mandatory in character. [They] state the
minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall with-
out being subject to disciplinary action.... [They] should be
uniformly applied to all lawyers, regardless of the nature of
their professional activities."58 The Model Code, in other
words, sought to pronounce not only ethical norms but also en-
52. See Report of Special Committee to Secure Adoption of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, supra note 51 at 268.
53. See WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 5, § 2.6.3, at 56-57.
54. See id. at 56 (noting that some states declined to adopt the ethical
considerations); Ritts, supra note 6, at 18 (reporting that some state authori-
ties made important changes to the Model Code before adopting it).
55. See Burbank, supra note 7, at 972; O'Brien, supra note 6, at 679.
56. See Hazard, supra note 39, at 1246-52 (comparing individual provi-
sions of the Code with corresponding Canons).
57. Id. at 1249. Part of the motivation for a more concrete and "law-like"
set of professional standards may have been the concern that unless lawyers
themselves engaged in meaningful self-regulation, other potential regulators
might step in. See Richard Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical
Rules?, 59 TEx. L. REV. 639, 667 (1981) (arguing that ABA rules are designed
to legitimate lawyers' relative freedom from outside control); David B. Wilk-
ins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REv. 801, 802 n.10, 803
(1992); Zacharias, supra note 7, at 338-39 & n.10.
58. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary State-
ment 1 (1979).
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forceable legal rules, dramatically increasing the significance
of the Code's content.
That increased significance lead to increased scrutiny, serious
dissent, and, ultimately, a new set of rules. Despite the Model
Code's nearly uniform initial acceptance by the states, com-
mentators were quick to point out significant flaws. 9 As a result,
the ABA adopted amendments to the Code every year between
1974 and 1980, several of which were rejected or substantially
modified by a large majority of states.60 By 1977, the problems
were serious enough that a committee was appointed to study
overhauling the Code. This committee, called the Kutak
Commission after its chair, recommended the adoption of yet
another new approach, the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct.
Unlike the Model Code, the Model Rules evoked contro-
versy and dissent from the outset, even before they were finally
adopted by the ABA House of Delegates and sent out to the
states.6 1 The first draft of the Model Rules, which was leaked
to the press in August 1979, revealed that the Kutak Commission
intended a "bold reworking" of the Code, proposing major
changes not just in the structure62 but also in the substance of
the rules on confidentiality, pro bono work, advertising and so-
licitation, conflicts of interest, and disclosure during litigation
and negotiation.63 This ambitious approach was met with a
59. See generally Symposium, The American Bar Association Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, 48 TEx. L. REV. 255 (1970) (describing the history,
objectives, and form of the new code).
60. See WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcs, supra note 5, § 2.6.3, at 57.
61 See, e.g., Abel, supra note 57, at 639 (postulating that the Model Rules
would fail); Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective
on Professional Codes, 59 TEX L. REV. 689, 689-92 (1981) (commenting on the
controversy stemming from the creation of the Rules); Ted Sctneyer, Profes-
sionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677, 678 (1989) (describing drafting and adop-
tion of Model Rules as "the most sustained and democratic debate about
professional ethics in the history of the American bar"); Alexander Unkovic,
The Current Format of the Code of Professional Responsibility Should Be
Amended, Not Abandoned, 26 VILL. L. REV. 1191 (1981) (arguing against the
wholesale revision of the Code).
62. In terms of structure, the Model Rules took the "legalization" begun
by the Model Code a step further, eliminating aspirational Canons and Ethi-
cal Considerations and using instead a "restatement" format-black letter
rules with official commentary.
63. See WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICs, supra note 5, § 2.6.4, at 61;
see also Schneyer, supra note 61, at 700-03.
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great deal of alarm and some outrage, 6 and resulted in fully
formed, self-described counterproposals from other organizations
65
and successively milder drafts of the Model Rules.6 6 The proc-
ess within the ABA was finally completed in August 1983,
when the ABA House of Delegates amended and then approved
the Rules by a divided vote,67 with the recommendation to
states that the Model Rules replace their existing versions of
the Model Code.6 8
The controversy surrounding the Model Rules did not
abate following House of Delegates approval. Understanding
that these Rules had "real bite," people unhappy with the final
ABA product continued the debate in their own states, arguing
for a return to earlier Kutak Commission drafts, other signifi-
cant amendments, or outright rejection.69 While the ABA's pro-
fessed goal was uniform state adoption of the Model Rules, ° a
member of the ABA Special Committee on Implementation of
the Model Rules offered as a selling point for the Model Rules
the invitation to "shape these rules to your own states when
you get home."7' While 39 states have now adopted codes
based on the structure and content of the Model Rules, every
one of those states has acted on that invitation and made some
modification to the ABA's model.7
64. See Schneyer, supra note 61, at 702-03 & n.151.
65. See id. at 708-14 (discussing alternative drafts prepared by or on be-
half of American Trial Lawyers Association and National Organization of Bar
Counsel).
66. See WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 5, § 2.6.4, at 61.
67. See id. at 62.
68. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 34, at 15.
69. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
§ AP4:101, at 1256-57 (2d ed. Supp. 1994). In addition, at the time the ABA
recommended state adoption of the Model Rules, "many states had only re-
cently adopted the Code, and there was substantial hesitance on the part of
many jurisdictions to switch ethics codes again so rapidly." Ritts, supra note
6, at 18.
70. See ABA Committee on Counsel Responsibility, supra note 6, at 1235
("establishment of uniform rules to the maximum extent feasible [was] the
original driving force behind proposal of the Model Rules").
71. Vicki Quade, New Ethics Code Now Is Up to the States, 9 B. LEADER,
Nov.-Dec. 1983, at 25 (quoting Michael Franck).
72. See JOHN S. DZIENKOwSKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES 142 (1995).
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2. Current Disparity
A brief review of the extent and nature of the current dis-
parity in lawyer-conduct standards will help put in perspective
both the prevailing description of the problem posed for law-
yers and proposed solutions. Though the Model Rules and their
amendments have not been uniformly adopted, and some state
amendments have been significant, those amendments typically
involve a small number of rules and take a limited number of
forms.73 In other words, those states adopting some version of
the Model Rules have adopted the vast bulk of the text without
change. The great majority of state amendments concern either
confidentiality or information about legal services (advertising
and solicitation).74 Most of the rest address details about fees
or particular conflict-of-interest situations.75 In terms of the
states that have adopted the Model Rules, therefore, the level
of disparity in adopted standards is not as great as advertised.
Of course, the substantial number of states that still retain
some version of the Model Code increase the diversity of stan-
dards. Moreover, in some areas even identically worded rules
may be interpreted differently in different jurisdictions, creating
nonuniformity out of uniform language. Finally, the diversity
picture is not complete without reference to the remarkably
haphazard federal court approach to setting lawyer-conduct
standards.
a. State Variations in Text
The most amended provision of the Model Rules has been
Rule 1.6,76 which states the Rules' basic confidentiality princi-
ple and sets out the main exceptions. Lawyers and scholars
have long debated the appropriate scope of attorney-client con-
fidentiality, particularly with respect to revealing future client
crimes,77 and that debate was given full voice during both the
73. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 69, § AP4:102.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. § AP4:103.
77. See generally MONROE FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN AD-
VERSARY SYSTEM 6 (1975) (distinguishing an attorney's duty when possessing
knowledge of a past crime with knowledge of a future crime); Harry Subin,
The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent Harm, 70
IOWA L. REV. 1091, 1101 (1985) (discussing the balance of attorney confiden-
tiality and disclosure); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA
L. REV. 351, 354-55 (1989) (suggesting that strict confidentiality rules are con-
trary to public and professional interests). Compare Marvin Frankel, The
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Kutak Commission drafting process and the debates in the
House of Delegates. 8 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that
the states adopting the Model Rules have not agreed on a uni-
form version of Model Rule 1.6.
A brief review of the Rule's history both reveals the diver-
sity of views on the subject and helps explicate the resulting
state resolutions. The Model Code provision on confidential-
ity-Disciplinary Rule 4-101-states the general rule that "a
lawyer shall not knowingly ... reveal a confidence or secret of
[a] client,"79 and then provides for specific exceptions, including
permissive disclosure when required by law, or of a client's in-
tention to commit any crime. 0 The version of Rule 1.6 presented
by the Kutak Commission to the ABA House of Delegates con-
tained a somewhat broader statement of the confidentiality
principle: "A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to
representation of a client .... -", Its exceptions were both
broader and more limited than those in the Model Code, in-
cluding permissive disclosure (1) to comply with other law, (2)
to prevent a client from committing a crime or fraud that would
cause substantial harm to the person or financial interests of a
third person, and (3) to rectify the consequences of a client's
crime or fraud in which the lawyer's services had been used. 2
The Proposed Final Draft exceptions for compliance with
other law, for prevention of crime or fraud involving only sub-
stantial financial harm, and for rectifying the consequences of
past crime or fraud all proved controversial, and all were re-
jected by the ABA House of Delegates.8 3 As a result, Model
Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1057-58 (1975)
(arguing that the legal system would improve if lawyers were required to dis-
close all information favorable to client's adversary), with H. Richard Uviller,
The Advocate, the Truth and Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to Judge Frankel's
Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1081-82 (1975) (maintaining that the adversary
system is an effective method for reconstructing truth).
78. The drafting history of Model Rule 1.6 is described by HAZARD &
HODES, supra note 69, §§ 1.6:101, at 109-14. See also Schneyer, supra note
62, at 681-724 (chronicling the development of the Model Rules).
79. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNSIBILITY DR 4-101(B) (1980).
80. See id. DR 4-101(C)(2)-(3). The other exceptions are for client con-
sent, see id. DR 4-101(C)(1), and in connection with fee disputes and lawyer
"self-defense," see id. DR 4-101(C)(4).
81. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (Proposed Final
Draft 1981).
82. See id. The other exceptions permitted disclosure in connection with
fee disputes and "self-defense" against charges made about the lawyer's con-
duct. Id.
83. See Charles W. Wolfram, Parts and Wholes: The Integrity of the Model
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Rule 1.6 as adopted by the ABA permits disclosure only to pre-
vent a client from committing a crime likely to result in immi-
nent death or serious bodily injury, and in fee disputes and
"self-defense" situations 4 Recognizing that the resulting rule
"was so nearly absolute as to be unworkable," 5 Model Rules
reporter Geoffrey Hazard added, and the House of Delegates
adopted, the infamous "notice of withdrawal" comment to the
rule, 6 effectively allowing lawyers to put others on notice of
possible crimes or fraud committed by the client without di-
rectly revealing a client confidence.
The states that have adopted some version of the Model
Rules have taken one of four basic approaches to Rule 1.6. A
substantial number of states restored some or all of the Kutak
Commission's language permitting disclosure to rectify harm,
comply with other law, or prevent future client misconduct
threatening substantial harm to financial interests.8 7  Other
states adopted the ABA version without amendment. 88 Still
others retained the Model Code approach to future misconduct,
permitting disclosure of a client's intent to commit any crime.8 9
Finally, several states mandated revealing client confidences with
respect to certain future crimes.90 The disparity in permissive
Rules, 6 GEo. J. LEG. ETHICS 861, 866 & n.15 (1993). In 1991, the ABA's
House of Delegates considered and rejected a proposed amendment to Model
Rule 1.6 that would have permitted, but not required, disclosure "to rectify
the consequences of a client's criminal fraudulent act in the commission of
which the lawyer's services had been used." See Hazard, supra note 40, at 721
(citing the ABA House of Delegates, Transcript of Proceedings, August 12,
1991, at 8).
84. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1995).
85. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 69, § AP4:103, at 1260.
86. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) cmt. 16 (1995)
("Neither this rule nor Rule 1.8(b) nor Rule 1.16(d) prevents the lawyer from
giving notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer may also withdraw or
disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like."); see Schneyer, supra
note 61, at 723 (describing Hazard's responsibility for the commentary). See
generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud: Death and
Revival of a Professional Norm, 33 EMORY L.J. 271, 298-304 (1984) (discussing
Model Rule 1.6 and notice.of-withdrawal comment); Ronald D. Rotunda, The
Notice of Withdrawal and the New Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
Blowing the Whistle and Waving the Red Flag, 63 OR. L. REV. 455, 471-84
(1984) (same).
87. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 69, § AP4:103 (listing states).
88. According to the National Reporter on Legal Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, five states, Alabama, Delaware, Louisiana, Missouri and Mon-
tana, adopted Rule 1.6 without amendment. See Natl Rep. Legal Ethics
(Univ. Pub. Am.) (1996).
89. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 69, § AP4:103, at 1261.
90. See id. § AP:104, at 1262. Of the ten states in this category, six re-
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disclosure standards is likely to have little practical effect; even
"[i]n states that permit disclosure of any contemplated crime,
the vast majority of lawyers will quite properly refuse to take
that option in all but the most dire circumstances." Lawyers
have practiced since 1970 under the permissive disclosure
scheme of the Model Code, "yet there are few reported in-
stances of disclosure, let alone unwarranted disclosure."92
Even the mandatory disclosure of future crimes threatening
death or serious bodily injury is unlikely to operate differently
from a rule that permits but does not require disclosure: "So
long as lawyers are not prohibited from revealing the threat,
moral duty will ordinarily convert 'may reveal' into 'must re-
veal.' 93
The one variation on Rule 1.6 that harbors significant
practical consequences is the mandatory disclosure of future
client misconduct that does not threaten death or serious bod-
ily injury. Four states have adopted such a requirement. Two
states, New Jersey and Wisconsin, require disclosure when a
client threatens the substantial financial interests of another.94
The other two states, Florida and Virginia (in its revision of the
Model Code), require disclosure of a client's intent to commit
any crime.95 These more radical disclosure requirements sug-
gest a markedly different view of the lawyer's role than that of-
fered by even the expansive permissive disclosure of the Model
Code.
The other principal area of substantial state variation falls
under Part 7 of the Model Rules, "Information about Legal
Services." The law of lawyer advertising and solicitation has
quire disclosure in the case of client conduct threatening death or serious
bodily injury. See id. at 1263.
91. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 69, § AP4:103, at 1262.
92. Id.
93. Id. § AP4:104, at 1262.
94. See NEW JERSEY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)
(1997); WISCONSIN RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS Sup.
Ct. Rule 20:1.6(b) (1997).
95. See FLORIDA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-1.6(b)(1)
(1997); VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(D)(1)
(1996). To appreciate the significance of these differences, suppose L repre-
sents C in connection with C's efforts to secure a bank loan. Shortly before
the closing of the loan, L learns that C has materially overstated C's assets to
the bank Model Rule 1.6 would prohibit L from disclosing to the bank C's in-
tended fraud, while Disciplinary Rule 4-101(c)(3) would permit, but not re-
quire, L to make such disclosure. The confidentiality rules adopted by Flor-
ida, New Jersey, Virginia, and Wisconsin, in contrast, would require
disclosure to the bank.
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been profoundly shaped by the commercial speech decisions of
the United States Supreme Court.96 The Court has used law-
yer advertising and solicitation as a significant vehicle in the
development of commercial speech doctrine, and since 1977 has
limited states' ability to restrict the way lawyers seek to attract
clients.97 The ABA responded to and attempted to account for
the Court's decisions both in the 1983 version of the Model
Rules and in several subsequent amendments.98 The states
have been somewhat less swift to respond, and their responses
have ranged from the generally permissive to "regulating
whatever it... [is] still constitutionally permissible to regu-
late."9 9 Even among the states still aggressively regulating ad-
vertising and solicitation, there are important differences in
detail, particularly with respect to mailings to prospective cli-
ents"o and claims of specialization in advertisements.101
The foregoing focus on the two most widespread areas of
state variation on the text of the Model Rules is not meant to
suggest that there are not other noteworthy disparities. In the
areas of conflicts of interest and imputed disqualification, for
example, important state differences create potential choice-of-
law problems for the multistate practitioner."°2 The point is
96. See generally LOUISE L. HILL, LAWYER ADVERTISING 57-82 (1993)
(analyzing Supreme Court decisions involving the commercial speech of law-
yers).
97. See, e.g., Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of
Illinois, 496 U.S. 91 (1990) (holding that a lawyer has a First Amendment
right to advertise certification as a specialist as long as advertisement is not
misleading); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (holding that
First Amendment bars prohibition of "targeted" mailings directed at persons
"Iknown to need legal services"); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,
471 U.S. 626 (1985) (holding, inter alia, that an attorney cannot be disciplined
for soliciting business through truthful, non-deceptive printed advertising);
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (establishing that lawyer
advertising is commercial speech entitled to some First Amendment protec-
tion).
98. See HILL, supra note 96, at 73-82.
99. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 69, § AP4:106, at 1267.
100. See id. at 1267-69.
101. See Zacharias, supra note 7, at 347 n.55. For example, Model Rule 7.4
permits lawyers to advertise the fields in which they practice, while sharply
limiting their ability to claim the status of "specialist." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.4 (1995). Some states, such as Delaware,
place limits even on the advertisement of areas of practice. See, e.g.,
DELAWARE LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.5(a) (1997)
(requiring that field of practice claimed in advertisements constitutes at least
25% of the advertising lawyer's practice).
102. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 69, at § AP4:102; Roach, supra note
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that we should be careful not to exaggerate the extent to which
the substance of lawyer-conduct standards varies among the
states. Most states' rules are close to identical, in substance if
not in precise language.
b. State Variations in Interpretation
A fair description of the extent of the "balkanization" of
ethics codes must include the contribution of inconsistent in-
terpretation of identically or similarly worded rules. Even
where two states (or virtually all states) have adopted the same
language, judicial interpretation of that language may vary
significantly from state to state. Perhaps the best example of
such interpretive disparity is the no-contact rule-the venerable
ban on ex parte communications by attorneys with adverse rep-
resented parties. Before it was amended in August 1995,
Model Rule 4.2 provided: "In representing a client, a lawyer
shall not communicate about the subject of the representation
with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another
lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the
other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so."" 3 Rule 4.2 was
taken almost word-for-word from Model Code Disciplinary Rule
7-104(a),' ° and while several states have amended the rule,10 5
inconsistent interpretations of identical language, rather than
amendments to the model language, account for most of the
rule's interstate nonuniformity. The range and history of those
inconsistent interpretations has been well documented else-
where, particularly in the context of the long and often bitter
debate over whether and to what extent the no-contact rule
6, at 910-11, 913-14.
103. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1983). The 1995
amendment to Rule 4.2 changed the word "party" to "person." MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1995).
104. DR 7-104 provides in relevant part:
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall
not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the sub-ject of the representation with a party he knows to be repre-
sented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior consent
of the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by
law to do so.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(1) (1969).
105. See STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF
LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 268-70 (1997). But see Todd S. Schul-
man, Note, Wisdom Without Power: The Department of Justice's Attempt to
Exempt Federal Prosecutors from State No-Contact Rules, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1067, 1074 (1996) ("Te text of the rule varies little between states.").
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should apply to federal prosecutors." 6 For present purposes, it
is enough to note that courts have offered inconsistent inter-
pretations of several aspects of the no-contact rule, including
whether it applies at all to criminal litigation, 7 whether it
applies to investigative activity that precedes the filing of a
complaint or indictment,10 8 how it applies to the employees and
former employees of an adversary corporation,10 9 and what the
rule means by "authorized by law."110 As a source of uncer-
tainty for multistate practitioners, this interpretive disparity
may be as important as the textual variation described
above.111
c. Federal Court Variations
The diversification of lawyer-conduct standards has not
been confined to the states. Professor Daniel Coquillette, in a
study for the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of
the Judicial Conference of the United States, has demonstrated
the remarkably fragmentary nature of local federal district
court rules governing attorney conduct.112 The majority of fed-
106. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and
Federal Prosecutors: The Controversies of the Anti-Contact and Subpoena
Rules, 53 U. PrIT. L. REV. 291, 318-59 (1992); Rory K. Little, Who Should
Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 367-75
(1996); Schulman, -supra note 105, at 1076-81.
107. See Alafair S.R. Burke, Note, Reconciling Professional Ethics and
Prosecutorial Power: The No-Contact Rule Debate, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1635,
1639-42 (1994) (describing lack of consensus among both courts and commen-
tators in applying the no-contact rule in the criminal context).
108. See Cramton & Udell, supra note 106, at 333-38 (describing inconsis-
tent interpretations of the rule, particularly the terms "party" and "subject of
the representation," to include and not include activity preliminary to the fil-
ing of an indictment or complaint).
109. See Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should
Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should the Rules Be Created?, 64
GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 460, 525 n.328 (1996) (describing "range of inconsistent
tests to determine which present and former officers and employees of a cor-
poration may or may not be contacted under this rule").
110. Cramton & Udell, supra note 106, at 346-49 (describing inconsistent
interpretations of the "authorized by law" exception to the rule).
11L See Green, supra note 109, at 524 (contending that "the professional
literature addressing the problem of 'balcanization'... exaggerate[s] the ex-
tent to which the substance of ethical rules varies among jurisdictions and
overlook[s] the greater extent to which 'balkanization! results from inconsis-
tent interpretations of similarly worded rules").
112. See DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, REPORT ON LOCAL RULES REGULATING
ATTORNEY CONDUCT (July 5, 1995) [hereinafter COQUILLETME REPORT] (on file
with author); see also Amy R. Mashburn, A Clockwork Orange Approach to
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eral district courts incorporate by local rule the conduct rules
of the state in which they sit, thereby inheriting state-based
balkanization.13 Other districts have taken a variety of ap-
proaches, including adoption of the ABA Model Rules or Model
Code (even if different from the local state version), adoption of
both an ABA model and state standards (without recognizing
or resolving conflicts between the two), and failure to adopt any
local rule at all.'1 4 As a result, lawyers engaged in multistate
practice must be aware not only of state-to-state disparity in
conduct rules, but of state-federal and federal-federal disparity
as well.
d. Disparity Outside the Rules
Finally, any assessment of lawyer uncertainty in an era of
multijurisdictional practice should recognize that the ethics
codes form only a small part of the law governing lawyers. The
other relevant law includes not only that which applies specifi-
cally to lawyers, such as malpractice law and the rules of civil
and criminal procedure, but also law of general applicability,
like tort and criminal law. In our federal system, that "other"
law is most often state law, and as such it frequently varies
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction."5
3. Increased Enforcement
At the same time that professional conduct standards were
becoming both increasingly diverse and more "law-like," pro-
fessional discipline was becoming better funded and more pro-
fessional, and civil suits for legal malpractice were becoming
more common. In 1970, the ABA Clark Committee recom-
mended dramatic changes in the undeveloped structure of dis-
ciplinary enforcement,116 which until then had been controlled
Legal Ethics: A Conflicts Perspective on the Regulation of Lawyers by Federal
Courts, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 473 (1995); Linda S. Mullenix, Multiforum
Federal Practice: Ethics and Erie, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 89 (1995).
113. See CoQUILLETTE REPORT, supra note 112, at 2.
114. See id. at 3-4.
115. See infra Part H (explaining that interstate disparity in legal norms is
both common and inevitable in the American federal system). The law of legal
malpractice, perhaps the best example of "other" state-based law governing
lawyers, is not entirely uniform. While in most respects states treat the ac-
tion consistently, their treatment of at least three important issues-third-
party claims, the relevance of professional rules, and the statute of limitations-
varies widely. See Symposium, Legal Malpractice, 61 TEMPLE L. REv. 1045
(1988).
116. See ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY EN-
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by bar committees staffed by volunteer lawyers, and had fo-
cused largely on removing the few lawyers deemed unfit to
practice."' Following the Clark Committee report, disciplinary
staffs became more professional, disciplinary rates and expen-
ditures per lawyer rose dramatically, and use of sanctions
short of disbarment became more prevalent. 18 During the
same period, legal malpractice claims multiplied,119 as the
"professional conspiracy" against suing lawyers began to break
down.120 This increased enforcement of ethics norms has mark-
edly elevated the significance of the contemporaneous diversifi-
cation of those ethics norms.
C. THE RESULTING PROBLEM AS PERCEIVED BY THE BAR AND
COMMENTATORS
According to the rhetoric of the organized bar, the increas-
ing diversity in conduct rules and the growth of multijurisdic-
tional practice have created an "increasingly serious problem"
that poses "grave difficulties" for multistate practitioners. 121
Lawyers' inability to determine in advance which of several in-
consistent rules might later be applied to their conduct
"undermines compliance with legal ethics codes.""n Commen-
tators, lamenting the "critical level of interstate disparity in
professional ethics,"123 complain that lawyers' "ability to find
guidance in a single state's code of conduct has virtually disap-
peared,"124 explain that law firms are "bedeviled" by conflicting
standards that might apply to a team of multiply-admitted
FORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY EN-
FORCEMENT (1970) (named after its chair, retired Justice Tom C. Clark of the
United States Supreme Court).
117. See Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 20-22 (1991) (explaining that, prior to the Clark report,
disciplinary agencies were typically underfunded and discipline was thought
of largely as a way to purge the profession of particularly egregious offenders).
118. See id.
119. See John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibil-
ity, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 101, 101 n.1 (1995) (citing sources discussing growth
and development of legal malpractice litigation).
120. See Hazard, supra note 40, at 715 (documenting the "emerging trans-
formation" of the legal profession in the late 1960s and early 1970s).
121. ABA Committee on Counsel Responsibility, supra note 6, at 1229,
1232.
122. Roach, supra note 6, at 908.
123. Developments in the Law-Lawyers' Responsibilities and Lawyers' Re-
sponses, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1547, 1584 (1994) [hereinafter Responsibilities
and Responses].
124. Zacharias, supra note 7, at 344.
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practitioners working on a single transaction, 125 and predict
that inconsistency in state ethics rules will harm the attorney-
client relationship. 
1 26
These calls to alarm typically are justified by hypotheticals
illustrating the few state ethical rules that are in direct con-
flict. By far the most popular scenario concerns inconsistent con-
fidentiality rules and involves some variation of the following:
Lawyer L is admitted to practice in states A and B. L,
representing a client that does business in both states,
learns that the client intends to commit a fraud that
could result in serious financial injury to a third party
that also has contacts in both states. State A, like
Delaware, has adopted Model Rule 1.6 without amend-
ment, and so prohibits disclosure of the client's intent.
State B, like New Jersey, has adopted a version of Rule
1.6 that requires L to reveal this client fraud. If L
complies with state A's rule and remains silent, she
may later be disciplined by state B for violation of its
rule. If L decides to comply with state B's rule and dis-
closes the intended fraud, she may later be disciplined
by state A.127
Sometimes the facts are massaged to increase complexity,
so for example L may become a team of lawyers with multiple
admissions working for a multistate law firm.' 21 But whatever
the formulation, the hypothetical successfully illustrates that
state-to-state disparity of confidentiality standards can create
a situation where two potentially applicable rules create con-
flicting obligations. It is worth noting, however, that this sort
of "conflict of obeisance"' 2 9-where compliance with one state's
rule would mean violation of another state's rule, and vice
versa-is largely limited to the area of attorney-client confi-
dentiality and exists only as a result of the rules in four
states. 3 ' In other words, while the hypothetical ably captures
125. Daly, supra note 11, at 798.
126. Susanna Felleman, Note, Ethical Dilemmas and the Multistate Law-
yer: A Proposed Amendment to the Choice-of-Law Rule in the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1500, 1509 (1995).
127. See the examples provided in ABA Committee on Counsel Responsi-
bility, supra note 6, at 1233-34; Daly, supra note 11, at 717-18; Felleman, su-
pra note 126, at 1500-01; Zacharias, supra note 7, at 347 n.52.
128. See Daly, supra note 11, at 717.
129. Richard M. Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalization of the In-
ternal Affairs Doctrine in Corporation Law, 75 CAL. L. REv. 29, 36 (1987).
130. See supra Part I.B.2.a. Lawyers may face conflicts of obeisance in one
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the fact that lawyers may on occasion face serious choice-of-law
problems with respect to their own conduct (problems not un-
like those they get paid to address for their clients), it does not
describe a problem of epic proportions.
Of course, the other inconsistencies in state conduct
rules-"two-hurdle" conflicts that do not create directly con-
flicting obligations' 31-are not without cost. While generally
lawyers can avoid violating two or more potentially applicable
standards by complying with the more onerous standard (the
higher hurdle), such compliance is at the expense of the policy
of the state with the lower hurdle. 32 So, for example, where
one state makes the normative decision to give a lawyer dis-
cretion to disclose a particular client confidence, that policy
choice is subverted if a multistate lawyer feels compelled by
the rule of another state to keep the confidence. 133 But here
again, just because the problem is easy to illustrate with well-
constructed hypotheticals does not mean that it has a signifi-
cant impact on the lives of many lawyers.
D. EXISTING PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The problem of uncertainty over which conduct rules to
follow has generated two types of proposed solutions. The first
seeks to eliminate the diversity of conduct standards by imposing
uniform standards at the national level. The second attempts
to mTinimize lawyer uncertainty by creating a model choice-of-
law rule for state adoption.
1. Creating Uniform National Standards for All Lawyers
The relevant literature of the last several years includes
increasing reference to the prospect of uniform national rules
that would govern the conduct of all lawyers in all practice
settings. A recent Developments Note in the Harvard Law Re-
other area-lawyer advertising. See infra note 381 (explaining that advertis-
ing raises particularly difficult issues, especially because it is often cross-
jurisdictional).
131. Buxbaum, supra note 129, at 36.
132. See ABA Committee on Counsel Responsibility, supra note 6, at 1234.
133. Compare, e.g., PENNSYLVANIA RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.6(c)(1) (1997) (permitting disclosure of confidences to prevent "the client
from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in
death or substantial injury to the financial or property interests of another")
with MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1995)
(permitting disclosure only to prevent "imminent death or substantial bodily
harmr).
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view described "the idea of a federal code of ethics" as "an as
yet undeveloped, but potentially promising reform."13 4 Stephen
Burbank has suggested that it may be "time to think seriously
of a national bar, governed by uniform federal norms of pro-
fessional conduct in all practice contexts." 135 Ted Schneyer has
predicted the ultimate adoption of a "Federal Code of Lawyer-
ing" for all lawyers, along with a federally administered dis-
ciplinary system. 136  Fred Zacharias has given full-length
treatment to the subject of federalizing legal ethics. 137 While
not purporting to offer a detailed vision of the federalization of
professional regulation, Zacharias effectively marshals the ar-
guments in favor of federalization, 138 anticipates and addresses
objections to federalization, 139 and concludes that "some form of
standardized national regulation seems inevitable."14°
The form of national regulation anticipated by these com-
mentators, while not entirely clear, seems to be congressional
adoption of a new, nationally applicable code of lawyer conduct.
Such a code would be enforced at the national level, either
through a newly created federal agency or by the Department
of Justice.11  A national code would eliminate uncertainty
problems created for lawyers by eliminating all disparities in
state codes. Proponents further argue that a national code
would serve to enhance the image of lawyers in the eyes of both
clients and the public generally, because the current disparity
compels inconsistent lawyer conduct that upsets client and
public expectations."
134. Responsibilities and Responses, supra note 123, at 1585-86 n.43.
135. Burbank, supra note 7, at 974. But see id. at 969 ("Federal legislation
preempting state law of professional conduct is conceivable but hardly
likely....").
136. See Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline in 2050: A Look Back, 60
FoRiHAm L. REv. 125 (1991).
137. See Zacharias, supra note 7.
138. See id. at 345-73.
139. See id. at 373-79.
140. Id. at 380.
14L See id. at 378; see also Schneyer, supra note 136, at 125-29 (describing
development of a national disciplinary agency).
142. See Zacharias, supra note 7, at 357-65.
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2. A Choice-of-Law Rule for Lawyer Discipline: Amended
Model Rule 8.5
In 1993, the ABA amended Model Rule 8.5 in an effort to
address the problems of uncertainty faced by multistate law-
yers. The original 1983 version of Rule 8.5 is a rule ofjurisdiction,
not choice of law. It simply states the uncontroversial proposition
that "[a] lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is
subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction al-
though engaged in practice elsewhere.""' The only references
to ethical conflicts in multistate practice are confined to the
comments to the rule, which state:
[21 If the rules of professional conduct in the two jurisdictions differ, princi-
ples of conflict of laws may apply. Similar problems can arise when a lawyer
is licensed to practice in more than one jurisdiction.
[3] Where the lawyer is licensed to practice law in two jurisdictions which
impose conflicting obligations, applicable rules of choice of law may govern
the situation.)" .
The amended version of Model Rule 8.5, entitled
"Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law," directly takes on the
conflicts issue. According to the responsible committee, the
purpose of the amended rule is to establish "relatively simple,
bright-line rules" for the determination of which jurisdiction's
rules should be applied to particular conduct. 145
Subsection (a) of the new Rule 8.5 covers the same ground
as the original rule, providing that any admitting jurisdiction
has authority to discipline its lawyers, no matter where the
conduct in question occurs. 46  Subsection (b) is entirely new,
addressing choice-of-law problems in both the litigation and
transactional contexts. For choice-of-law problems in litigation,
the rules of the forum apply as long as the lawyer has been
143. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5 (1983).
144. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5 cmts. 2, 3 (1983).
The lack of attention to choice-of-law problems in the original version of the
Model Rules might have been expected, given the ABA's hope that the Rules
would be uniformly adopted.
145. ABA Comm. On Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Recommen-
dation and Report to the House of Delegates 4 (1993) [hereinafter Recommen-
dation and Report].
146. The Rule states: "A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is
subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where
the lawyer's conduct occurs. A lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary
authority of both this jurisdiction and another jurisdiction where the lawyer is
admitted for the same conduct." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 8.5(a) (1993).
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admitted in that jurisdiction. 147 For "any other conduct," which
presumably covers both transactional work and conduct related to
litigation in a jurisdiction where the lawyer is not admitted,
the choice-of-law rule depends on whether the lawyer is licensed
in one or multiple jurisdictions. If the lawyer is licensed in
only one jurisdiction, then the rules of that jurisdiction ap-
ply. 148 If the lawyer is admitted in multiple jurisdictions, then
the rules to be applied are those of the jurisdiction in which the
lawyer "principally practices," unless "particular conduct
clearly has its predominant effect in another jurisdiction in
which the lawyer is licensed," in which case the rules of that
jurisdiction apply.' 49
Proponents of federally promulgated uniform conduct
standards and amended Model Rule 8.5 offer them as solutions
to the uncertainty generated by the combination of multistate
practice and diverse state norms. Parts IlI and IV of this Ar-
ticle examine these proposals in light of federalism principles.
Before turning to the solutions, however, this Article assesses
in Part II the relative seriousness of the problem that has
given them life. Lawyers better than anyone should appreciate
that normative variation, and the resulting uncertainty over
which norms apply to what conduct, are inevitable components
of the American federal system. Viewed through the lens of
federalism, the uncertainty that now confronts lawyers appears
147. Rule 8.5(b)(1) states:
[F]or conduct in connection with a proceeding in a court before which
a lawyer has been admitted to practice (either generally or for pur-
poses of that proceeding), the rules to be applied shall be the rules of
the jurisdiction in which the court sits, unless the rules of the court
provide otherwise.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5(b)(1) (1993).
148. Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(i) provides that "if the lawyer is licensed to prac-
tice only in this jurisdiction, the rules to be applied shall be the rules of this
jurisdiction." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5(b)(2)(i)
(1993).
149. Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii) provides in full:
[f the lawyer is licensed to practice in this and another jurisdiction,
the rules to be applied shall be the rules of the admitting jurisdiction
in which the lawyer principally practices; provided, however, that if
particular conduct clearly has its predominant effect in another ju-
risdiction in which the lawyer is licensed to practice, the rules of that
jurisdiction shall be applied to that conduct.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii) (1993).
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far less serious than many have suggested. At worst, it is not
more daunting than that faced much more often by clients.
II. EXAMINING THE PROBLEM THROUGH THE LENS OF
FEDERALISM: DISPARITY AND UNCERTAINTY
IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM
Even a superficial survey of the vast historical, political
science, economics, and legal academic literature on the topic of
federalism reveals that it is many things to many people.
1 50
While there may be some consensus on the broadest and most
basic description of what American federalism "is'--a system
of allocating normative responsibility between the national and
state governments-there has been extraordinary disagree-
ment from the framing of the Constitution until today over the
social, economic, political, and legal consequences of that fed-
eralism. 151 In terms of the contemporary debate, the Supreme
Court's most eloquent tribute to American federalism came in
the relatively recent case of Gregory v. Ashcroft.'52 Justice
O'Connor's encomium to the virtues of federalism has been
matched by equally passionate descriptions of federalism's
vices. While Gregory contends that federalism "increases op-
portunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes, 53
critics respond that it merely entrenches local elites. 154 While
Gregory claims that federalism "makes government more re-
sponsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citi-
zenry," and "assures a decentralized government that will be
150. Larry Kramer has aptly likened talking about federalism to "joining
the proverbial blind men trying to describe an elephant." Larry Kramer, Un-
derstanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1994).
151. Of the foundational principles addressed in The Federalist-
republicanism, separation of powers, federalism, and limited government-
federalism received the least systematic and most ambiguous treatment. See
GEORGE W. CAREY, THE FEDERALIST: DESIGN FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL RE-
PUBLIC 96-125 (1989) (discussing difficulties of The Federalist authors in ar-
ticulating a coherent explanation of federalism).
152. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
153. Id. at 458 (citing Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the
Founders' Design, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 1484, 1491-1511 (1987); Deborah Jones
Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third
Century, 88 COLum. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1988)); see also Lewis B. Kaden, Politics,
Money and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847, 853-
55 (1979) (asserting that federalism promotes public participation).
154. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin & Malcom Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes
on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 915 (1994) ("[Tlhe story of par-
ticipation in state and local government regularly features low voter turnouts,
entrenched elites, and narrow-minded policies.").
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more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous soci-
ety,"155 critics answer that federalism instead creates races to
the bottom at the state level'56 and inhibits autonomy and vari-
ability at the local level. 57 Gregory's assertion that federalism
"allows for more innovation and experimentation in govern-
ment"5 ' is met by the claim that federalism in fact discourages
local experimentation because such experimentation is less
likely without encouragement from the central authority. 59 To
the final and principal benefit of the federal system claimed by
Gregory-that it serves (like the separation of powers) as "a
check on abuses of government power" by diffusing power among
separate sovereigns 6 -- critics respond that far from securing
155. 501 U.S. at 458; see also infra Part III.B.l.a (discussing the advan-
tages of normative diversity among states).
156. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections
Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (arguing that state competition for
corporate charters inhibits important regulatory efforts); Jerry L. Mashaw &
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Federalism and Regulation, in THE REAGAN
REGULATORY STRATEGY 111, 117 (George C. Eads & Michael Fix eds., 1984)
(asserting that competition among states discourages social welfare pro-
grams); see also infra Part III.B.l.c (discussing the effects of competition
among states).
157. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 154, at 918-19.
158. 501 U.S. at 458. Justice Brandeis originated the classic formulation
of the states-as-experimenters argument for federalism: "It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Charles
Fried, Federalism-Why Should We Care?, 6 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 2-3
(1982) (arguing that decentralized political power leads to innovation); Kaden,
supra note 153, at 854-55 (identifying a number of state programs that in-
spired changes in national policy); Merritt, supra note 153, at 9 (noting that
states have validated Justice Brandeis' observation by pioneering new social
and economic programs).
159. See Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurispru-
dence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 411-12 (identifying
obstacles to local innovation that are absent at the national level); Susan
Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Inno-
vation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 614-16 (1980) (arguing that federalism can suc-
cessfully promote local innovation only if the national government offers in-
centives to states).
160. 501 U.S. at 458. The Court explains this point by asserting that "a
healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will
reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front." Id. As the Court rec-
ognized, the authors of The Federalist made the same point over two hundred
years ago. See THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter, ed. 1961) ("If [the people's] rights are invaded by either [the state
government or the general government], they can make use of the other as the
instrument of redress."); Id. NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison):
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liberty, federalism both multiplies the opportunity for govern-
ment tyranny and undermines individual rights by freeing
states from the ameliorating authority of the national govern-
ment.6 1 The impressive list of virtues recited in Gregory has
been supplemented by recent communitarian scholarship, which
claims that federalism promotes community. 62 Federalism's
critics, on the other hand, contend that states are not effective
"communities" in any meaningful sense; that the true social
communities of neighborhoods, towns and civic groups are not
enhanced by federalism; and that in the United States our one
distinct political community is national.1 63
Whether federalism is part of the problem or part of the
solution, one unquestionable consequence of a federal system is
normative variation. Lawmakers with independent authority
are not going to treat every subject in the same way. In the
United States, in virtually every area of the law, states have
exercised their independent lawmaking authority to take dif-
ferent approaches to similar problems. Examples of diverse
In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is
submitted to the administration of a single government; and the
usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into
distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of
America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided be-
tween two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each
subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a dou-
ble security arises to the rights of the people. The different govern-
ments will control each other, at the same time that each will be con-
trolled by itself.
See generally FEDERALISM AND RIGHTS (Ellis Katz & G. Alan Tarr eds., 1996)
(analyzing the relationship between federalism and the protection of individ-
ual rights).
16L See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION,
SIGNIFICANCE 142, 145 (1964) (using the example of southern opposition to
national civil rights laws to highlight weaknesses of federalism); cf Gary Jef-
frey Jacobsohn, Contemporary Constitutional Theory, Federalism, and the
Protection of Rights, in FEDERALISM AND RIGHTS, supra note 160, at 29, 43
("Where rights are involved, local communities have become the problem, not
the solution.").
162. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 154, at 936 (citing Adeno Addis, Indi-
vidualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 67 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 615 (1992); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism,
96 YALE L. J. 1425 (1987); Rapaczynski, supra note 159); see also Joseph P.
Viteritti & Gerald J. Rnssello, Community and American Federalism: Images
Romantic and Real, 4 VA. J. Soc. POLY & LAw 683 (1997) (exploring the rela-
tionship between community and the American federalist system). For a dis-
cussion of how state-level norm setting promotes community for lawyers, see
infra note 345.
163. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 154, at 936-51 (analyzing the efficacy
of federalism in promoting different types of community).
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state approaches are seemingly endless, and include important
issues in criminal law and procedure, 1' torts,165 products liabil-
ity,1 6 property,67 family law, 6 8 commercial law,169 and con-
sumer protection. 70
For the proponents of federalism, the state-based diversity
of norms is a good thing. A defense of this claim comes later,
17
'
but whatever its merits, the tremendous normative variation
in the American federal system is undeniable. Such variation
creates the possibility that interstate actors will face inconsis-
tent or contradictory commands from different jurisdictions,
and may even have to seek legal counsel concerning difficult
questions of choice of law. Indeed, it is the ubiquity of that
variation, coupled with overlapping jurisdiction, that creates con-
flicts of laws and necessitates choice of law. Before proceeding to
the radical cure of nationalizing legal ethics standards, commen-
164. In the area of constitutional criminal procedure, for example, many
states have heeded Justice Brennan's call to grant greater protection to their
citizens than that afforded by the United States Supreme Court. See William
J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Consti-
tutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548 (1986).
For a thorough discussion of the consequences of the resulting disparate state
rules, see James W. Diehm, New Federalism and Constitutional Criminal
Procedure: Are We Repeating the Mistakes of the Past?, 55 MD. L. REV. 223
(1996). For a review of the diverse state approaches to anti-stalking laws, see
Laurie Salame, Note, A National Survey of Stalking Laws: A Legislative
Trend Comes to the Aid of Domestic Violence Victims and Others, 27 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 67, 71-83 (1993).
165. See, e.g., Jacqueline Perczek, Note, On Efficiency, Punishment, Deter-
rence, and Fairness: A Survey of Punitive Damages Law and a Proposed Jury
Instruction, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 825, 838-41 (1993) (discussing substantive
and procedural differences in state laws governing punitive damages).
166. See, e.g., John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American
Law Institute Adorns a "New Cloth" for Section 402A Products Liability De-
sign Defects-A Survey of the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L.
REV. 493 (1996) (comparing treatment of design defect cases under states'
products liability laws).
167. See, e.g., Hertha L. Lund, The Property Rights Movement and State
Legislation, in LAND RIGHTS: THE 1990S' PROPERTY RIGHTS REBELLION 199
(Bruce Yandle ed., 1995) (discussing evolution and diversity of state laws gov-
erning compensation for the taking of private property).
168. See, e.g., Linda D. Elrod, Summary of the Year in Family Law, 27
FAM. L.Q. 485, 510-12 (1994) (discussing differences in state divorce laws con-
cerning division of property).
169. See infra Part II.A (discussing the lack of uniformity in states' adop-
tion of the Uniform Commercial Code).
170. See, e.g., Albert Norman Shelden et al., A Truncated Overview of the
State Consumer Protection Laws, C998 ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATE-
RIALS: PRODUCT DISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING 523, 532-40 (1995).
17L See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the advantages of federalism).
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tators and bar groups alarmed by the current nonuniformity of
such standards would do well to compare them to the nonuniform
state standards faced by nonlawyers every day. To illustrate
the pressure toward normative variation exerted by the federal
system, this Part briefly examines the nonuniformity of the
Uniform Commercial Code, by reputation the most successful
of the "uniform" state-based codes, and then reevaluates the
significance of variations in state ethics codes.
A. FACTS OF LIFE IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM: NONUNIFORMITY AND
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The Uniform Commercial Code has been called "the most
spectacular success story in the history of American law."172
The Code, a joint venture of the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law In-
stitute, was the product of interest in broad and uniform com-
mercial law reform and fear of federal encroachment on
traditional state responsibility for the regulation of commercial
law.173  As its name implies, a central goal of the Uniform
Commercial Code was, and is, uniformity. The Code itself
provides that one of its critical underlying purposes is "to make
uniform the law among the various jurisdictions."174 According
to William Schnader, the man who both "conceived the idea of
a comprehensive commercial code" and sold the idea to the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws,175 uniformity was an even more fundamental goal than
reform:
The Code project was undertaken by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Insti-
tute, to achieve UNIFORMITY in state laws regulating commercial
transactions. It was not undertaken as a project merely to improve
the law; the Act was promulgated not as a model act but as a uniform
act.
76
172. 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 1, at 5 (3d ed. 1988).
173. See generally id. § 1 (discussing the history of the Code project);
WLLM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 278-85
(1973); William A. Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and Enact-
ment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 4-5, 12 (1967)
(discussing the interest in uniform commercial laws and noting the possibility
that Congress could enact a federal commercial code to counteract non-
uniform amendments to the UCC).
174. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c) (1995).
175. See 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 172, at 3.
176. Lawrence J. Bugge, Commercial Law, Federalism and the Future, 17
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But despite the name, the goal, and the praise, "[t]he Uni-
form Commercial Code is not uniform."17 7 Indeed, both the rea-
sons for and extent of the significant disparity in state versions
of the UCC are instructive as we consider the same phenome-
non in the field of conduct standards for lawyers.
While forty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and the
Virgin Islands have all adopted some version of the UCC,7 8
every jurisdiction has modified the official text in some way.179
An entire volume of the leading UCC reporting service is de-
voted to state variations from the official text,8 0 and a brief
review of that volume demonstrates the pervasiveness of those
variations. One sort of variation from the current official text
stems from the fact that there have been a host of amendments
to the official text since the first one was issued in 1952.81
Some states adopting one official text have been unable or
unwilling to upgrade to a newer version, 82 much like the states
that have retained the Model Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity rather than switching to the Model Rules.18 3  Similarly,
state variations have been fostered by periodic amendments of-
fered by the Permanent Editorial Board of the UCC, many of
which have not been uniformly adopted.'" The options in-
cluded in the official text of the Code itself further exacerbate
the lack of uniformity among states."5 Section 2-318, for ex-
DEL. J. CORP. L. 11, 30 (1992) (emphasis in original).
177. 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 172, at 7; see also Gerald T.
McLaughlin, The Evolving Uniform Commercial Code: From Infancy to Ma-
turity to Old Age, 26 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 691, 692-93 (1993) (discussing the
lack of uniformity in commercial law despite the adoption of the UCC).
178. See 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 172, at 5. Louisiana, the only
state not to have adopted the entire code, enacted Articles 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 of
the 1972 Official Text in 1974. See id. It has since adopted Article 9 as well.
See State UCC Variations, U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) at Louisiana-Page 1
(1996).
179. See McLaughlin, supra note 177, at 692 (discussing reasons for the
lack of uniformity in states' treatment of the UCC).
180. State UCC Variations, supra note 178.
18L See Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Introduction to the Uniform Commercial
Code Annual Survey: Some Observations on the Past, Present, and Future of
the U.C.C., 41 Bus. LAw. 1343, 1345-47 (1986), which described the "Official
Texts" of 1952, 1957, 1958, 1962, 1972, and 1978.
182. See I WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 172, at 1 (listing the states that
have enacted each of the official texts).
183. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the development of conduct codes in
the legal profession).
184. See Bugge, supra note 176, at 25-29 (1992) (discussing the history of
amendments to the UCC).
185. See 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 172, at 8 (explaining why the
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ample, offers three alternative provisions concerning third
party beneficiaries of warrantees, 8 6 while section 7-403(1)(b)
allows states to include optional language regarding the bur-
den of proving a bailee's negligence.18 7 States have chosen
freely among these and other official options,"88 much as some
states have adopted the official version of Model Rule of Pro-
fessional Responsibility 1.6 while others have opted for the
earlier Kutak Commission version.18 9
Perhaps the most important source of UCC textual non-
uniformity has been state amendment to the official text.190 Af-
ter Pennsylvania promptly adopted the original Code without
amendment, 191 other states undertook independent study of the
Code and made substantial revisions. 192 Indeed, Pennsylvania
was the only state to adopt the original code without amend-
ment,1 93 and "[ais early as 1967, the various jurisdictions enacting
the Code had made approximately 775 separate amendments to
it."' 94  Substantial state amendment to the official text has
continued to the present. For example, Article 2A, which gov-
erns leases, was originally promulgated in 1987 and immedi-
ately became the subject of nonuniform state amendments. 195
UCC is nonuniform).
186. See U.C.C. § 2-318 (1995).
187. Id. § 7-403(1)(b). The Code contains a substantial number of addi-
tional optional provisions, and "[in almost every instance, some states have
adopted one version while other states have adopted another." 1 WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 172, at 8.
188. See State UCC Variations, supra note 178 (documenting the variations
among states? versions of the UCC).
189. See supra Part IB.2.a.
190. See F. Stephen Knippenberg & William J. Woodward, Jr., Uniformity
and Efficiency in the Uniform Commercial Code: A Partial Research Agenda,
45 Bus. LAw. 2519, 2519-20 (1990) (explaining why states adopt nonuniform
amendments).
191. See Bugge, supra note 176, at 24-25 (describing how the Pennsylvania
legislature enacted the Code without a dissenting vote).
192. See 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 172, at 4 (discussing the New
York State Law Revision Commission's extensive review of the Code); Robert
Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58
COLUM. L. REV. 798, 805-06 (1958) (examining the review and enactment of
the Code in Massachusetts).
193. See Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REv. 83, 142 (1993).
194. 1 WHIE & SUMMERS, supra note 172, at 7 (citing Schnader, supra
note 173, at 10).
195. See 3A WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND & FREDERICK H. MILLER, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2A-101 (1993) (reporting on states' varied re-
sponses to the initial promulgation of Article 2A); 2 JAMES J. WHITE &
ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 13-1 (4th Prac. ed. 1995)
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In particular, California made substantial changes to signifi-
cant portions of Article 2A, many of which were adopted by
other states, and some of which found their way into the 1990
official revision of Article 2A. 96 Of course, state-by-state de-
viation from the official text of the UCC parallels the similar
state-by-state amendment of the official versions of the ABA
Model Code and Model Rules.
Even where states enacted the official text of the UCC, in-
consistent interpretations of that text produced another layer
of nonuniformity. According to Professor Mooney, "inconsistent
and poorly reasoned judicial opinions" may be the greatest
cause of state-by-state variations in commercial law.197 Such
interpretive nonuniformity stems from a number of sources.
For example, the Code's open-ended terms, such as "good faith"
and "commercial reasonableness,"198 have been subject to
widely varying judicial constructions. 199 In addition, the Code's
occasional ambiguity, as well as plain old bad work by judges, have
each produced inconsistent judicial interpretations. 00 Here again,
the interpretive nonuniformity of the UCC not only parallels
but could also have served to predict the interpretive nonuni-
formity of the Model Rules.20 '
(explaining how eight states adopted nonuniform versions of Article 2A be-
tween 1987 and 1990).
196. See 2 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 195, § 13-1, at 2; see also Fred
H. Miller, Is Karl's Kode Kaput?, 26 LOYOLA LA. L. REV. 703, 708-09 (1993)
(discussing the impact of California's adoption of nonuniform amendments to
Article 2A).
197. Mooney, supra note 181, at 1352-53; see also John L. Gedid, U.C.C.
Methodology: Taking a Realistic Look at the Code, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV.
341 (1988) (asserting that the primary reason for nonuniformity is the lack of
a standard methodology for interpreting and applying the Code).
198. 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 172, at 8.
199. See E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., Uniformity of Commercial Law and State-
By-State Enactment: A Confluence of Contradictions, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 337,
349-52 (1978) (discussing inconsistent interpretations of UCC terms
"unconscionability" and "reasonableness"); Susan A. Wegner, Comment, Sec-
tion 1-208: "Good Faith" and the Need for a Uniform Standard, 73 MARQ. L.
REV. 639, 639-40 (1990) (noting that courts have interpreted "good faith," as
used in the UCC, as an objective standard, as a subjective standard, and as a
combination of both).
200. See Mooney, supra note 181, at 1352-53 (asserting that judicial inter-
pretation has been a major reason for nonuniformity); Taylor, supra note 199,
at 352-58 (arguing that poor drafting and flawed judicial interpretation have
led to nonuniformity).
201. A final source of normative variation under the ambit of the UCC is
the significant impingement of "other law." For example, within the UCC it-
self, section 1-103 provides that aspects of the common law of contracts,
agency, estoppel, and fraud continue to apply unless displaced by particular
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The state-by-state disparity in commercial law referenced
above would have little practical significance if commercial
transactions were wholly intrastate. They are not, of course,
and commercial actors have to contend with the inconvenient
reality that their transactions might ultimately be judged by
the inconsistent laws of two or more jurisdictions. As a conse-
quence, those commercial actors (and their lawyers) should be
aware of and familiar with potentially applicable choice-of-law
rules. The drafters of the UCC, unlike the drafters of the
Model Code and the original version of the Model Rules, an-
ticipated conflicts of law and included a rule designed to re-
solve such conflicts. Section 1-105 of the Code, which like the
rest of the UCC has been through several versions,20 2 today
grants contracting parties considerable authority to choose the
law applicable to their transaction.0 3 That authority to choose
is conditioned on the transaction bearing a "reasonable rela-
tion" to the state or nation whose law is chosen,204 and it does
not extend to certain enumerated situations in which the par-
ties' choice might adversely affect, or fail to take account of, the
interests of third parties. 05 Absent an effective choice by the
parties or a specific selection by the Code, section 1-105 pro-
vides that forum law applies to transactions bearing an
"appropriate relation" to the forum.
20 6
Not surprisingly, the facts of life that drive the need for
choice-of-law rules-normative variation and interstate con-
duct in a federal system with overlapping jurisdiction-have
provisions of the Code. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1995). In addition, as with the ethics
codes, law wholly outside the UCC, both state and federal, can affect sub-
stantial aspects of commercial transactions, thus generating another layer of
potential nonuniformity. See Mooney, supra note 181, at 1350-51.
202. See generally 1 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
SERIES § 1-105:02 (1986) (discussing the history of the UCC's choice-of-law
provision); Robert A. Leflar, Conflict of Laws Under the U.C.C., 35 ARK. L.
REV. 87 (1981) (tracing the development of the choice-of-law provisions).
203. Section 1-105(1) provides:
Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction
bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or
nation the parties may agree that the law either of this state or of
such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties. Fail-
ing such agreement this Act applies to transactions bearing an ap-
propriate relation to this state.
U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (1995).
204- See id.
205. See U.C.C. § 1-105(2) (1995); see also 1 HAWKLAND, supra note 202, § 1-
105:05 (detailing situations in which mandatory choice-of-law rules govern).
206. U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (1995).
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affected the Code's choice-of-law rules as well. While every
state has enacted a choice-of-law rule for its version of the
Code, those rules themselves vary widely. Some states have
retained the original text of section 1-105, others have adopted
the 1972 official text, while still others have made their own
nonuniform amendments to one text or the other.2°7 Added to
this textual variation is considerable interpretive variation,
which becomes particularly significant in those jurisdictions
that read section 1-105 to call for application of the forum's
own common law of choice of law.20 Thus, even where the
Code's drafters and caretakers have tried to accommodate
nonuniformity through a uniform choice-of-law rule, the result
of their quest has been still more nonuniformity.0 9
What's wrong with nonuniformity in commercial law? Ac-
cording to a past president of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, nonuniformity tends to
undercut certainty and predictability in commercial transactions,
and thus "can impede economic development, complicate
transactions, burden the legislature, deprive courts of useful
precedent, increase the likelihood of federal preemption, and
forego the benefit of a national consensus on important is-
sues."' 0 Uniformity, on the other hand, reduces transaction
costs by making the law more accessible and less confusing,
and increases the confidence with which commercial endeavors
can be undertaken by increasing the predictability of legal out-
comes.211 Does that mean that the nonuniform UCC is (or
should be) a dead letter, replaced by a code governing all com-
mercial transactions enacted by the national government?
207. See State UCC Variations, supra note 178 (listing the amendments
and variations for each state).
208. See 1 HAWELAND, supra note 202, §1-105:04 (explaining that one of
the approaches taken by the courts where the parties have not agreed on
choice-of-law provisions is to apply the common law of conflicts); David D.
Siegel, The U.C.C. and Choice of Law: Forum Choice or Forum Law?, 21 AM.
U. L. REV. 494, 496 (1972) (reviewing courts' approaches to choice of law un-
der the UCC).
209. More nonuniformity may be just around the corner. The UCC's spon-
sors, the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, are in the middle of a major reworking of the
Code. See Jean Braucher, The UCC Gets Another Rewrite, A.B.A. J., Oct.
1996, at 66. If history is any guide, many states will either ignore or put their
own mark on the new Code.
210. Bugge, supra note 176, at 30.
21L See Knippenberg & Woodward, supra note 190, at 2521-22 (arguing
that uniformity facilitates transactions).
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While the answer to that question depends on who you talk
to,2
12 the Code is still praised as a "spectacular success,"213 and
is generally regarded even by its critics as "a useful framework
within which a significant number of commercial transactions
are efficiently and effectively conducted."214
Whatever the import of UCC nonuniformity, its existence
demonstrates the inevitability of normative variation in the
federal system, even where uniformity is a high priority and
nonuniformity brings with it undeniable costs. When states
have the authority to place their own mark on someone else's
draft, they will, based either on a perceived need to accommodate
local interests or on a simple desire to improve the product
generally. In a federal system, the UCC experience reminds
us, balkanization happens.
B. LAWYER-CONDUCT STANDARDS IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM
Viewed against the backdrop of UCC nonuniformity, the
disparity in state lawyer-conduct standards seems somewhat
less than earth shattering. Indeed, state variations on the
UCC-deemed the most successful uniform statute in the his-
tory of American law21 -arguably match or exceed state
variations on the Model Code and Model Rules. This is not to
suggest that the ABA promulgation of model standards of lawyer-
conduct constitutes another great success story in the annals of
American law, or that state disparity in conduct standards is
without cost. The salient points are simply that there is nothing
particularly uncommon or alarming about conduct-standards
disparity, and that such disparity need not be debilitating.
Given that our federal system and the consequent primacy
of state regulation have always been in tension with uniformity
and the values it promotes (predictability and reduced trans-
action costs), the recent discovery by lawyers and the ABA of
the perils of nonuniformity seems somewhat belated. While
clients have had to deal with those perils since the beginning of
the republic,216 lawyers have been forced to pay attention by
212. See Symposium, Is the UCC Dead, or Alive and Well?, 26 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 535 (1993) (presenting varying views on the utility of the UCC).
213. Bugge, supra note 176, at 30.
214. Brian D. Hull, Foreword: Is the UCC Dead, or Alive and Well?, 26
Loy. LJAL L. REv. 535, 536 (1993).
215. See 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 172, at 5.
216. Commentators have long recognized that a federalist system compli-
cates transactions that cross state lines. John William Wallace, focusing on
1997]
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the recent trend of "legalizing" lawyer-conduct standards. 217 As
conduct standards matter, states care about and tinker with
their content. As states care about discipline, and discipline
happens, lawyers become concerned with predictability and
want protection.
Of course uniform national standards would make life
easier for lawyers, just as uniform national commercial law
standards would make life easier for many of their clients, and
just as uniform national product liability standards would
make life easier for manufacturers (and their insurers).218 But
if arguments of convenience or tidiness were alone enough to
warrant preemptive national legislation, then the federal gov-
ernment would have to take responsibility for vast areas of law
now dominated by the states, including commercial law, crimi-
nal law, torts, consumer protection, and family law. There
would, in short, be little left for the states to do. The lesson of
the UCC experience is that at a fundamental level, the federal
system continues to promise that normative variation will or-
dinarily trump uniformity.
commercial law, made the point in an 1851 address to the Law Academy of
Philadelphia:
[O]ur law is essentially defective, when our people shall be safe in
their business, while they are on one side of a river or surveyor's line,
and not safe if they stop across it; shall hold their debtor tight, if they
can sue him here, and hold him not at all, if they must sue him there;
shall find that justice as laid down in some State Courts, is injustice
as laid down in other State Courts; and is not known as either in a
court of all the States-The Union; ... where in the North, professing
the principles of the English common law, a merchant shall have a
contract interpreted in one way in Pennsylvania, another way in New
York, and a third way in Boston: and when he goes South with it next
week, shall find it open to new constructions ....
JOHN WILLIAM WALLAcE, THE WANT OF UNIFORMITY IN THE COMMERCIAL
LAw BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT STATES OF OUR UNION 28 (1851).
217. See supra Part I.B (discussing the codification of lawyers' ethics stan-
dards and noting the potential problems for lawyers engaged in a multistate
practice).
218. See generally NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW (Walter Olson, ed.
1988) (exploring the reasons for the expansion of products liability litigation
and posing ideas for reform); Harvey S. Perlman, Products Liability Reform in
Congress: An Issue of Federalism, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 503 (1987) (discussing
products liability reform on a federal level).
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Ill. FEDERALISM AND NATIONAL STANDARDS OF
ATTORNEY CONDUCT
Our federal system is hostile to uniform regulation of most
types of conduct. In some areas, of course, the national gov-
ernment intervenes and eliminates state-created disparity.
While such national intervention can and does occur for a host
of reasons, this Article's focus is on the normative question of
when the desire for uniformity, or more precisely the desire for
predictability and certainty, warrants intervention by the national
government. In particular, do the problems of uncertainty and
unpredictability posed by disparate state standards of lawyer
conduct justify the creation of national, uniform standards?
Generally this sort of question is not one of power, but rather of
policy, for despite recent Supreme Court efforts to put some
teeth into federalism, almost any area that can claim a cogent
argument for national uniformity will be one that Congress has
the authority to regulate. Nevertheless, because some proposals
suggest the possibility of mandatory state enforcement of na-
tionally-imposed lawyer-conduct standards, the question of
congressional power is not free from doubt. This Part, there-
fore, begins with a brief evaluation of congressional authority
both to preempt state standards of attorney conduct and to re-
quire state agencies to enforce the resulting national stan-
dards. It then proceeds to critically examine the claim that
federalism values pose no serious obstacle, in terms of policy,
to national intervention.
A. FEDERAL AUTHORI=Y TO IMPOSE NATIONAL STANDARDS OF
ATTORNEY CONDUCT
For most of the last sixty years, there would have been little
doubt about Congress's power under the Commerce Clause to
set and enforce standards of attorney conduct. In a series of
cases beginning with the 1937 decision in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.,219 the Supreme Court firmly established
that federal legislation regulating conduct that "affects" inter-
state commerce would be sustained." Those cases also made
219. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
220. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (holding that lo-
cal loansharking affects interstate commerce and therefore is within Con-
gress' power to regulate); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964)
(upholding regulation of local restaurant's activities); Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942) (sustaining statute regulating the production of wheat bar-
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clear that each transaction regulated need not itself have a
substantial impact on commerce: "[W]here a general regulatory
statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de mini-
mus character of the individual instances arising under the
statute is of no consequence."' In light of this aggregation prin-
ciple, illustrated most clearly by cases like Wickard v. Filburn
and Perez v. United States,"3 the activities of lawyers, indi-
vidually and collectively, would surely be within Congress's
reach. The Court's decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro-
politan Transit Authority,12 4 in addition to overruling National
League of Cities v. Usery,22 5 simply formalized what had been
the practical consequence of these cases: Any meaningful pro-
tection for state interests must come not from the judiciary but
from the national political process. 226
The recent and somewhat surprising decision in United
States v. Lopez, 227 in which the Supreme Court struck down a
law as beyond the commerce power for the first time in sixty
vested for home consumption); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)
(upholding statute regulating hours and wages).
221. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n.27 (1968), overruled on other
grounds by National League of Cities v. Usery, 392 U.S. 833 (1976); see also
Perez, 402 U.S. at 156-57.
222. 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942) (upholding regulation of wheat harvested
for home consumption because of aggregate effect of such wheat on interstate
commerce).
223. 402 U.S. at 154 (holding purely local loansharking subject to congres-
sional regulation because it belongs to "class of activities" that affects com-
merce).
224. 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985) (holding that wage and hour regulations for
state employees did not violate the Tenth Amendment).
225. 426 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1976) (striking down federal wage and hour
regulations as applied to state employees), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. at 551.
226. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556 ("The political process ensures that laws
that unduly burden the states will not be promulgated."). In adopting this
"political process" view of federalism, the Court echoed the work of a number
of scholars. See Martin Diamond, The Federalist on Federalism: Neither a
National Nor a Federal Constitution, But a Composition of Both, 86 YALE L.J.
1273 (1977) (arguing that the political side of federalism is often forgotten in
modern discussions of federalism but is vital to the American system); Her-
bert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 543 (1954) (arguing that state government and state influence in na-
tional government make federalism work). For a vigorous dissent from the
view that the structural features of the federal government provide meaning-
ful protection for state interests, see Kramer, supra note 150, at 1503-14
(asserting state influence in national government has diminished and that
political safeguards meant to protect states "flimsy devices").
227. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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years,2 8 generated new hope for proponents of judicially en-
forceable federalism limits on national regulatory authority.
But even Lopez appears not to raise any serious question of
Congress's power to set national standards of attorney conduct.
While a great deal of ink has been spilled over the meaning
and import of Lopez n 9 with some of it suggesting that the case
portends a revolutionary change in Commerce Clause doc-
trine,23 ° Judge Louis Pollak aptly observed that "there is less in
Lopez than meets the eye."2 31 No member of the Court save
Justice Thomas called for a fundamental reexamination of
post-New Deal commerce power precedent.23 The first of the
majority's arguable doctrinal innovations-the requirement
that the regulated activity "substantially affects" interstate
commerce 23 3-appears to be little more than "repackaging a
test that [the Court] has recited in virtually every Commerce
Clause case decided since 1937.234 Even if the revitalized
228. See Charles Fried, Foreword: Revolutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13, 15
(1995) (identifying Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 297-310 (1936), as
the last such ruling prior to Lopez).
229. See, for example, the articles contained in Symposium: Reflections on
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 533 (1995), and Symposium: The
New Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 633
(1996).
230. See, eg., Steven G. Calabresi, 'A Government of Limited and Enumerated
Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MCH. L. REV. 752 (1995)(arguing that Lopez marks a "revolutionary and long overdue revival of the
doctrine that the federal government is one of limited and enumerated pow-
ers"); Timothy M. Phelps, Judicial Revolution: Recent Cases Slant Toward
States, NEWSDAY, May 29, 1995, at A13 (describing Lopez as evidence of a
"revolutionary states-rights movement within the court").
231. Louis H. Pollak, Foreword: Reflections on United States v. Lopez, 94
MICH. L. REV. 533, 553 (1995). See also Fried, supra note 228, at 17 (arguing
that the rhetoric of revolution in the Court's decision is just rhetoric); Deborah
Jones Merritt, The Fuzzy Logic of Federalism, 46 CASE W. L. REv. 685, 692(1996) (arguing that the Lopez decision "will have very little practical effect");
Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 661(1996) (reasoning that those who see Lopez as a portent of great change "are
looking for the future in the wrong place").
232. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., dissenting). It bears noting that
the Court accomplished its seemingly radical result without expressly overruling
any Commerce Clause precedent. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (concluding
"substantial effects" test is consistent with the Court's precedents).
233. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (emphasis added).
234. Melvyn R. Durchslag, Will the Real Alfonzo Lopez Please Stand Up: A
Reply to Professor Nagel, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 671, 672 (1996). But see id.
at 673 (arguing with Nagel that "substantial effects" test is the same, but ar-
guing that there is evidence to support theories that the Court in Lopez began
to modify its Commerce Clause doctrine).
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"substantial effects" test turns out to have bite beyond situations
such as Lopez (where Congress made no effort to justify its use
of the commerce power),235 any reasonable assessment of the
interstate effects of attorney conduct would find the test met.
The other new twist offered by Lopez lies in its distinction be-
tween "commercial" and "noncommercial" activities, and its
suggestion that Congress lacks (or possesses diminished)
authority to regulate the latter.23 6 Whatever the merits, or
workability, of this distinction,237 the conduct of lawyers would
appear to fall comfortably on the "commercial" side of the line.
What happens, however, if Congress chooses to delegate
enforcement of new national attorney-conduct standards to the
states? Professor Fred Zacharias suggests this as a possible
(though ultimately undesirable) alternative to federal enforce-
ment that would "simultaneously minimize the federal expense
and decrease the impact on state autonomy."238 In two recent
cases, however, the Supreme Court has drawn a sharp distinction
between authority to make the rules and authority to require
states to administer those rules.239
235. See Pollak, supra note 231, at 552 (reasoning that Lopez is largely
about "irresponsibility on the part of a Congress that has failed to make out
even a minimally plausible case for utilizing the commerce power to undergird
a new regulatory scheme").
236. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560-61, 564-66; see also id. at 580 (Kennedy, J. con-
curring) (NHlere neither the actors nor their conduct have a commercial char-
acter, and neither the purpose nor the design of the statute have an evident
commercial nexus.").
237. See id. at 627-29 (Bryer, J., dissenting) (contending that distinction
between commercial and noncommercial activities is unsupported and un-
workable).
238. Zacharias, supra note 7, at 396; cf id. at 378 (recognizing that "cost
alone" of federal enforcement system "might be considered prohibitive as a
political matter"). Indeed, if one accepts the need for national standards of
attorney conduct, a strong argument can be made that requiring Congress to
build a new national agency rather than relying on existing state agencies(that otherwise would be out of business) for enforcement would be needlessly
costly and inefficient. Cf Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism,
79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 2033-35 (1993) (contending that framers intended to
permit commandeering executive and judicial, but not legislative, branches of
state government, in part for efficiency reasons).
239. Zacharias himself notes this distinction. See Zacharias, supra note 7,
at 337 n_4 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992), for the
proposition that "[ilf Congress were to require states to take particular ac-
tions, rather than simply preempt state law, states might have a colorable ar-
gument that Congress has interfered with state sovereignty.").
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In the first of these cases-New York v. United States240-
the Court struck down part of the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, not because Congress
lacked authority to set disposal standards, but because Con-
gress had tried to "commandee[r] the legislative processes of
the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a
federal regulatory program."41 According to the Court, such
"commandeering" violates the Constitution even where Con-
gress could regulate the private conduct directly or could offer
financial incentives to the states for acting.242 Requiring states
to implement through state legislatures a federally established
agenda, the Court said, interferes with the autonomous processes
of state government, allows federal legislators to escape political
accountability for their regulatory program, and unfairly holds
state legislators accountable for someone else's program.243
Just last term, in Printz v. United States,2" the Court built
on its "no-commandeering" limit on Congress's commerce
power by striking down that portion of the Brady Act that re-
quired local law enforcement officials to perform criminal rec-
ords checks on prospective handgun purchasers. Declining the
government's invitation to limit New York to the commandeer-
ing of state legislative and other policy-making processes, Jus-
tice Scalia's opinion for a five-justice majority "categorically"
240. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
241. Id. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
242. Id. at 166-69. As to the constitutional source for policing 'the division
of authority between federal and state governments," the Court offered both
the Tenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause. According to the Court, it
matters not whether the Court asks "whether an Act of Congress is author-
ized by one of the powers delegated to Congress in Article I of the Constitu-
tion," or "whether an Act of Congress invades the province of state sover-
eignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment." Id. at 155-56. "[The two
inquiries are mirror images of each other." Id. at 156. For an effort to dem-
onstrate the fallacy of this "mirror image" approach to constitutional federal-
ism, see Martin H. Redish, Doing It with Mirrors: New York v. United States
and Constitutional Limitations on Federal Power to Require State Legislation,
21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 593 (1994) (arguing that the limits of federal power
over the states are properly found in and defined by the enumerated powers of
the Commerce Clause, and that the Court's Tenth Amendment analysis im-
properly revives the "enclave" model of federal power, which purports to
identify defined areas of inviolate state sovereignty).
243. New York, 505 U.S. at 168-69.
244 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
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concluded that "[t]he Federal Government may not compel the
States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program."245
If Printz means what it says, then a requirement that states
enforce federally mandated standards of attorney conduct
could not survive. Were Congress to command the states to
implement its regulatory program, with no opportunity to opt
out, the impact on state treasuries, personnel, and control over
their political agendas would surely qualify as prohibited
"commandeering."2 46 The one clear message of New York and
Printz is that the commerce power does not authorize the national
government to order states to use their regulatory machinery
in the service of national regulatory objectives. 247  Congress
might instead attempt to entice (rather than conscript) states
into service of its goals through conditional preemption, giving
states the choice between enforcing the national regulatory
program (perhaps with financial incentives) and being ousted
from regulatory jurisdiction by a nationally imposed enforce-
ment system. Neither New York nor Printz calls into question
Congress's power to offer states such a choice,24 although one
might question the efficacy of a national scheme designed to
create uniform standards that is administered by a patchwork
of state agencies and federal substitutes. In any event, one
nearly certain consequence of Printz is that any effort to create
uniformity through nationally imposed standards of attorney
conduct would require creation of some sort of national en-
forcement agency.249
245. Id. at 2383 (emphasis added) (quoting New York v. United States, 505
U.S. at 188).
246. For an extended and thoughtful effort to apply the analysis of New
York v. United States to a wide range of national health care reform proposals,
see Candice Hoke, Constitutional Impediments to National Health Care Re-
form, 21 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 489 (1994).
247. Candice Hoke has noted that the Court's opinion in New York "mention[s]
some version of [this point] a dozen times." Id. at 537 & n.213 (identifying
relevant portions of the opinion).
248. "[Wlhere Congress has the authority to regulate private activity un-
der the Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress' power to offer states
the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having
State law pre-empted by federal regulation." New York, 505 U.S. at 167. See
generally Ronald D. Rotunda, The Doctrine of Conditional Preemption and
Other Limitations on Tenth Amendment Restrictions, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 289,
306-22 (1984) (detailing the development of the conditional preemption doc-
trine).
249. One obvious irony of the no-commandeering rule is that Congress may
choose instead to preempt the field altogether, thereby excluding all state in-
volvement and arguably doing greater damage to state autonomy.
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None of the proponents or prognosticators of national
standards of attorney conduct actually advocate conscription of
state agencies in the enforcement of such standards. Indeed, at
least one proponent identifies substantial practical difficulties
with such an approach and appears to reject it as-little better than
the current state-based system.250 The no-commandeering rule,
like the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence generally,
would pose no threat to nationally created standards as long as
they were enforced by the national government. That fact, of
course, does not end the inquiry, for the absence of a judicially
enforceable federalism bar to a particular national action does
not preclude the conclusion that federalism values should
nonetheless prevent that action.
B. FEDERALISM VALUES AND NATIONAL STANDARDS OF
ATTORNEY CONDUCT: DIVERSITY VERSUS UNIFORMITY
United States v. Lopez and Printz v. United States will
continue to generate extensive debate over the future of judi-
cially enforced federalism limits. Federalism values, however,
operate much more pervasively at the level of policy and pref-
erence.25 This was a central message of Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transportation Authority,2 5 a message largely unal-
tered by Lopez and Printz. Proponents of national standards of
attorney conduct bear the burden of establishing not only that
the national government has the power to impose such stan-
dards but also that the exercise of such power is warranted in
our federal system. In an effort to meet that burden, Fred
Zacharias has offered both an afrmative case for nationally
imposed uniformity and an anticipatory defense against fed-
eralism objections to such national intervention.
250. See Zacharias, supra note 7, at 396-97.
25L See, e.g., Harry N. Scheiber, Federalism and the Constitution: The
Original Understanding, in AMERIcAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
85, 89 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber, eds. 1988) (explaining
that the founders left settlement of disputes between states and Congress as
much to informal political process as to decisions by Supreme Court); Samuel
L Beer, The Modernization of American Federalism, PUBLIUS, Spring 1973,
at 51 (arguing that federalism influences the pattern of intergovernmental
relations "[both as ajuristic devise and as an element of political culture"); cf
Diamond, supra note 226, at 1283 ("The Federalist... directs our attention to
what may be called the political rather than the legal side of federalism.").
252. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). See supra notes 224-226 and accompanying text
(discussing the significance and impact of the Supreme Court's holding in
Garcia).
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As to the affirmative case for national standards,
Zacharias argues that the current system of diverse state
rules-in an era of national law practice and increasing mul-
tistate litigation and transactions-imposes unacceptable
costs. 253 Uniform national standards would eliminate the cost
for lawyers of ascertaining in advance which of several incon-
sistent rules might later be applied to their conduct, and the
individual and societal costs of inevitable noncompliance with
applicable rules.254 Zacharais makes the additional claim that
the current disparity in conduct standards compels inconsis-
tent conduct that upsets client and public expectations, thereby
diminishing the public image of lawyers.25 5 Uniformity, he ar-
gues, would thus serve to enhance that public image.256 As to
potential federalism objections, Zacharias anticipates and
dismisses two. First, he rejects the "states as laboratories for
experimentation" argument on the twin grounds that states
have not "produce[d] useful innovation in professional regulation"5 '
and that any innovation would be useless because "[n]either
empirical study nor observation of the market will reveal
which jurisdictions' approaches to professional regulation
maximize society's interests."2 58 Second, he contends that state
autonomy cannot be justified on the ground that state regulation
is more likely to be responsive to local characteristics and needs
because most states are "professionally and demographically di-
verse" and "one cannot help doubting that local tailoring of the
rules is taking place."259
The federalism objection to national standards of attorney
conduct is both broader and deeper than the rendering offered
by Zacharias. Normative variation is not only a necessary
product of the federal system,26 ° but also perhaps the chief
value of federalism. 21 Diversity is, in other words, both inevi-
253. See Zacharias, supra note 7, at 345.
254. See id. at 345-57.
255. See id. at 357.
256. See id. at 357-65.
257. Id. at 373.
258. Id. at 374.
259. Id. at 375.
260. See supra Part 11.
26L See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOvERNMENT 49 (1930)
("The very notion of our federalism calls for the free play of local diversity in
dealing with local problems."). For a critical analysis of Frankfurter's ap-
proach to judicial federalism (the idea that federal courts must wield their
power with deference to state judicial systems) and of his influence on today's
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table and good. As a consequence, the burden should rest with
those who advocate uniformity through national preemption of
state standards to demonstrate that the costs of diversity in
the particular field are more severe than the costs of diversity
generally. The case for national standards of attorney conduct
fails to distinguish such standards from the broad range of
conduct regulation that likewise varies from state to state. The
federalism values that leave with the states primary (though
not sole) responsibility for norm setting in areas such as real
property law, commercial law, consumer fraud, criminal law
and torts-despite congressional authority to exert national
control-likewise counsel against a national effort to relieve
states of their role as primary lawmakers in the area of lawyer
conduct. The claim that the desire of lawyers for greater cer-
tainty in ordering their affairs justifies imposition of uniform
national conduct standards translates into either a plea for
special treatment for lawyers not afforded to their clients or a
rejection of the notion that normative variation remains a cen-
tral virtue of our federal system. Neither translation is par-
ticularly attractive.
1. Diversity as a Foundational Value of Federalism
The American federal system as constructed in 1787
plainly contemplated that the states, not the national govern-
ment, would retain primary responsibility and authority for
making and enforcing law. The states were defined by more
than geography; they were distinct societies, with differing
tastes and conditions that could best be served by decentral-
ized decisionmaking.262 The powers of the new national gov-
ernment would respect state diversity by being "few and de-
fined,"263 while state power would "extend to all objects which,
in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and
properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement,
concept of judicial federalism, see Mary Brigid McManamon, Felix Frank-
furter: The Architect of "Our Federalism," 27 GA. L. REV. 697 (1993).
262. See, e.g., Letters from the Federal Farmer, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 230 (Herbert J. Storing, ed., 1981) ([One government and gen-
eral legislation alone, never can extend equal benefits to all parts of the
United States: Different laws, customs, and opinions exist in the different
states, which by a uniform system of laws would be unreasonably invaded.");
Essays by the Impartial Examiner, in id. at 180 ("For being different societies,
though blended together in legislation, and having as different interests; no
uniform rule for the whole seems to be practicable.").
263. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
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and prosperity of the State."2' 6 Of course much (some might
say all) has changed since 1787, with the Civil War and the
New Deal dramatically altering the state-federal balance,265
and modern developments in communication and travel dimin-
ishing interstate differences and increasing homogeneity.
Nevertheless, while on occasion Congress has legislated to (or
perhaps beyond) the limits of its Commerce Clause authority,
vast areas arguably within Congress's power to regulate still
rest largely in the control of the states. Federal law remains,
in the words of Hart and Wechsler, "generally interstitial in its
nature,"266 because federalism values still matter, even where
they impose no (meaningful) judicially enforceable limits.
a. Diversity and Individual Preference Satisfaction
The most direct and enduring argument for federalism
rests on the simple utilitarian principle that governmental
policy should attempt to satisfy the greatest possible number of
individual preferences. 267 Because those preferences are un-
evenly distributed among the states, the diversity of policies
produced by state-level decisionmaking can satisfy more people
than could a single, central government. This insight, which
264. Id. at 293. See also Scheiber, supra note 251, at 97 (discussing Madi-
son's and Jefferson's "champion[ing] diversity as an instrument... for the
pursuit of the 'common good).
265. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991), in which Ackerman
characterizes post Civil War Reconstruction and the New Deal as the two
most significant events in the history of the American republic, the first trans-
ferring power from the states to the federal government and the second con-
solidating federal supremacy through economic centralization and executive
authority. One need not subscribe to Ackerman's theory of "constitutional
moments," cf. Robert Justin Lipkin, The Anatomy of Constitutional Revolu-
tions, 68 NEB. L. REv. 701 (1989) (articulating theory of "revolutionary" con-
stitutional adjudication), to appreciate that those two events enormously
broadened the scope of federal power at the expense of the states. As David
Shapiro, among others, has observed, "the scope of the federal power today is
in many respects far broader than even the most nationalistic of the Founders
might have hoped." DAvID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 113 (1995).
266. PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AD THE FEDERAL SYSM 533-34 (3d ed. 1988). For a defense of the continued
vitality of this characterization, see SHAPIRO, supra note 265, at 114.
267. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,458 (1991); WALLACE E. OATES,
FISCAL FEDERALISM 11-13 (1972); Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism:
"Converse-1983" in Context, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1237 (1994); Kramer, su-
pra note 150, at 1511; McConnell, supra note 153, at 1511; Deborah Jones
Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula for the Future, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1574 (1994).
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was understood by the founding generation2 68 and which has
been elaborated on by modern public choice theory 69 and posi-
tive political theory,27° is captured in the following model. As-
sume that there are two states, A and B, with equal populations of
100 each. Assume further that eighty percent of the people in
State A wish to permit contingent-fee arrangements in crimi-
nal cases, while only thirty percent of the people in State B
wish to permit such arrangements. If the decision is made by the
national government based on the preference of the majority,
110 people will be pleased, and ninety will be displeased. But
if separate decisions are made by the majorities in each state,
150 people will be pleased, and just fifty will be displeased.2 71
Assuming that neither preference is independently prohibited,
272
and that neither preference would have substantial negative
spillover effects in the other state,273 the case for permitting the
states to make independent choices is quite powerful.274
268. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 262 (positing that a centralized gov-
ernment cannot accommodate the diversity of custom among the states). The
point was later made by Tocqueville. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DE-
MOCRACY IN AMERICA 161 (J.P. Mayer ed. 1969) ("In large centralized nations
the lawgiver is bound to give the laws a uniform character which does not fit
the diversity of places and of mores.').
269. See, eg., OATES, supra note 267, at 11-13; VINCENT OSTROM, THE
MEANING OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 126-32 (1991) (discussing the insensitivity of
a national legislature to the concerns of the various communities of interests
that exist among the states); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Ex-
penditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956) (performing an efficiency analy-
sis of consumption of public goods, which suggests that mobile consumer-
voters optimally choose from a diverse group of local governments to satisfy
their preferences); Gordon Tullock, Federalism: Problems of Scale, 6 PUB.
CHOICE 19, 21 (1969) (analyzing the economic efficiency of local government
units in responding to the informed choices of voters).
270. See Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's
'Unsteady Path": A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1447, 1467-70 (1995) (using a preference satisfaction model to support
the idea that local governments respond to the preferences of a heterogeneous
society most efficiently). For a discussion of the controversial question of
whether and to what extent "positive political theory" differs from "public
choice theory," see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Positive
Political Theory in the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457, 458-63 (1992) (examining
the similarities and differences between the theories).
271. The model in text is a variation on models often employed to make the
same point. See, e.g., Tulock, supra note 269, at 22; McConnell, supra note
153, at 1494.
272. See infra Part mH.B.I.c.
273. See infra Part IILB.I.c.
274 See, e.g., OATES, supra note 267, at 11 ("A basic shortcoming of a uni-
tary form of government is its probable insensitivity to varying preferences
among the residents of the different communities.").
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The preference-maximizing quality of federalism is en-
hanced by adding the mobility of citizens and capital to local
decision-making. Citizens can express their preferences not
only by having a voice in the decision-making process but also
by exercising their "exit rights" and leaving the jurisdiction.275
In the model set out above, twenty citizens of State A and
thirty citizens of State B were displeased by their respective
states' decisions about the legality of contingent fees in crimi-
nal cases. If some of those citizens felt strongly enough about
the matter, they might move to the other state, thereby further
enhancing individual preference satisfaction.276 This point has
obvious limitations, particularly the undeniable fact that many
citizens are insufficiently mobile, informed, or motivated to
vote with their feet.277 For most citizens, relocation costs are
likely to outweigh their dissatisfaction with any particular
public policy or set of policies.7 ' Nevertheless, substantial
275. See ALBERT 0. HIRsCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 106-19 (1970) (discussing the
central role that exit has played in American cultural tradition); Amar, supra
note 267, at 1237 (observing that diversity fostered by federalism offers citi-
zens, through domicile shopping, a "true choice of laws"); Richard A. Epstein,
Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 147 (1992)
(explaining the check that federalism, through the exit remedy, creates on
state governments).
276. Exit rights in the federal system not only serve to maximize individual
preference satisfaction but also can promote individual liberty. David Shapiro
offers as examples the Mormons escaping religious persecution by moving to
Utah, and individuals expressing their objection to the homophobia or an-
tipornography stance of a particular state by moving across the state line. See
SHAPIRO, supra note 265, at 95. Of course, the story of states as liberty pro-
tectors paints a rather incomplete picture. American legal history is filled
with instances of state institutions trampling individual rights, with ultimate
protection coming from one or more branches of the national government.
Slavery, civil rights, and abortion come quickly to mind. See infra Part
m.B.I.c (examining the role of the national government in protecting individ-
ual rights). On the other hand, in recent years many states have gone notably
farther than the federal government in protecting individual rights. See
SHAPIRO, supra note 265, at 97-99. More fundamentally, the point is that op-
pressive policies at the state level are easier to avoid than are oppressive
measures at the federal level. See McConnell, supra note 153, at 1503, who
cites the "migration of homosexuals to cities like San Francisco, where they
received official toleration, and the migration of individuals from Massachu-
setts to New Hampshire to escape high rates of taxation," as examples of that
phenomenon.
277. See, e.g., James M. Buchanan & Charles J. Goetz, Efficiency Limits of
Fiscal Mobility: An Assessment of the Tiebout Model, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 25, 27-
34 (1972) (evaluating the limitations of an efficiency analysis, which assumes
all individuals have unlimited mobility).
278. See Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residential Real Estate
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empirical research by economists and sociologists has sug-
gested that government policies have a measurable impact on
migration patterns. 79 Even if only relatively limited numbers
of people (and firms) have a sufficient incentive to move to a
competing state for a bundle of policies, the result will be both
the furthering of individual preference satisfaction and the im-
position of some discipline on state lawmakers. Moreover,
whatever the barriers to interstate migration, they are sub-
stantially less than the barriers to moving out of the country in
order to escape nationally imposed policy.
A fundamental and forceful objection to the argument that
federalism's diversity maximizes preference satisfaction is that
individual preferences are not unevenly distributed among the
states. Advances in the technology of travel and communication,
the argument runs, have rendered state boundaries meaningless
for purposes of identifying and measuring individual prefer-
ences.280 While this objection accurately observes that social,
economic, and cultural differences among states and regions
are not as distinct as they once were,"' it ignores the wealth of
political science research demonstrating that states and re-
gions do retain distinctive political cultures and attitudes.
282
Finance Law in the 1990s and the Implications of Changing Financial Mar-
kets, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1295 (1991); ef. id. at 1295 n.172 (describing
empirical studies supporting the claim that intermetropolitan migration pat-
terns are affected by variations in taxation and expenditure policies).
279. See Richard J. Cebula, A Survey of the Literature on the Migration-
Impact of State and Local Government Policies, 34 PUB. FIN. 69 (1979)
(summarizing research conducted on the effect of local policies on human mi-
gration patterns); John Joseph Wallis & Wallace E. Oates, Decentralization in
the Public Sector: An Empirical Study of State and Local Government, in
FISCAL FEDERALISM: QUANTITATIVE STUDIES 5 (Harvey S. Rosen ed., 1988).
280. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 154, at 922 ("The United States, de-
spite its federal structure and its self-image as a vast and variegated nation,
is in fact a heavily homogenized culture with high levels of normative consen-
sus.-).
28L But cf Paul Brace, Isolating The Economies of States, 17 AM. POL. Q.
256, 269 (1989) (empirical evidence suggests that in the period between 1968
and 1985, "states became more economically autonomous"); Michael H. Schill,
Intergovernmental Takings and Just Compensation: A Question of Federalism,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 887-88 (1989) (detailing the rise of regionalism in the
1970s and 1980s).
282. See, e.g., Schill, supra note 278, at 1303 (discussing the influence that
cultural differences between states have on their real estate laws); id. at 1300
("Ilt would be a grave error to conflate the trend of increasing national homo-
geneity with the conclusion that meaningful differences among states no
longer exist.").
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Beginning with the seminal work of Daniel Elazar in
1966,283 political culture studies have repeatedly found that
economic, social, and cultural differences among states have
lead to differences in political attitudes and ultimately to dif-
ferences in public policy and law.2 Elazar's work has been ably
described in the recent legal literature,285 and a full summary
here is not warranted. Three points bear emphasis, however.
First, despite increasing national homogeneity, meaningful dif-
ferences among states continue to exist in terms of political
culture, economy,286 and demographics." 7 Second, although the
283. DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES
(1966). Elazar postulates the existence of three distinct state political cul-
tures: the individualistic, the moralistic, and the traditionalistic, and dis-
cusses the impact that those cultures have on public policy choices. Id.
284. See, e.g., THOMAS J. ANTON, AMERICAN FEDERALISM AND PUBLIC
POLICY: How THE SYSTEM WORKS 56 (1989) ("[Ciareful students of state poli-
tics, from journalists to systematic empirical researchers, agree that state
boundaries continue to define important differences of substance as well as
style in American politics."); THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM:
COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS 41 (1990) (finding, despite nationalizing
influences, "no convincing evidence that the policy preferences of the states
are becoming homogenized," and' demonstrating that "the coefficients of
variation for per capita state and local tax revenues, total expenditures, and
expenditures for education, welfare, health, and highways have remained vir-
tually unchanged over the past three decades").
Michael Schill has collected and described the significant studies that
have assessed and built upon Elazar's thesis. See Schill, supra note 278, at
1301-04; see also Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators
and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation
of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 281 (1990) ("The fifty states that comprise
the union differ dramatically in history, demography, economic orientation,
and natural endowment.").
285. See SHAPIRO, supra note 265, at 86-88 (discussing Elazar's thesis re-
garding the nation's three dominant subgroups, which are unevenly concen-
trated among the states); Schill, supra note 278, at 1301-04 (examining the
utility of Elazar's theories in developing models for predicting political par-
ticipation and policy formation).
286. See Virginia Gray, The Socioeconomic and Political Context of States,
in POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES 3, 24 (Virginia Gray et al., eds., 5th ed.
1990) ("[Tlhe states' economies vary in size, in which economic sector is [the]
most important..., and in the major goods produced.").
287. As one commentator states:
Besides economic factors, states continue to vary along racial, re-
ligious, and cultural dimensions. Some states have large numbers of
racial or ethnic minorities, while others are racially or culturally ho-
mogenous. Among states with large minority populations, the ethnic
and cultural composition of the minority population varies dramati-
cally from state to state. Large Hispanic populations live in Califor-
nia, Florida and the Southwest, while African-American households
make up a significant proportion of the population in the South and
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relationship between those differences and public policy may
be uncertain, the differences often do translate into different
bundles of state public policies. As Michael Schill concluded
after a careful review of the relevant political culture studies,
"American states retain their importance and vitality as dis-
tinctive forums for policy generation and legal rulemaking."
288
Third, state boundaries may also define different attitudes toward
the role of government and therefore different attitudes toward
government innovation and proposals for change. 289 In short,
while interstate differences have been markedly diminished by
citizen mobility and modern communications, significant and
identifiable differences still exist, and those differences con-
tribute meaningfully to the pervasive normative variation in
the American federal system.
290
b. Diversity, Competition, and Innovation
Diversity is also at the core of federalism's compliment to
citizen choice-state competition for citizens and capital.291 By
allowing a multiplicity of norms, federalism permits states to
offer distinct policies and bundles of policies in an effort to at-
tract productive citizens and productive investment.292 Unlike
certain northeastern states. Kansas and Oklahoma remain in the
Bible Belt whereas Jews still duster in states with large urban
populations.
Schill, supra note 278, at 1301; see also Calabresi, supra note 230, at 766-69
(discussing the demographic differences observed in the major geographic re-
gions of the U.S. and their relation to interstate differences).
288. Schill, supra note 278, at 1303.
289. See SHAPIRO, supra note 265, at 87 (noting that a relationship likely
exists between moral attitudes within a regional population and their recep-
tivity to certain types of change); Schill, supra note 278, at 1301-02
(concluding that diverse political cultures among states dictate diverse public
policies).
290. One additional claim for the benefits of distinct and varied bundles of
state polices is that such variation promotes community. See infra note 345.
291 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (federalism "makes
government more responsive by putting States in competition for a mobile
citizenry"); Amar, supra note 267, at 1238 ('The counterpart of citizen choice
and self-selection is state competition for the allegiance of citizens....");
Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories
and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 543-53 (1984) (describing state compe-
tition for capital). For an extended discussion of the economic advantages and
disadvantages of federalism, see Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federal-
ism and the Proper Scope of the Federal Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 555 (1994).
292. Thomas Dye put the argument as follows:
Competitive federalism envisions a marketplace for governments
where consumer-taxpayers can voluntarily choose the public goods
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a unitary national government, which reduces choice and is
relatively unaffected by competition,293 state governments have
an incentive to implement policies that not only maximize
utility for a majority of voters already in the state but also
serve to attract additional taxpayers. Michael McConnell put
the point well:
If a community can attract additional taxpayers, each citizen's
share of the overhead costs of government is proportionately reduced.
Since people are better able to move among states or communities
than to emigrate from the United States, competition among gov-
ernments for taxpayers will be far stronger at the state and local
than at the federal level. Since most people are taxpayers, this
means that there is a powerful incentive for decentralized govern-
ments to make things better for most people. In particular, the de-
sire to attract taxpayers and jobs will promote policies of economic
growth and expansion. 94
In short, competitive federalism forces governments to be more
efficient by improving services, reducing costs, and better as-
sessing citizen preferences for public goods. 95
and service they prefer, at the cost they wish to pay, by locating in
the governmental jurisdiction that best fits their policy preferences.
In this model of federalism, state and local governments compete for
consumer-taxpayers by offering the best array of public goods and
services at the lowest possible costs. The preferences of all individu-
als in society are better met in a system of multiple governments of-
fering different packages of services and costs than of a single mo-
nopoly government, even a democratic one, offering a single package
reflecting the preferences of the majority. The greater number of
governments to select from, and the greater the variance in public
policies among them, the closer each consumer-taxpayer can come to
realizing his or her own preferences.
DYE, supra note 284, at 14.
293. See McConnell, supra note 153, at 1498 ("A consolidated national gov-
ernment has all the drawbacks of a monopoly: it stifles choice and lacks the
goad of competition.").
294. Id. at 1498-99. Some jurisdictions may decide to put less emphasis on
the economic growth that comes from attracting individual and industry tax-
payers from other states, and more emphasis on maintaining a particular
quality of life for current residents. While federalism "structures competition
between governments," Amar, supra note 267, at 1237, it does not require
that governments pursue the same goals in that competition. Again, a central
feature of federalism is that it permits states to choose different goals.
295. See DYE, supra note 284, at 14 (noting that a greater number of gov-
ernments results in a greater number of policies, thereby providing consumer-
taxpayers more choices). The interstate mobility of citizens, which, while
limited, is undeniably greater than international mobility, serves as the mar-
ket solution for determining citizen preferences. This was the insight of
Charles M. Tiebout in A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, supra note 269, at
424. See DYE, supra note 284, at 14-15; LeBoeuf, supra note 291, at 560.
While unitary governments have difficulty accurately assessing the true value
of their activities to their citizens, "competition among governments, offering
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Competition in turn creates incentives for innovation.
Product differentiation, after all, is at the heart of competition,
and states seeking to attract the tax dollars of new residents
and industry will want to distinguish themselves from their
competitors by offering innovative policies.296 Justice Brandeis
made the best-known version of this argument, dissenting in
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann:
97
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with
serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents
of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citi-
zens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.
298
Brandeis makes the important point that the costs of failed
social and economic experiments at the state level are much
smaller and more confined than the costs of failed experiments
at the national level. Unfortunately, his laboratory metaphor
captures only part of the story of state innovation in the federal
system. By invoking the image of scientific testing, the labora-
tory metaphor suggests that the central benefit of state ex-
perimentation comes with the identification, after thorough
testing, of a single, correct, national solution that all states (or
the national government) will then adopt.299 Where such a
single, correct, national solution exists, then its discovery is
certainly a benefit of state experimentation. Justice O'Connor
different types and levels of public goods at different costs, provides a rough
market solution to the information problems confronting public officials."
DYE, supra note 284, at 14-15.
296. See OATES, supra note 267, at 12-13 (noting that a larger number of
actors will result in a larger variety of policies); SHAPIRO, supra note 265, at
85-88 (theorizing that the sheer number of states and localities will result in
experimentation and variation in policies); see also Fried, supra note 158, at 2-
3 (arguing that states can serve as laboratories for innovation); Kaden, supra note
153, at 854-55 (providing examples of successful experimental state pro-
grams).
297. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
298. Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes also championed
local experimentation. See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921)
(Holmes, J., dissenting ) (decrying use of the Fourteenth Amendment "to pre-
vent the making of social experiments that an important part of the commu-
nity desires, in the insulated chambers afforded by the several States").
299. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 154, at 923 (describing state experi-
mentation as arguably valuable "because the variations may ultimately pro-
vide information about a number of governmental programs and enable us to
choose the best one").
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elaborated on this aspect of the laboratory model in her dissent
in Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi:
States serve as laboratories for the development of new social,
economic, and political ideas. This state innovation is no judicial
myth. When Wyoming became a state in 1890, it was the only state
permitting women to vote. That novel idea did not bear national
fruit for another 30 years. Wisconsin pioneered unemployment in-
surance, while Massachusetts initiated minimum wage laws for
women and minors. After decades of academic debate, state experi-
mentation finally provided an opportunity to observe no-fault auto-
mobile insurance in operation.
30 1
But the benefits of state innovation do not depend on the
existence of one right answer. In fact, "[t]he conclusion that
states should retain a high degree of decision-making auton-
omy is stronger on the humble assumption that most govern-
mental decisions are fairly debatable-that is, that there is no
single compelling just answer to many questions of govern-
ment." °2 And if individual preferences and local conditions
vary across jurisdictions, then state innovation may identify an
answer that is "right" for a limited number of jurisdictions, and
wrong for the rest.303
c. The Limits of Diversity and Decentralization
The foregoing description of the virtues of normative di-
versity made possible by federalism should not be misunder-
stood as a plea for mass decentralization (or nostalgia for the
300. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
301. Id. at 788-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
302. McConnell, supra note 153, at 1507. David Shapiro discusses the
states' record as experimental laboratories in terms of identifying both local
and national solutions, as well as nonsolutions. See SHAPIRO, supra note 265,
at 87-90 (giving as examples experiments in workers' compensation programs,
welfare reform, health care, public education, taxation systems, penology and
environmental protection).
303. Susan Rose-Ackerman has argued that federalism impedes innovation
because local politicians in a federal system will be more risk-averse than
politicians in a unitary national government. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note
159, at 593. But even if local politicians are more risk averse than national
politicians, "there will be more innovation in a decentralized system as a
whole, both because there are more actors and because individual constituen-
cies will perceive risk and reward differently." McConnell, supra note 153, at
1498 n.58; see also SHAPIRO, supra note 265, at 85-86 ("Mt seems clear that
over eighty thousand state and local governmental units, or even fifty state
units (plus some other territorial units), are more likely to engage in experi-
ments than one national unit, especially in a country with as many regional
and social differences as ours.").
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Articles of Confederation). The claim made here is only that
there are significant benefits to the normative variation fos-
tered by American federalism, and that where such variation
exists it ought not be eliminated without sound reasons. To
put it differently, state differences are worth preserving and so
should be, other things being equal.3°4 Of course, sometimes
other things are not equal, as when states make fundamentally
unjust policy choices, or when interstate competition becomes
destructive rather than constructive. Those circumstances
provide strong reasons for national intervention.
Granting states the ability to set norms has often resulted
not in useful innovation but rather in pernicious norms. Slav-
ery, followed by a century of post-Civil War, state-sponsored
racism, provides the most obvious and tragic example of fed-
eralism's more than occasional threat to individual liberty. °5
Other examples abound, including in the areas of reproductive
rights,0 6 criminal procedure, 07 civil rights, °0 free speech 0 9 and
freedom of religion.31 0 National intervention, by the courts or
by Congress (or through the amendment process), has been and
304. The following statement captures my position:
My own simpleminded view about the value of federalism is that,
other things being equal, the states are entitled to be different-to
have different views about the best solutions to their problems and
even to have different views about what is a problem and what is not.
Other things being equal, state differences should be protected.
Donald IL Regan, How to Think about the Federal Commerce Power and Inci-
dentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 554, 558 (1995).
305. See SHAPIRO, supra note 265, at 53-55 (criticizing the ability of states
to protect individual and group rights, especially when dealing with slavery
and racism).
306. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
307. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963)
(invalidating state conviction obtained without counsel for defendant); Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (excluding criminal evidence obtained by the
state in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
308. This is one area in which Congress, rather than just the federal judi-
ciary, has played a substantial role in protecting individual rights against
state encroachment. See SHAPIRO, supra note 265, at 56 n.153 (collecting
statutes).
309. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989); New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,291-92 (1964).
310. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 609 (1971) (striking down
a Pennsylvania law providing funding to parochial schools); School District of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) (invalidating a state
law requiring public school prayer).
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will continue to be necessary where states make choices that
are deemed fundamentally unjust by the national polity.311
Similarly, while the argument that federalism's normative
variation promotes social welfare is a powerful one, economic
analysis also teaches that under certain circumstances inter-
state competition will produce suboptimal results and even be
destructive.312 First, the mobility of citizens and capital that
makes interstate competition possible also threatens the effi-
cacy of state-based redistributive policies.313 Suppose a state is
interested in correcting what it (and a majority of its citizens)
perceives to be unjust disparities in economic well-being within
the state, and so raises taxes to fund a more generous welfare
program. Such a program immediately creates incentives for
wealthy citizens to leave the state and potential recipients to
enter the state, thereby threatening to lower the general wel-
fare of the state and undermine the redistributive policy it-
self.314 The prospect of such doubly costly migration stands as
a substantial impediment to state adoption of redistributive
policies in the first place. As a result, "[w]here redistribution is
the objective,.., advocates should and do press for federal pro-
grams, or at least for minimum federal standards."315
Second, decentralized regulation often suffers from the
problem of either positive or negative externalities-the inter-
jurisdictional spillover of costs and/or benefits. Some public
goods, because they produce positive externalities that allow
311. See SHAPIRO, supra note 265, at 55-56 (describing examples of racial
discrimination, criminal procedure, freedom of speech and freedom of relig-
ion).
312. The framers well understood this point. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 22,
at 144 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) (describing the need
for "[tlhe interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States" to be
"restrained by a national control").
313. See SHAPIRO, supra note 265, at 46 (noting that redistributive policies
provide incentives for the wealthy to leave to avoid costs and the poor to come
to share in benefits); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic
Commerce Clause: A Political Theory of American Federalism, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 1355, 1364 (1994) (noting that low mobility costs will cause beneficiaries
to migrate in and payers to migrate out of a jurisdiction with a redistributive
policy); McConnell, supra note 153, at 1499-1500 (arguing that migration of
wealth out of a jurisdiction creates a disincentive for redistributive policies).
314. See OATES, supra note 267, at 6-8 (describing the "free-rider" phe-
nomenon in which individuals will seek to avoid the higher costs necessary to
a redistribution system); PAuL PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 69-72, 77-79 (1981)
(noting that the tax-benefit ratio of a state controls the degree to which it can
redistribute).
315. McConnell, supra note 153, at 1500 (footnote omitted).
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out-of-staters to enjoy their benefits without sharing the costs,
will either be underproduced or not produced at all by states
acting independently.316 This was the justification offered by
Hamilton in Federalist No. 25 for the control of defense by the
national government; because a state-based defense system
would be extraordinarily costly and would also serve to protect
other states, no individual state would have an adequate in-
centive to provide a defense system against foreign intrud-
ers.317 The same argument can be made about state control
over interstate highways, national parks, and medical and sci-
entific research.318 Left to their own devices, states will devote
suboptimal (or no) resources to those projects because, while all
the costs will be borne by the providing state, a substantial
portion of the benefits will fall outside that state.319 As a re-
sult, the national government ordinarily should take respon-
sibility for both norm setting and revenue-raising in these ar-
eas.
320
The existence of substantial negative externalities atten-
dant to state regulation can also justify national intervention.
State legislation that exports a substantial portion of the costs
to other jurisdictions but retains the benefits in-state is likely
to be inefficient.321 Because the out-of-state costs are borne by
individuals without a vote in the enacting state, the legislation
316. See Bednar & Eskridge, supra note 270, at 1474 (describing ways in
which states may reap the benefits of federal redistributive policies but avoid
the costs).
317. THE FEDERALIST No. 25, at 162 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed. 1961).
318. For an analysis of the collective action problems inherent in producing
such public goods, see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTivE ACTION
(1965).
319. As one commentator has stated:
Rational local governments, like rational individuals, will produce
public goods until the benefit of the good falling within the jurisdiction
equals the marginal cost of supplying it. As the ratio of benefits fal-
ling outside the jurisdiction to those falling inside it increases, the
community will produce decreasing amounts of the good, and the so-
cial gains attributable to the production of the good will be increas-
ingly foregone. At the limit, when all or virtually all of the benefits of
the good fall outside the jurisdiction, the jurisdiction will not produce
the good at all, and all of the potential gains will be foregone. This is
the case with pure public goods.
LeBoeuf, supra note 291, at 568-69 (footnote omitted).
320. See SHAPIRO, supra note 265, at 131-32 (noting that some public
needs, by their nature, will not be satisfied unless addressed by a national
authority).
321. See Schill, supra note 278, at 1288-91.
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may be enacted even though its total costs substantially out-
weigh its total benefits. The most obvious examples of ineffi-
cient cost exportation occur where "the externalization of costs
is an integral part of the legislative program,"3" as with tolls
and tariffs against out-of-state products,323 and other barriers
to trade.324  But [iln some cases the externalized costs are
merely incidental to the achievement of state objectives."325
For example, State A may choose to maximize jobs and tax
revenues by not regulating a particular industry, with the
"incidental" effect that downstream (or downwind) states suffer
from that industry's pollution emanating from State A.
Whether the cost exportation is desired, intended, or merely
incidental, the state policy may be suboptimal when viewed
from the perspective of the economy as a whole. States en-
gaged in trade wars (or in exporting pollution) are the victims
of prisoners' dilemmas,326 adopting policies that may benefit
322. Id. at 1289 n.142.
323. See Bednar & Eskridge, supra note 270, at 1469-70 (comparing state
use of tolls and tariffs to a "prisoner's dilemma" in which all states lose).
324 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (invalidating
New York navigational restrictions as violative of the Interstate Commerce
Clause). A more subtle (and much discussed) example may be state product
liability legislation. See Michael W. McConnell, A Choice of Law Approach to
Products Liability Reform, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABIrTY LAW 90 (Walter
Olson, ed., 1988) (arguing that state rules tend to be one-sidedly pro-plaintiff
because states can benefit in-state plaintiffs with protective liability rules,
while imposing the cost of such rules largely on out-of-state defendants).
325. Schill, supra note 278, at 1289 n.142.
326. The prisoner's dilemma, long the best-known paradigm of game the-
ory, is now a familiar part of efforts in the legal literature to analyze strategic
behavior and the problems of collective action. See DOUGLAS G. BAuD ET AL.,
GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 31-35 (1994). The prisoner's dilemma is typically
described as a two-person game captured by the story of two criminals
charged with committing a serious crime. In its simplest form, this game in-
volves an offer from the prosecutor that leaves each prisoner with two choices:
(1) remaining silent, and (2) confessing and agreeing to testify against the
other prisoner. Each prisoner is told that if one confesses and the other does
not, then the confessor will go free and the silent prisoner will receive a long
sentence (10 years). If both prisoners confess, then both will receive interme-
diate sentences (six years). And if both remain silent, then both will receive rela-
tively short sentences (two years) for a lesser offense. The prisoner options
and payoffs are set out in the following table, with Prisoner One's payoffs
listed first.
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their own coffers (at least temporarily) but only at the expense
of overall general welfare. If all states adopted such policies,
all states (or at least the states collectively) likely would be
worse off. Only the authority of the national government can
facilitate (or constitute) the collective action necessary to over-
come the this sort of mutually destructive competition.
A related manifestation of destructive competition is the fa-
miliar "race to the bottom." Most often employed in the contexts of
environmental 2 7 and corporate2 8 regulation, the "race to the
PRISONER TWO
silent confess
PRISONER ONE silent -2,-2 -10,0
confess 0,-0 6
Critical components of the game are that neither prisoner knows what the
other will do, and each prisoner is interested only in minirnizing his own jail
time (and is indifferent both to how much time the other gets and to possible
opprobrium that might attach to being a snitch). See id.
The central insight of the prisoner's dilemma is that while the best thing
for the prisoners to do collectively is remain silent and receive a total of 4
years (2 years each), each prisoner-acting rationally (in the absence of infor-
mation about what the other will do) will choose to confess, resulting in a total
of 12 years in jail for the pair (6 years each). See id. The classic prisoner's
dilemma involves an optimal result that is better for both prisoners than the
one they will reach acting independently. More complex versions include
situations in which the optimal solution (in terms of collective payoff) might
make one prisoner worse off, but only to an extent that is more than offset by
the gain of the other prisoner. See LeBoeuf, supra note 291, at 577
(describing variations of the classic prisoner's dilemma). In both the classic
and modified prisoner's dilemma, the prisoners have a disincentive, acting in-
dependently, to choose a course of action that would benefit them collectively.
See id. (describing choices available to participants in the prisoner's dilemma).
See generally AvINASH DIXT & BARRY NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY
11-14 (1991) (outlining the importance of the prisoner's dilemma in strategic
planning); RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982) (discussing effective
techniques for reaching common goals).
327. The existence of a race to the bottom in environmental regulation was
first discussed in two semingl articles published in 1977. See Richard B.
Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-constitutional Law in
Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean
Air Act, 62 IOWA L. REV. 713, 745-50 (1977); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of
Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of Na-
tional Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1199-1202 (1977) [hereinafter
Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?]. Stewart's analysis was recently challenged
in Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the
'Race to the Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67
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bottom" argument for national intervention posits that state
competition for jobs, industry, and investment will lead states
to adopt lower-than-optimal regulatory standards. Richard
Stewart argued in the environmental context as follows:
Given the mobility of industry and commerce, any individual state
or community may rationally decline unilaterally to adopt high envi-
ronmental standards that entail substantial costs for industry and
obstacles to economic development for fear that the resulting envi-
ronmental gains will be more than offset by movement of capital to
other areas with lower standards. If each locality reasons in the
same way, all will adopt lower standards than they would prefer if
there were some binding mechanism that enabled them simultane-
ously to enact higher standards, thus eliminating the threatened loss
of industry or development.329
In other words, a state government acting strategically
may rationally conclude that lax regulatory standards will in-
crease its constituents' welfare (by increasing investment and
employment) by an amount greater than any (in-state) costs
resulting from the lower standards.330 Other states, however,
will naturally relax their own standards in response, in order
to get ahead themselves or not be left behind, "triggering a
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210 (1992). For a thorough review of the "race to the bottom"
debate in the environmental area, and a sharp criticism of Revesz's analysis,
see Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV.
570 (1996).
328. William Cary argued that state competition over corporate charters
created a race to the bottom that required federal action, and that the liberal
policies extended to corporations by Delaware heavily contributed to that
state's success in attracting new businesses. See William L. Cary, Federalism
and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
Cary's argument spawned criticism, see, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to
the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Cor-
poration Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913 (1982); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Private
Goals and Competition among State Legal Systems, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 127 (1982), and support, see, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and
the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1444-48 (1992) (contending that prevailing business
culture might lead states to adopt unfavorable corporate laws). See also Alan
E. Garfield, State Competence to Regulate Corporate Takeovers: Lessons from
State Takeover Statutes, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 535 (1989) (examining federali-
zation debate from perspective of state competence to regulate).
329. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?, supra note 327, at 1212 (footnote
omitted). See also PETERSON, supra note 314, at 27-29 (explaining that fed-
eral environmental standards are necessary for effective control of industry).
330. See SHAPIRO, supra note 265, at 42 (arguing that negative externali-
ties are not a necessary precondition for a race to the bottom); Esty, supra
note 327, at 634 (cautioning that the risk of such a race is obviously far
greater where a portion of the costs of lax regulation can be imposed on other
jurisdictions).
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downward regulatory spiral and nonoptimal results."331
Stewart's "binding mechanism" for avoiding such destructive
competition and ensuring rational collective action can best be
supplied by the national government.3
32
Finally, the concept of scale economies suggests that na-
tional intervention may sometimes be warranted. In both the
private and the public sector, there are advantages to size in
terms of production, organization, purchasing, selling, and fl-
nancing.333 Some government activities can't be operated effi-
ciently at the state level because they are characterized by
enormous start-up costs and increasing returns to scale.33 4
While obvious instances like the space program and nuclear
weapons are relatively rare, more subtle examples like the
setting of pollution-control standards, which involves massive
data collection and highly technical scientific analysis,335 are
somewhat more plentiful. Nevertheless, for the bulk of gov-
ernment activities, such as the operation of schools, sanitary
districts, police departments, and criminal justice systems, the
advantages of scale come to an end long before reaching the
national level.336 Moreover, depending on the product or serv-
ice provided, size eventually becomes a disadvantage, with
problems of administrative coordination and transportation
overtaking any economies in production.337  In other words,
many government activities are characterized by significant
diseconomies of scale, making direction of those activities from
a single, central source economically inefficient.
331. Esty, supra note 327, at 604.
332. Theoretically, states could escape the race to the bottom through ne-
gotiation in their collective interest. This was the insight of Ronald Coase in
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). But the complexity of
most problems of inteijurisdictional spillover present insurmountable trans-
action costs to effective interstate bargaining. See OLSON, supra note 318;
SHAPIRO, supra note 265, at 41; Esty, supra note 327, at 604; LeBoeuf, supra
note 291, at 574.
333. See Proctor Thomson, Size and Effectiveness in the Federal System: A
Theoretical Introduction, in ESSAYS IN FEDERALISM 169, 176-84 (1960).
334. Calabresi, supra note 230, at 780.
335. See Esty, supra note 327, at 613-17 (examining the technical areas
likely to benefit from federal intervention); LeBoeuf, supra note 291, at 566
(discussing the benefits of economies of scale).
336. See LeBoeuf, supra note 291, at 566 (identifying the advantages of
small-scale economies). See generally ALIcE RrvLIN, REVIVING THE AMERICAN
DREAM: THE EcoNoMy, THE STATES, AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1992).
337. See Thomson, supra note 333, at 184-91 (advocating the importance of
maintaining local economic control).
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The foregoing arguments for national intervention-
fundamentally unjust state policy choices, the disincentive for
states to supply certain public goods, the destructive impact of
certain types of interstate competition, and economies of
scale-all are consistent with the basic premise of the Ameri-
can federal system that normative variation ordinarily should
be valued and protected. They simply recognize that in a federal
system there is an important and substantial role for the na-
tional government, a role that must account for the increasingly
transjurisdictional nature of modern economic, political, and social
life.
2. Diversity Versus Uniformity in Attorney-Conduct
Standards
The affirmative case for normative diversity-maximizing
individual preference satisfaction and fostering interstate
competition and state innovation-applies to the general task
of setting conduct standards for lawyers. Moreover, none of the
arguments for national action discussed above support the
across-the-board preemption of state ethics codes with national
standards of attorney conduct. The advocates of national stan-
dards are left with the broad and general claim that the pre-
dictability and reduced transaction costs afforded by uniform,
nationally-imposed legal standards generally outweigh the
benefits of federalism's diversity. But that claim, lacking as it
does a demonstration that the costs imposed by diverse stan-
dards of attorney conduct are somehow unique, cannot support
special treatment for the legal profession.
a. State-Level Norm Setting Satisfies Diverse Preferences
The current disparity in lawyer-conduct standards reflects
important, though relatively confined, areas of normative con-
flict within and without the legal profession.33 Assuming that
individual preferences about the appropriate resolution of
those conflicts are unevenly distributed among the states,
state-level noirm setting satisfies more people than would im-
338. There may appear to be some tension between the suggestion made
earlier that concern over state variation in conduct standards is overblown,
see supra Part I.B.2, and the claim here that diversity in state regulation is
the primary good to be preserved against federal intervention. But even if the
practical significance of interstate variation for multistate practitioners is not
great, the normative value of the variation is substantial.
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position of a single rule by the national government.339 Again
assume two states, A and B, with equal populations of one
hundred persons each. Assume further that eighty people in A
but only thirty people in B wish to permit lawyers to disclose the
future financial fraud of a client. A decision by the national gov-
ernment based on majority preference will satisfy 110 people
(eighty from A and thirty from B), while state-level decisions
will satisfy 150 people (eighty from A and seventy from B).3 °
The proffered response to the preference-satisfying claim
for state-level norm setting is to assert that "[t]he primary
changes that states have made [to the Model Code and the
Model Rules] do not reflect their unique populations," and that
therefore "one cannot help doubting that local tailoring of the
rules is taking place."341 But while the existing normative
variation in conduct rules may not track state differences in
population density or industrialization-the only "unique" fea-
tures identified as relevant342-one should not lightly assume
that the variation does not reflect local preferences. To the con-
trary, when Delaware adopts Model Rule 1.6 verbatim, thereby
permitting disclosure of client information only to prevent a
crime likely to result in imminent death or serious bodily in-
jury,343 while New Jersey chooses to amend Rule 1.6 not just to
permit but to require disclosure of a much wider range of
threatening client conduct,34 those choices plainly reflect the
339. See supra Part I.B.I.a.
340. I do not mean to suggest, of course, that the will of the people is di-
rectly reflected in the votes of their representatives, least of all in the context
of lawyer-conduct rules. The claim has long been made that the ABA seeks to
control the content of such rules in order to insure that other regulators, per-
haps those with a closer connection to the will of nonlawyers, stay out of the
game. See supra note 57 (exploring the role of the ABA in setting lawyer-
conduct rules). A similarly familiar claim about the ABA is that it is domi-
nated by the elite corporate bar, see JEROLD S. AUERBAcH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE:
LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976), and that that
domination is evidenced in conduct rules that favor such elite lawyers and dis-
favor the rest of the profession, see Philip Shuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics:
The Propriety of the Canons as a Group Moral Code, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
244, 268 (1968) (finding that the profession favors the interests of large firm
attorneys more than the rest of its members). For a thorough and illuminat-
ing account of the contending political forces that shaped the Model Rules, see
Schneyer, supra note 61, at 701-24.
341. Zacharias, supra note 7, at 375.
342. See id.
343. DELAWARE LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)
(1997).
344. New Jersey's rule provides:
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fundamentally different normative choices of two jurisdictions.
Permitting those different choices, and hence increasing indi-
vidual preference-satisfaction, is one of the chief virtues of fed-
eralism.
45
A lawyer shall reveal such information to the proper authorities, as
soon as, and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary,
to prevent the client
(1) from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the
lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or sub-
stantial bodily harm or substantial injury to the financial inter-
est or property of another;
(2) from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the
lawyer reasonably believes is likely to perpetrate a fraud upon a
tribunal.
NEW JERSEY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1997).
345. An additional virtue claimed for state-level norm setting is that it
promotes community. See supra notes 162-163 and accompanying text. While
serious flaws mar that contention when broadly made, in the narrower con-
text of lawyer regulation it may have some merit.
Rubin and Feeley, supra note 154, at 936, state that recent communitar-
ian scholarship claims the fostering of community as a benefit of federalism,
but then attack the claim as romantic or fanciful. See id. at 936-51. While
federalism appears to play no more than a minimal role in the work of con-
temporary community theorists, others have noted its potential to reinforce
the unity of citizens in their local communities. Justice Frankfurter, for ex-
ample, wrote of the "special relations between a State and its citizens,"
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 408 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), and
that these relations fostered "[a] binding tie of cohesive sentiment," Min-
ersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 596 (1939), overruled by West Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), on grounds unre-
lated to Frankfurter's quoted comments. From Frankfurther's perspective,
citizens gain an important part of their identity from the states in which they
live. See Robert C. Post, Justice Brennan and Federalism, 7 CONST.
COMMENTARY 227, 234 (1990) (contrasting Frankfuter's views of federalism
with those of Justice Brennan).
This perspective has at least superficial appeal. To the extent that prob-
lems and preferences are unevenly distributed among states, citizens in a
particular state may develop a sense of both social and political kinship with
fellow state citizens. Many of us root for our state-university sports teams,
take pride in the successes of state government, businesses, and individuals,
and cringe when our state is subject to national ridicule or disrespect. Fed-
eralism, particularly in its promotion of both interstate diversity and citizen
participation, is a critical precondition to the maintenance of whatever state-
level community in fact exists. The limits of the community-promoting claim
for federalism, on the other hand, are substantial. See Rubin & Feeley, supra
note 154, at 940-41 (contending that even the smallest states are far too large
to permit state-wide feelings of personal or emotional connection). The states
lack what some have described as "affective community." Id. at 937 (citing
ROBERT P. WOLFF, THE POVERTY OF LIBERALISM 187-92 (1968)). In terms of
defining "political communities"--groups engaged in collective political deci-
sionmaking-states may be less relevant than local governmental units or the
national government. See id. at 937-47 (contending that true political com-
munity in United States is national).
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b. State-Level Norm Setting Permits Useful Innovation
Proponents of nationalization admit the existence of "some
experimentation in ethics codes,"31 but then dismiss its value.
Zacharias, for example, contends that experimentation to date
has been narrow and not useful,34 7 and that the legal profession
has failed to develop (and the market cannot provide) a mean-
ingful technique for measuring the success of any experiments
that do take place.348 He concludes that "[blecause experiments
by definition are prone to failure, it makes little sense to rely
on them if the results cannot, or will not, be analyzed. Federal
lawmakers are better off simply attempting to discern the best
rule."349 This argument understates the significance of existing
(and potential) state experimentation, and takes the laboratory
metaphor too far by dismissing as useless an experiment unac-
companied by proof of its results.
While state experimentation, expressed as deviations from
the ABA model, may be relatively limited, that deviation has
been extensive enough to cause alarm about the
For lawyers, however, federalism may indeed promote community. State-
based regulation, geographic boundaries confining practice, and relatively
limited population combine to create for many lawyers bonds of attachment,
both political and emotional, with other in-state lawyers. While I know of no
empirical studies that identify or measure interstate differences in the culture
of lawyers, anecdotal evidence of such differences is at least interesting. A
recent and notable example is the celebrated conflict between Texas lawyer
Joe Jamail and the Delaware Supreme Court. See Benjamin Weiser, Are Too!
Am Not! Are Too! Am Not!: Judges Try to Impose a Civil Tone as Deposi-
tions Get Increasingly Down and Dirty, WASH. POST, Thursday, March 10,
1994, at B10 (documenting the growing intolerance of the judiciary toward
unprofessional behavior on the part of the practicing bar). In a scathing ad-
dendum to its opinion in Paramount Communications v. QVC Network Inc.,
637 A.2d 34, 51-57 (Del. 1993), the Court attacked Jamairs conduct in a
deposition as "outrageous and unacceptable," id. at 55, and contended that the
Delaware courts would not tolerate such behavior from Delaware lawyers, see
id. One Delaware lawyer later observed that lawyer conduct tolerated else-
where would result in "swift sanctions" after the first instance of misconduct
in Delaware. William E. Wiggin, Uncivil Procedure, DEL. LAWYER, Spring
1996, at 40. Wiggin also noted that "our bar is made up overwhelmingly of
ladies and gentlemen" Id.
I should add that the promotion of community is not an unqualified good.
One way that communities are defined is through exclusion, and attempts to
define state citizenship, or membership in a state professional community,
may be unfairly or harmfully exclusive.
346. Zacharias, supra note 7, at 373.
347. See id. at 373-74.
348. See id- at 374.
349. Id. at 374-75.
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"balkanization" of ethics norms.350 Moreover, at least in the
area of the relationship between client confidentiality and in-
tended client financial fraud, state deviation from the ABA
norm has resulted in a new dominant norm. 5 1 Nor has all
state experimentation been modest. New Jersey, for example,
has undertaken an approach to client confidentiality that Pro-
fessors Hazard and Hodes rightly characterize as "an openly
radical experiment." 2 In addition to amending Rule 1.6 to
mandate disclosure when "substantial injury to the financial inter-
est.., of another [is threatened],"353 New Jersey has made
significant amendments to other confidentiality-related provi-
sions of the Model Rules. Those amendments include: (1) creat-
ing a meaningful requirement that lawyers correct their clients'
material misstatements to third parties by eliminating Model
Rule 4.1(b)'s gaping confidentiality exception; 54 (2) amending
Rule 1.6 to require revealing threatened client perjury;355 and
350. See supra Part .C (describing the concern of attorneys and commen-
tators over variations in state standards).
35L See Wolfram, supra note 83, at 901. Wolfram explains:
The states have been, if modestly, laboratories of experimentation,
much more interesting in the articulation of standards on many is-
sues than the ABA. Some states have shown both a measure of inde-
pendence and creativity in doing their own tinkering in adopting and
modifying their version of the Model Rules. That tinkering has pro-
duced, in some instances, a set of national norms entirely different
from those first pressed on the profession by the ABA.
Id. Wolfram goes on to cite as "[tihe most obvious example... the over-
whelming rejection in almost all jurisdictions of the ABA's initial and present
position on extreme client confidentiality in the face of intended financial
harm." Id. at 901 n.137
352. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 69, § AP4:104, at 1265.
353. NEW JERSEY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1997).
354. Model Rule 4.1 provides in relevant part:
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
()" fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclo-
sure is necessary to avoid assisting in a criminal or fraudulent
act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 (1995) (emphasis added).
New Jersey's version of the rule, in contrast, requires disclosure "even if
compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule
1.6." NEW JERSEY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1(b) (1997).
355. NEw JERSEY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1997)
provides in relevant part:
A lawyer shall reveal such information to the proper authorities as
soon as, and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary,
to prevent the client:
(2) from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the
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perhaps most significantly (3) adding a new provision to Rule
3.3 barring "fail[ure] to disclose to the tribunal a material fact
with knowledge that the tribunal may tend to be misled by
such failure."356 While perhaps not quite revolutionary, these
changes taken together offer a notably different vision of both
client confidentiality and the adversary system than do the
Model Rules.
The claim that experiments like New Jersey's are value-
less, on the ground that neither empirical study nor the market
is likely to measure their costs and benefits, fails in several re-
spects. First, the remedy for the admitted dearth of empirical
studies of diverse conduct rules is not to abandon diversity in
favor of national intervention, but rather to conduct and con-
tinue to encourage useful studies.5 7 Second, while alternative
lawyer-conduct norms may not generate easily quantifiable
costs and benefits, they are not fundamentally different from
many other norms that involve abstract interests. Competitive
federalism does not depend on individual citizens engaging in
elaborate calculations of the costs and benefits of particular
policies, but simply on the citizen rights of voice and exit con-
veying to government decisionmakers information about what
bundle of policies will best satisfy citizen preferences. The
claim is not that government policies are just like widgets and
that officials and voters act just like manufacturers and con-
sumers, but only that "competition among governments, offer-
ing different types and levels of public goods at different costs,
provides a rough market solution to the information problems
confronting public officials." 358
lawyer reasonably believes is likely to perpetrate a fraud upon a
tribunal
356. NEW JERSEY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(5) (1997).
This factual equivalent of the lawyer's obligation to disclose adverse legal
authority, see MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 3.3(a)(3) (1995),
has potentially radical consequences. Imagine a lawyer who learns of a wit-
ness whose testimony would establish a material fact damaging to her client.
Ordinarily, the lawyer would have no obligation (absent an appropriate dis-
covery request) to reveal the witness to the other side or to the court. Indeed,
the lawyer might win the case by allowing the court to find that the other side
had not established the material fact in question. Under New Jersey Rule 3.3,
however, the lawyer apparently would be obligated to reveal the witness, or
admit the fact, to the court. See HAzARD & HODES, supra note 69, at 1264 n.4.
357. Zacharias himself conducted one of the few relevant empirical studies,
see Zacharias, supra note 77, at 379-96, and has been a consistent advocate for
more testing of the various mechanisms for professional regulation.
Zacharias, supra note 7, at 374 n.172.
358. DYE, supra note 284, at 14-15 (emphasis added).
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Third, and most important, rigorous testing of the effects
of innovative legal norms should not (and often cannot) be a
necessary precondition of innovation. Such testing of course is
generally desirable, and in the case of technical innovation in
areas like pollution control it may well be necessary.359 But
common law courts, legislatures, and other norm setters regu-
larly make policy choices based on imperfect information about
the consequences of those choices, and often rely on unscien-
tific observations about conditions in other jurisdictions. In-
deed, the conclusion to the dismissal of the benefits of experi-
mentation in legal ethics-that "[flederal lawmakers are better
off simply attempting to discern the best rule"36 -- begs the
question of how those lawmakers are supposed to go about
"discerning" the best rule, if not at least in part by observing
competitive rules in operation. Even if the results of New Jer-
sey's "radical experiment" with client confidentiality are not
scientifically tested, other jurisdictions should still learn some-
thing useful from the experience. 3
61
c. The Case for National Preemption Has Not Been Made
As discussed in the preceding section, the benefits of nor-
mative variation should give way to some measure of national
control when states make fundamentally unjust or otherwise
impermissible normative choices, when states lack adequate
incentive to supply a needed public good, and when state-based
regulation generates significant inefficiencies, either through
destructive competition or lost economies of scale. None of
those arguments for national intervention, however, support
complete national preemption of state-generated standards of
attorney conduct.
National intervention has been necessary, on occasion, to
remedy impermissible choices in the regulation of lawyers,
made either by individual states or by the legal profession as a
359. See Esty, supra note 327, at 613-17.
360. Zacharias, supra note 7, at 375.
361. Hazard and Hodes express the concern that New Jersey's approach
may represent such a dramatic departure for lawyers trained in the tradi-
tional adversary ethic that the new rules will be widely ignored. HAZARD &
HODES, supra note 69, § AP4:104, at 1265. If that concern proves valid, other
states can take it into account in deciding both whether and how to deviate
from the traditional norms. If, on the other hand, lawyers generally comply
with New Jersey's new rules, if courts, litigants and third parties feel pro-
tected by them, and if there is no demonstrable harm to attorney-client rela-
tionships, then other states may decide to follow New Jersey's lead.
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whole. Residency requirements 62 and restrictions on lawyer
advertising and solicitation 63 provide prominent examples.
But those instances, addressed by Supreme Court articulation
of constitutional limits on state options, clearly do not warrant
national takeover of the whole enterprise of regulating lawyers.
And while many other lawyer-conduct standards have gener-
ated controversy, and even passionate disagreement, they have
not constituted the sort of fundamentally unjust norms that so
offend the national polity as to require national intervention.3
Nor do any of the economic arguments for national inter-
vention apply to the establishment of comprehensive standards
of attorney conduct. First, there is no evidence of an interstate
race to the bottom in lawyer-conduct standards. Many com-
mentators have observed, of course, that the regulation of law-
yers suffers from a marked bias in favor of protecting the inter-
ests of lawyers over the interests of other members of society.365
Whatever the flaws in existing standards, the point is that
states are not engaging in lax regulation of the legal profession
in order to attract more lawyers.
Second, lawyer-conduct rules do not generally suffer from
the ills associated with significant externalities.366 Despite the
inevitable interstate spillovers attendant to the increasingly
362. See supra note 23 (discussing the constitutionality of residency re-
quirements in light of the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
363. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional
limitations on regulation of lawyer advertising).
364. As discussed above, the proper relationship between client confiden-
tiality and the interests of noncients has long been the subject of intense de-
bate. Neither the extraordinarily expansive position taken by the ABA in
Model Rule 1.6 nor New Jersey's radical revision, however, comes close to any
constitutional line. Senator Arlen Specter was sufficiently troubled by Model
Rule 1.6 that even before its adoption by the ABA House of Delegates he in-
troduced a bill that would have preempted the rule. See infra note 381
(describing legislation introduced by Senator Specter but not passed by Con-
gress).
365. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 61, at 692 ("[Bloth the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility and the Canons of Ethics it replaced consistently re-
solved conflicts between professional and societal objectives in favor of those
doing the resolving. So too. ... one would expect the Model Rules to serve
first and foremost the interests of the bar."); see also id. at 692 n.15 (citing
earlier works making the same point).
366. The underproduced public good argument for national intervention,
see supra notes 316-320 and accompanying text, plainly does not apply to law-
yer-conduct regulation. Lawyer-conduct rules are not like the interstate
highway system or the space program-public goods characterized by inter-
nalized costs and externalized benefits that therefore would not be supplied
without national policy making and funds.
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multijurisdictional nature of law practice,3 67 the fact remains
that the bulk of the relevant costs and benefits of lawyer regu-
lation remain in state. Depending on the rule, costs and/or
benefits are generally borne by someone likely (though not cer-
tain) to be a resident of the regulating state, be it the regulated
lawyer, the client, a court, or an affected third party.3 68 Of
course, some costs (and benefits) will be exported to the out-of-
state clients of multijurisdictional practitioners, or to out-of-
state third parties, but they are likely to be small both in abso-
lute terms and in relation to internal costs (and benefits). Unlike
barriers to interstate trade or the exportation of pollution, 369 state-
based lawyer-conduct rules are not generally skewed by a real-
izable desire to internalize benefits and externalize costs. The
mere fact of some spillover of costs, an inevitable component of
much state regulation, does not justify national preemption of
the benefits of diversity.
Finally, national intervention may occasionally be justified
by the argument that state-level regulation causes lost econo-
mies of scale. Zacharias, for example, makes the modest sug-
gestion that "a national enforcement scheme might have
economies of scale,"3 70 offering as examples a reduced need for
experts on state law, an increase in accessible information on
multistate practitioners, and fewer multiple prosecutions of the
same lawyer.37' Even if those examples represent actual prob-
367. See supra Part I.A.
368. For example, the costs associated with the rule governing the safe-
keeping of client property, MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.15(a) (1995), fall on the in-state lawyers holding client funds, while the cli-
ents, most of whom will be state residents, will reap the bulk of the benefits.
When a state decides to strengthen the rule's protection of clients, such as by
adding detailed accounting requirements, see DELAWARE LAWYERS' RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15 & Interpretive Guideline No. 2 (1997), the
additional costs and benefits will likewise be largely internalized. Similarly,
both the client beneficiaries of the strict confidentiality principle embodied in
Model Rule 1.6 and the rule's cost-bearers-third parties harmed by client
conduct or courts deprived of relevant information-will ordinarily be state
residents. When a state weakens the confidentiality principle by taking
greater care to protect the interests of third parties or courts, the benefits and
the costs imposed by the change will likewise remain chiefly within the state.
The same assessment would apply to stricter and milder versions of most con-
duct standards, including the no-contact rule, and the rules governing con-
flicts of interest.
369. See supra notes 321-326 and accompanying text (discussing the expor-
tation of costs due to state regulation).
370. Zacharias, supra note 7, at 371.
371. See id. at 371 n.165.
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lems that could be remedied by a national enforcement system,
they hardly warrant dismantling the existing state systems
and starting from scratch. Moreover, the size disadvantages of
a national lawyer-regulation bureaucracy, in terms of both ef-
ficiency and effectiveness, would surely outweigh the minimal
scale economies claimed for such a system.
At bottom, the argument for nationally imposed standards
of attorney conduct is a complaint about the transaction costs
associated with state-level norm setting.372 Lawyers engaged
in conduct with multijurisdictional consequences may find that
diverse state norms have a potential claim to govern that con-
duct. Prudent lawyers will therefore incur costs researching
the potentially applicable lawyer-conduct rules of multiple ju-
372. Another possible argument for federal regulation bears mention, one
not made by commentators concerned chiefly with predictability for lawyers.
At the time of the founding, perhaps the most fully developed argument for
centralization was made by Madison in The Federalist. According to Madison,
a large republic offers greater protection from the tyranny of faction than do
the smaller polities of states, chiefly because of the inevitable dilution of, and
competition between, factional interests. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82-84
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). In small republics, "a self-
interested private group could easily seize political power and distribute
wealth or opportunities in its favor," Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in Ameri-
can Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 39 (1985) (describing Madison's theory),
while the "greater variety of parties and interests" in a large republic would
"make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive
to invade the rights of other citizens," THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra, at 83.
An argument might well be constructed that the interests to be served by
lawyer-conduct regulation could be corrupted by factional power, either be-
cause lawyers possess a disproportionate power adverse to the public interest,
cf. Rhode, supra note 61, at 692 ("[Bloth the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity and the Canons of Ethics it replaced consistently resolved conflicts be-
tween professional and societal objectives in favor of those doing the resolv-
ing. So too.... one would expect the Model Rules to serve first and foremost
the interest of the bar."), or because a faction within the legal profession
dominates other subsets of the profession, see supra note 340. If such fac-
tional corruption exists, and if it would be less likely to prevail at the national
than at the state level, then nationalization of lawyer-conduct regulation
might be warranted. Exploration of this as-yet unmade argument for na-
tionalization, which would have to address the relative state- and national-
level influence of lawyers generally, of the ABA and other professional organi-
zations, and of various subsets of the profession, will have to await another
day. For the moment, 11 simply observe that commentators concerned with
predictability for lawyers have posited loss of the profession's ability to set its
own standards as an argument against nationalization. See, e.g., Daly, supra
note 11, at 784 (contending that "the proposal for a national bar threatens the
independence of the legal profession" and "would inevitably place lawyers un-
der the thumb of Congress").
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risdictions, costs that would be materially lower if the research
could be confined to a single set of national rules.373 This ob-
servation of increased transaction costs for lawyers, while ac-
curate, fails to distinguish the nature or magnitude of those
costs from the transaction costs inherent in federalism generally.
Indeed, lawyers undoubtedly spend dramatically more time
and energy addressing the multijurisdictional problems of
their clients than they do their own. Given that the practice of
law is still far more state-based than many aspects of modern
commercial life, and that the significant disparity in lawyer-
conduct rules is relatively confined, the case for national pre-
emption of lawyer-conduct standards is in fact far weaker than
the case for national standards in many areas still dominated
by state law.374
Zacharias, while conceding that "[slome of the rationales
for federalizing professional regulation track arguments one
could make for federalizing other areas of state law, including
commercial law, environmental law, consumer fraud and
torts,"3 75 contends that "the problem of disuniformity in the
professional responsibility field is exceptionally serious."376
What makes it so? For Zacharias, the chief distinguishing fea-
ture is that disparate attorney-conduct standards undermine
the public perception of lawyers. 3 7 His argument proceeds as
follows. Lay persons are exposed through the mass media to
inconsistent conduct by attorneys. While that inconsistent
conduct is in fact attributable to diverse state norms, lay per-
sons mistakenly attribute it to disregard by some attorneys of
governing standards. That mistaken perception fosters costly
disrespect for the legal profession, disrespect that could be
373. Many lawyers, of course, would devote precisely the same resources to
research in the two situations-none.
374. Two ready examples are commercial law, see supra Part IA, and
products liability, see generally NEW DERECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW, supra
note 219.
375. Zacharias, supra note 7, at 371; see also id. at 372 ("The professional
responsibility field may not present a unique case for federal intervention, but
it does present one of the strongest.").
376. Id. at 371.
377. See id. at 372 (explaining that "[als the legal profession becomes more
visible, it becomes important for each jurisdiction to enforce its standards.
Failure to do so breeds distrust of the profession."); see also id. at 357-65
(asserting that if professional regulation codes affect the public's perception of
lawyers, a federal code is necessary to eliminate inconsistencies that may un-
dermine that perception).
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ameliorated by a national code.378 But to the extent that law-
yer-conduct standards have an effect on the public perception
of lawyers, I suspect that dissatisfaction with the substance of
the rules has a much greater impact than confusion over in-
consistent state standards. Who likes client-attorney confi-
dentiality besides clients and lawyers?
I do not dispute that we are at a point of great upheaval in
the legal profession, with rapidly declining public confidence
and increasing lawyer dissatisfaction.37 9 Nor do I dispute that
the combination of multijurisdictional practice and inconsistent
state ethics codes creates uncertainty and hence transaction costs
for lawyers, costs that undoubtedly are shared by lawyers with
their clients. What I do dispute is that a national code, prem-
ised on the idea that lawyers need special treatment to cope
with the uncertainty of operating in a federal system, is a sen-
sible response. To the contrary, now is precisely the time to
encourage different approaches to problems that the profession
has yet to resolve. In many areas, including efforts to strike
the proper balance between client and third-party interests,
the profession has yet to (and may never) develop any uniquely
right answers. We should therefore celebrate, and pay close at-
tention to, New Jersey's "radical experiment" in reshaping client
confidentiality,380 rather than lament the fact that it may cre-
ate uncertainty for some multistate practitioners. We may ul-
timately conclude that New Jersey's approach is right or
wrong, or that a range of permissible approaches exists. But
unless we are confident that we have uncovered the right an-
378. See Zacharias, supra note 7, at 357-65. In fairness, Zacharias does
take some care not to overstate his case, noting that client perceptions are af-
fected by a host of factors and that the effect of a national code on such per-
ceptions would be indirect. See id. at 364-65. Nevertheless, he places signifi-
cant weight on this "perception" component of his argument when seeking to
distinguish attorney-conduct standards from other state-based regulation.
See id. at 372 (noting that "the other candidates for federalization do not de-
pend on lay perception of the law for their effectiveness").
379. See generally ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993)
(discussing the decline of the lawyer-statesman and the current "crisis" in the
legal profession); Symposium, A Nation Under Lost Lawyers: The Legal Pro-
fession at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 100 DICK. L. REV. 477 (1996)
(providing several perspectives on the state of the legal profession and dis-
cussing proposed responses to these challenges); Edward D. Re, The Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Legal Profession, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 85
(1994) (outlining potential causes of dissatisfaction with the legal profession).
380. See supra notes 352-356 and accompanying text (summarizing New
Jersey's experimental changes to the confidentiality provisions of the Model
Rules).
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swer to this and other difficult problems of lawyer-conduct
regulation, or that the costs of multiple answers are simply too
great to bear, it would be a serious mistake to freeze attorney-
conduct standards in a single federal code.
381
381. An alternative to a comprehensive national code of attorney conduct,
particularly given that significant state variation is confined to a relatively
limited number of issues, see supra Part I.B.2, would be selective national in-
tervention confined to subject areas where the problems posed by nonuniform-
ity are particularly acute. See Zacharias, supra note 7, at 397-99 (stating that
federal regulations for the most controversial issues may solve current prob-
lems, but contending that such a narrow approach to ethics regulation may be
inappropriate).
Senator Arlen Specter proposed limited federal intervention in 1983 when
he introduced legislation that would have made it a crime for lawyers not to
disclose confidences where necessary to prevent crime or fraud. See S. 485,
98th Cong. (1983). Specter's bill, which was motivated by concern over the
substance of Model Rule 1.6, not by concerns over nonuniformity, died quietly.
See generally The Lawyer's Duty of Disclosure Act: Hearings on S. 485 Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong. (1983). As noted above, most states shared Senator Specter's unhappi-
ness with Model Rule 1.6 and included in their versions of the rule a great
deal more room for disclosure. See supra Part I.B.2 (comparing versions of
Rule 1.6 that states have adopted). Moreover, the negative externalities as-
sociated with diverse confidentiality rules are sufficiently slight, and the
benefits of experimentation sufficiently large, that national intervention for
the sake of uniformity seems unwarranted.
One area that may be uniquely suited to national regulation is advertis-
ing. Advertising, whether broadcast, print, or on the Internet, very often can-
not be contained within a single jurisdiction. See Louise L. Hill, Speech to
Delaware State Bar Association (Jan. 31, 1997) (on fie with author)
(discussing the multijurisdictional nature of Internet web sites developed by
law firms). Advertising and solicitation rules, though driven by a series of
commercial speech decisions of the United States Supreme Court, vary con-
siderably in matters of important detail. See supra notes 96-101 and accom-
panying text. Conflicting advertising rules pose particular problems for mul-
tiple-licensed lawyers practicing in border cities. Their advertisements on
television and radio, in newspapers, and even in telephone books, frequently
cross state lines. See, e.g., Iowa Ethics Op. No. 89-24 (1989) (concluding that
lawyer admitted in Iowa and Illinois, but who maintained his office in Dlinois,
nonetheless had to conform to Iowa advertising rules for ad in telephone di-
rectory that was distributed in both states).
It may often be difficult, or even impossible, for these lawyers to conform
their advertisements to the rules of all the states to which their advertise-
ments inevitably travel. Factoring in the inherently ajurisdictional character
of the Internet, see Hill, supra, we may have reached the point that effective
state-based regulation of lawyer advertising and solicitation is a practical im-
possibility. See Zacharias, supra note 7, at 347-50 (exploring the complications
that local advertising codes pose to national firms); Daly, supra note 11, at
797 (concluding that "state-based regulation of lawyer advertising and solici-
tation in a national economy is impossible as a practical matter").
One alternative to uniform, national rules for advertising and solicitation
would be to provide that lawyer marketing, unless false or misleading, be
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IV. FEDERALISM AND A CHOICE-OF-LAW RULE
In a federal system that fosters normative variation and
includes overlapping jurisdiction, multistate actors are bound
to confront uncertainty and hence incur costs. The federal sys-
tem's response to these long-familiar problems is not typically
the radical one of nationally-imposed uniformity but rather re-
sort to choice-of-law rules. Such rules are designed, among
other things, to give adjudicators a method for determining
which jurisdiction's rules to apply to a particular problem, and to
give multistate actors a method for making sensible predic-
tions about what those adjudicators will do later. This Part
first examines the ABA's effort to create a uniform choice-of-
law rule for attorney ethics by amending Model Rule 8.5, noting
the legitimate criticisms of the rule's substance and scope but
emphasizing the collective-action obstacles to the rule ever
being widely adopted. It then briefly explores the possibility of
a federal choice-of-law rule as a solution to those collective action
problems, explaining that the federalism objections to national
intervention discussed above would not apply, and that such a
rule would be fully consistent with the federal government's
role as interstate umpire.
A. AMENDED MODEL RULE 8.5
As propounded by the ABA in 1983, the Model Rules were
premised on the assumption of uniform state adoption, despite
the recent history of state variations on the Model Code.38 The
1983 version of Model Rule 8.5 was merely a rule of jurisdic-
tion, and no provision was made there or elsewhere in the
Model Rules for resolving interstate conflicts in lawyer-conduct
measured only against the rules of the state of origin, and not against the
rules of the receiving state. Cf Daly, supra note 11, at 797-98 (suggesting
that most states have adopted this solution sub silentio). This alternative
would permit states to enforce their own vision of lawyer marketing and con-
sumer protection in most cases, while preventing inconsistent state rules from
strangling such marketing. On the other hand, lawyers in a state with par-
ticularly restrictive rules might be placed at a competitive disadvantage when
multistate lawyers can market more aggressively from across the border.
Moreover, if lawyer marketing on the Internet grows at the rate that some
predict, the problem of identifying the home state may itself become insolv-
able. See Hill, supra, at 4-7 (questioning what advertising rules would apply
to a lawyer admitted to practice in numerous jurisdictions who publishes a
web site on the Internet).
382. See supra Part LB.1 (describing state amendments to the Model
Code).
19971 155
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
standards."3 Such conflicts did arise, however, and the ABA,
spurred by a request from its own business law components,3
belatedly produced a choice-of-law rule in the form of amended
Model Rule 8.5.
The ABA committee responsible for the amended rule de-
scribed the objective of the revision as follows:
[T]o bring some measure of certainty and clarity to the frequently en-
countered, and often difficult, decisions a lawyer must make when
encountering a situation in which the lawyer is potentially subject to
differing ethical requirements of more than one jurisdiction.... The
problem of lack of clear guidance that this proposal seeks to address
is exacerbated by the fact that existing authority as to choice of law
in the area of ethics rules is unclear and inconsistent .... The pro-
posed amendment to Rule 8.5 seeks to provide clear answers to these
problems in nearly all cases.385
In order to accomplish this objective, the committee added
subsection (b) to the original version of the rule, directly ad-
dressing choice-of-law problems for both litigators and trans-
actional lawyers. 38 6
383. But see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5 cmts. 2, 3
(1983) (suggesting that under some circumstances, choice-of-law principles
"may apply").
384 See ABA Committee on Counsel Responsibility, supra note 6, at 1236 (1990).
385. Report of the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility in Support of Amended Rule 8.5 (1993).
386. Subsection (b) provides:
Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this
jurisdiction, the rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as
follows:
(1) for conduct in connection with a proceeding in a court before
which a lawyer has been admitted to practice (either generally or
for purposes of that proceeding), the rules to be applied shall be
the rules of the jurisdiction in which the court sits, unless the
rules of the court provide otherwise; and
(2) for any other conduct,
(i) if the lawyer is licensed to practice only in this jurisdic-
tion, the rules to be applied shall be the rules of this juris-
diction, and
(ii) if the lawyer is licensed to practice in this and another
jurisdiction, the rules to be applied shall be the rules of the
admitting jurisdiction in which the lawyer principally prac-
tices; provided, however, that if particular conduct clearly
has its predominant effect in another jurisdiction in which
the lawyer is licensed to practice, the rules of that jurisdic-
tion shall be applied to that conduct.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5(b) (1993).
156 [Vol. 81:73
FEDERALISM & LEGAL ETHICS
1. Substantive Criticisms
While commentators generally welcomed the ABA's effort
to address the problem of choice of law in attorney discipline,
most have been quite critical of amended Model Rule 8.5's par-
ticulars. The criticisms have centered on perceived flaws in
both drafting and underlying policy. As to drafting, critics
have focused on the rule's reference to the law of the
"jurisdiction in which the lawyer principally practices" and the
exception to the choice of that state's law when "[the lawyer's]
particular conduct clearly has its predominant effect in another
jurisdiction."387 They contend that this language is insuffi-
ciently determinate to give lawyers or adjudicators adequate
guidance in selecting the applicable law.388 Given the increas-
ingly multijurisdictional nature of law practice and law firms,
they argue, the jurisdiction in which a lawyer "principally
practices" often will be difficult to identify. Likewise, neither
the rule nor the comment provides useful guidance on the
meaning of "predominant effect." Critics have also observed
that the rule's distinction between conduct "in connection with
a proceeding in a court" and "any other conduct" likewise fails
to draw a bright line, particularly with respect to conduct pre-
liminary to litigation.38 9
More fundamentally, commentators have questioned the
rule's lawyer-centered focus. "Rather than balancing the inter-
ests of clients, third parties, lawyers, and the legal system, the
rule embodies chiefly the purpose of protecting the private in-
terests (financial and professional) of lawyers-those being
regulated."390 Indeed, the express purpose of the rule is to
387. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii) (1995).
388. See Daly, supra note 11, at 760-61 ("[In the real world of practice,
applying subsection (b)(2) may prove more complicated than its simple lan-
guage suggests."); Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and the
Multistate Attorney, 36 S. TEx. L. REV. 799, 834-37 (1995) (contending that
Rule 8.5 does not sufficiently define "principally practices" and "predominant
effect").
389. See Edward A. Carr & Allan Van Fleet, Professional Responsibility
Law in Multijurisdictional Litigation: Across the Country and Across the
Street, 36 S. TE. L. REV. 859, 892-93 (1995); see also Daly, supra note 11, at
758-60 (criticizing Rule 8.5 for its vagueness); Rensberger, supra note 388, at
833-34 (asserting that the rule's language is ultimately too vague to serve as a
useful guide).
390. Gregory B. Adams, Reflections on the Reaction to Proposed Rule 8.5:
Consensus of Failure, 36 S. TE. L. REv. 1101, 1103 (1995).
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provide predictability to lawyers,391 and neither the rule, nor
the comments, nor the committee report pay much attention to
just and predictable treatment of clients or the interests of
competing jurisdictions in having their law applied in particu-
lar cases.392 These and similar observations have led to a range
of proposals for amending or rewriting Model Rule 8.5, includ-
ing looking to the state of residence of the client, an affected
third party or an interested court,393 giving presumptive effect
to choice-of-law clauses in lawyer-client contracts,394 and select-
ing the law of the jurisdiction that has "the most significant
relationship" to the representation 395 or in which the entire at-
torney-client relationship has its "predominant effect."3 96
391. See supra note 385 and accompanying text.
392. For example, the rule's limitation to multiple admission situations,
either through multiple licensure or admission pro hac vice, can have the ef-
fect of dismissing the interests of clients, third parties, and jurisdictions in
which an attorney is not admitted. An attorney admitted only in State A can
nonetheless cause substantial consequences in State B, as by disclosing (or
not) a client's intent to commit a financial fraud in State B. Because the at-
torney is admitted only in State A, amended Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) would not
look to State B's version of Model Rule 1.6, even if the client or the potential
victim resided in State B. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 8.5(b)(2)(i) (1993) (for non-litigation-related conduct, "if the lawyer is li-
censed to practice only in this jurisdiction, the rules to be applied shall be the
rules of this jurisdiction").
A related criticism of the rule is its equation of jurisdiction to discipline
with licensure. Model Rule 8.5(a) grants authority to discipline only to states
in which a lawyer has been admitted, leaving other states without jurisdic-
tion, no matter what contacts the attorney might have or harm she might
cause there. Cf Daly, supra note 11, at 787-89 (arguing that Model Rule 8.5
should subject lawyers to the jurisdiction and ethical codes of the state in
which they offer legal services, whether or not they are admitted to practice in
that state).
393. See Rensberger, supra note 388, at 844-45 (arguing that "it is more
sensible to require lawyers to conform their conduct and expectations to the
law of the state of their clients or third parties").
394. See Daly, supra note 11, at 793-95 (discussing the option of allowing a
client and law firm to decide which jurisdictions ethical standards will govern
the relationship):
395. Id. at 792-93.
396. Felleman, supra note 126, at 1524 (proposing that the "predominant
effects" test supplemented by a jurisdictional test based on minimum contacts
would resolve the choice-of-law dilemma). The literature also includes more
modest proposals to "fine-tune" amended Model Rule 8.5. See, e.g., David
Luban, A Friendly Amendment to Model Rule 8.5, 36 S. TEYX L. REV. 1015,
1019 (1995) (proposing that where multiple lawyers are working together on a
single matter, "whichever ethics rules apply to the primary lawyer responsible
for a client's matter apply to all the other lawyers working on the same mat-
ter").
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Finally, at least one commentary has made reference to
the fact that Rule 8.5, as part of the Model Rules, applies only
to disciplinary matters, not to the wide range of "other law"
that governs lawyer conduct.3 9 Even if the rule were a model
of clarity and accommodated all relevant interests, it would not
address two of the three contexts in which lawyers' conduct is
most often challenged-motions to disqualify for conflicts of in-
terest and civil litigation for improper conduct-contexts in
which courts might well employ a choice-of-law approach dif-
ferent from Rule 8.5.398 Indeed, a lawyer could carefully con-
form her conduct to the disciplinary rules of the state to which
Rule 8.5 points, and thus avoid discipline, only to face mal-
practice or other civil liability for failing to follow another
state's conflicting rule.
2. No Version of Amended Model Rule 8.5 Will Be Widely
Adopted
The foregoing criticisms of amended Model Rule 8.5, while
hardly exhaustive, do capture the general tenor of the rule's re-
ception. But whatever the merits of proposals for expanding,
rewriting or fine-tuning the rule, the practical value of those
proposals is dramatically diminished by the likelihood that
neither the rule as currently formulated, nor any re-worked
version of it, will ever be adopted by a sufficient number of ju-
risdictions to materially increase predictability. First, inter-
state variations on ABA themes created the problem in the first
place, sending the ABA scrambling to find a choice-of-law so-
lution.3 No one has offered any reason to believe that the
same diversifying pressures will not apply to state consideration
of a new choice-of-law rule.4°° Indeed, the original version of
Rule 8.5, which merely addressed jurisdiction to discipline, ex-
perienced some measure of predictable interstate variation in
the adoption process;4°1 the more controversial 1993 version, if
397. See Carr & Van Fleet, supra note 389, at 868 (observing that "[n]ew
Model Rule 8.5 includes a choice-of-law framework for professional discipline,
but does not address other contexts").
398. See id. at 891-92.
399. See supra Part I.B.2 & Part I.D.; Fred C. Zacharias, A Nouveau Real-
ist's View of Interjurisdictional Practice Rules, 36 S. TEX. L. REv. 1037, 1042
(1995) (describing the possibility of widespread adoption of Model Rule 8.5 as
a "fantasy").
400. See supra notes 207-209 and accompanying text (discussing state
modifications to choice-of-law provision in the Uniform Commercial Code).
401. Several jurisdictions have modified their version of the rule to provide
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adopted at all, will surely generate even greater interstate
variation. Unless all or most states adopt amended Rule 8.5
without material variation, it will fail to accomplish its stated
purpose of promoting lawyer certainty. Second, more than four
years after the ABA sent the amended rule out to the states,
just three jurisdictions have adopted it and few others appear
poised to do so.402
Third, and most important, a reasoned assessment of in-
dividual states' interests and information when considering the
amended rule, or even a better crafted version of the rule, sug-
gests that few states will opt for adoption. The original version
of Model Rule 8.5, enacted largely intact by a majority of
states, provides that "[a] lawyer admitted to practice in this
jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this ju-
risdiction although engaged in practice elsewhere." 403 While
the comments contain two unilluminating references to the
possibility that the jurisdiction might apply some law other
than its own,4°4 the underlying assumption of the rule itself
appears to be that the jurisdiction ordinarily will apply its own
conduct rules to lawyers it has licensed, no matter where they
are practicing.0 5 In contrast, amended Model Rule 8.5 ex-
pressly provides that the enacting jurisdiction, under certain
that their disciplinary authority governs out-of-state lawyers practicing
within the jurisdiction, whether licensed there or not. See, e.g., ALASKA
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5 (1994); CALIFORNIA RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1-100(D) (1992); MARYLAND RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5 (1995); MICHIGAN RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 8.5 (1995); NORTH DAKOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 8.5 (1994).
402. See District of Columbia Revises Rules on Conflicts of Interest, 12
Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 367, 368 (1996) (reporting that the
District of Columbia "adopted] verbatim the language approved in the ABA's
revision [of Model Rule 8.51 in 1993"); Pennsylvania Adopts New Rule Regulat-
ing Non-Legal Services, 12 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 367, 368(1996) (reporting that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court "amended Rule 8.5,
on choice of law in disciplinary proceedings, to conform with ABA Model Rule
8.5"); ILL. SUP. CT. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5 (1997)(representing a slightly modified version of ABA Model Rule 8.5). Hawaii,
which adopted its version of the Model Rules several months after the ABA's
amendment to Rule 8.5, chose to reject the amended rule and enact instead
the original Rule 8.5. See Hawaii Begins New Year with New Ethics Rules, 9
Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 395, 397 (1994).
403. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5 (1983).
404. See id. cmts. 2, 3.
405. This is the position that has been taken, for example, by states seeking to
discipline federal prosecutors for violation of the state's anticontact rule, even
where all relevant conduct occurs out-of-state. See supra notes 106-108 and
accompanying text.
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circumstances, will apply to the conduct of its own lawyers the
conduct rules of another state. The same presumably would be
true of any more refined version of the rule. That relinquish-
ment of authority to apply forum law may well make sense,
when the favor is returned by other states that have adopted
the same choice-of-law rule and apply under similar circum-
stances in their courts the conduct rules of the original juris-
diction. The substantial obstacles to effective interstate bar-
gaining over choice-of-law norms, however, leave states in a
prisoner's dilemma that generates considerable pressure to
reject a proposed choice-of-law rule that surrenders authority
to apply forum law.4°6
Assume two states, A and B, and a refined version of
Model Rule 8.5 that accommodates competing interests in a
way that would be satisfactory to both states.407 In other
words, assume a refined rule that captures each state's inter-
ests in asserting application of its law in the cases408 it cares
most about, while ceding to the norms of the other state cases
of a lower priority.4° Assume further that each state's current
rule would apply local law to its licensed lawyers in virtually
all cases, or at least in more cases than under the proposed
rule. If States A and B both adopt the refined version of Model
Rule 8.5, their joint utility will be maximized, and their indi-
vidual utility will be better than it was, even though the forum
state may apply local law less often. If neither adopts the rule,
choice-of-law questions will be resolved by each state's current
law, which we have assumed generates lower total utility than
the refined rule. If one state rejects the new rule while the
406. For an insightful application of economic game theory to the problems
of interstate cooperation in the adoption of choice-of-law rules, see BRIL-
MAYER, supra note 1, at 169-218.
407. Given the inability of courts and scholars to develop choice-of-law
rules that make all states better off, this may be a heroic assumption. See
BRILMAYER, supra note 1, at 218.
408. The reference to "cases" in text may suggest an unduly narrow con-
ception of the relationship between choice-of-law rules and state interests.
States adopt choice-of-law rules not only to decide cases in court (or before
disciplinary boards) but also to influence out-of-court conduct. See
BRILMAYER, supra note 1, at 199-202.
409. Larry Kramer has explained that "[elach state presumably cares more
about some true conflicts than others, because some true conflicts affect more
important purposes of the state's laws or affect these purposes in more impor-
tant ways." Kramer, supra note 1, at 2144. As a result, choice of law is "a
variable-sum game in which some solutions may leave states better off than
others by calling for the application of their laws in more of the cases they
care about." Id.
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other adopts it, however, the rejecting state will maximize its
utility (by applying its law to a higher number of in-state cases,
and having its law applied more often by the other state). At
the same time, the adopting state's utility will be minimized,
since its law is being applied less often both in-state and out-of-
state. The state options and utility payoffs are set out in the
following table, with A's payoffs listed first.
State B
adopt reject
State A adopt 3,3 1,4
reject 4, 1 2, 2
The insight of the prisoner's dilemma is that if States A
and B cannot communicate, and therefore cannot know what
the other will do, each has an incentive to reject the new rule
in an effort to maximize individual utility. 10 They have a dis-
incentive, in other words, to choose the course of action that
would benefit them collectively. Of course, in a world where A
and B can bargain effectively, they likely will agree to adopt
the new rule and thus maximize their total utility. The prob-
lem lies in the fact that we have fifty states, not two. The ob-
stacles to reaching agreement in a fifty-sided bargaining exer-
cise-including basic communication difficulties and free-rider
and hold out problems-are close to insurmountable."a  Per-
haps had the ABA included a choice-of-law rule in the original
version of the Model Rules, states might have had sufficient
confidence in each other's plans to adopt the rule in large num-
bers. As a stand-alone amendment to the Rules, however,
amended Rule 8.5 (or even a more satisfactory version of it)
leaves states in the position of incommunicado prisoners, with
a disincentive to adopt the rule. In short, game theory tends to
confirm what the experience thus far with amended Model
Rule 8.5 suggests-states are unlikely to adopt it in sufficient
numbers to enhance predictability.
410. See supra note 326 (describing the prisoner's dilemma).
41L See BRILMAYER, supra note 1, at 170 (citing OLSON, supra note 318, at
35) ("[IUt would be very difficult if not impossible for the fifty states to actually
bargain their way to a choice-of-law agreement.").
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3. What's Wrong With Relying on Existing Choice-of-Law
Principles?
The prediction that states will not adopt a uniform choice-
of-law rule for lawyer-conduct standards raises the question,
should we care? What would be wrong with consigning lawyers
to consult on their own behalf the same body of conflicts law
they consult on behalf of clients? To put the question affirma-
tively, are there good reasons to insist on a special choice-of-
law rule for the regulation of lawyer conduct? Two reasons
might support such special treatment for lawyers. First, sev-
eral commentators have observed that the existing authority in
the area is neither well-developed nor clear.412 Second, the se-
verity of the disciplinary sanction ought not be imposed absent
clear advance guidance about which state's rule will be ap-
plied, guidance that current choice-of-law principles do not
provide.413 While not without some force, neither reason seems
to warrant panic over the absence of a uniform choice-of-law
rule.
Mary Daly recently has researched the "universe of judi-
cial decisions and state bar association opinions specifically
addressing how to resolve ethical conflicts in multijurisdic-
tional practice" and found it "strikingly small: approximately
three cases and eleven opinions, totaling fewer than one hun-
dred pages. 414 Others have suggested that what law exists is
"confusing and inconsistent."415  The relative scarcity of rele-
vant opinions, rather than being cause for a new rule, might
instead suggest that interstate ethical conflicts have not (yet)
created a severe practical problem. 416 The lack of consistency
412. See, e.g., Report of the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility in Support of Amended Rule 8.5 (1993) ("The problem of
lack of clear guidance that this proposal seeks to address is exacerbated by
the fact that existing authority as to choice of law in the area of ethics rules is
unclear and inconsistent."); Roach, supra note 6, at 918 ("The few decisions of
disciplinary panels and courts that dealt with choice-of-law issues were con-
fusing and inconsistent.").
413. See Kathleen Clark, Is Discipline Different? An Essay on Choice of
Law and Lawyer Conduct, 36 S. TEX L. REv. 1069, 1072 (1995) (suggesting
that lawyer discipline warrants clear rules, and thus perhaps a special choice-
of-law rule, but then observing that "any number of the other disciplinary
rules are anything but clear").
414. Daly, supra note 11, at 764; see also id. at 764-74 (cataloging and de-
scribing opinions).
415. Roach, supra note 6, at 918; see also id. at 919-21 (describing unre-
solved issues in choice of law for legal ethics).
416. Daly suggests that the recent development of multijurisdictional
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in the law that does exist is not surprising, and hardly serves
to distinguish this little corner of choice of law from the rest of
the "dismal swamp." Should the problem become as severe as
some suggest, then the law will surely develop to the point that
lawyers will have as much guidance on the law governing their
multistate conduct as does everyone else.
Fairness undoubtedly dictates that the disciplinary sanction,
like criminal penalties, not be imposed without reasonable notice
of what conduct is prohibited. If current choice-of-law princi-
ples fail to provide such notice, then perhaps a special choice-
of-law rule is warranted. Of course, the Model Rules have been
roundly criticized for failing to provide clear answers to a host
of substantive questions; a lack of precision in choice of law
probably falls rather far down the list of reasons for lawyer un-
certainty.4 17 Moreover, there is no evidence that lawyers are
being taken by surprise in disciplinary proceedings by unpre-
dictable choice-of-law decisions.418  When the rules of more
than one state might legitimately be applied to the same con-
duct, lawyers should not be (and thus far have not been) dis-
ciplined if their conduct conformed to the rule they reasonably
thought applicable.
In sum, the prediction that few states are likely to adopt
any uniform choice-of-law rule, no matter how well-crafted,
should not be terribly troubling. Those few courts and bar as-
sociations that have faced interstate conduct-rule conflicts
have looked to general choice-of-law principles and not ap-
peared totally at sea.419 In the malpractice context, where
conflicts have arisen with somewhat more frequency, courts
have likewise employed the same choice-of-law principles they
use in other types of litigation.4 Again, if lawyers increas-
practice and the earlier uniformity of state rules explain the small number of
opinions. Daly also conjectures that lawyers find choice-of-law doctrine so
frustratingly indeterminate that they refrain from litigating mutijurisdic-
tional conflicts and from seeking ethics committee advice. See Daly, supra
note 11, at 765-66.
417. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 413, at 1072 & n.10 (discussing as an ex-
ample the treatment of disclosing client fraud under the Model Rules).
418. One possible exception arises in the unusual context of state efforts to
discipline federal prosecutors for violation of the state's anti-contact rule. See
supra Part I.B.2.b. Even there, however, any unfairness stems not from a
lack of clear notice (the state's choice of its own law is quite predictable), but
from the prosecutor's arguably reasonable reliance on contrary statements of
DOJ policy.
419. See Daly, supra note 11, at 764-74.
420. See Clark, supra note 413, at 1071.
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ingly face interstate conflicts in conduct rules, then choice-of-
law doctrine will develop in court and bar association opinions
and lawyers will gain increased guidance.421 If current choice-
of-law doctrine proves insufficiently determinate for lawyer
comfort, then the solution is not to seek a special rule that
solves the problem for lawyers, but to improve choice of law
generally.
B. A FEDERAL CHOICE-OF-LAW RULE
The foregoing discussion suggests that the current and fu-
ture absence of a state-based uniform choice-of-law rule for
lawyer conduct should be neither surprising nor alarming. But
the absence of justifiable alarm does not sanctify the status
quo. When predictable obstacles to collective action prevent
states from bargaining their way to optimal solutions, national
intervention may be warranted. I have argued at length that na-
tional preemption of attorney-conduct standards is unwarranted.
A more modest (and frankly obvious) role for the national gov-
ernment would be to create a choice-of-law rule governing in-
terstate conflicts of attorney-conduct standards. Such a rule
would have the virtue of preserving interstate diversity in con-
duct norms while at the same time providing uniform guidance
in the resolution of interstate conflicts.
A generation ago, prominent conflicts scholars called for a
national solution to the problems generated by state control of
choice of law.4' Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court
seemed to pay much attention, however, and calls for federal
421. That increased guidance may be of limited value, however, if courts
and bar associations take diverse paths in the development of relevant doc-
trine. See Michael E. Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of
Choice of Law, 24 GA. L. REv. 49, 54 & n.32 (1989) (discussing surveys and
concluding that 23 states follow the Second Restatement approach to choice of
law, 14 follow the First Restatement, four use the better law approach, two
employ comparative impairment, two presume that forum law applies, and six
use some undefined version of interest analysis).
422. See generally Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp:
The Case for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 17-20 (1991)
(describing earlier scholarship). William Baxter, for example, asserted that
"E[responsibility for allocating spheres of legal control among member states of
a federal system cannot sensibly be placed elsewhere than with the federal
government." William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16
STAN. L. REV. 1, 23 (1963). Brainerd Currie made a similar claim, see
BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 183 (1963),
as did Walter Wheeler Cook much earlier, see Walter Wheeler Cook, The Pow-
ers of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28 YALE L.J. 421,
432-33 (1919).
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intervention fell out of fashion.423 More recently, Michael Got-
tesman has argued that a host of factors-the increased volume of
multistate activity leading to litigation, the growing diversity
in state substantive law, the growing disparity in state choice-
of-law rules, and the Supreme Court's relaxation of constitu-
tional constraints on both state court jurisdiction and application
of forum law-have combined to increase dramatically the need
for a federal solution.424 Gottesman contends that in order to
eliminate the resulting costs of indeterminacy and non-
neutrality, Congress should declare choice-of-law rules for
those categories of disputes that frequently implicate the inter-
ests of multiple states. His initial list of candidates includes
products liability, vehicular and common carrier accidents,
medical malpractice, and toxic torts.425  A reasonable case
might be made for the inclusion of lawyer-conduct standards
on that list, though perhaps not too close to the top. A federal
rule would have obvious advantages over even an ideal version
of Model Rule 8.5-it would need to be enacted by only a single
jurisdiction and it would not be subject to varying state
amendments or interpretation.426
Congress undoubtedly has the power to enact preemptive
choice-of-law statutes governing not only the subjects listed by
Gottesman but also interstate conflicts in attorney-conduct
standards. Part HIL.A discussed Congress's authority under the
Commerce Clause to set national standards of attorney con-
duct.427 That greater authority should also encompass the
lesser measure of a conflicts rule, particularly where the pur-
pose of that rule is to promote predictability in interstate
423. See Gottesman, supra note 422, at 22 (stating that the prior clamor
over choice of law has been abandoned).
424. See id. at 28-29.
425. See id. at 16. Before Gottesman, a few commentators suggested en-
actment of a federal choice-of-law rule specific to particular problems. See id
at 17 n.58 (discussing proposals concerning products liability, and multi-party
multi-state tort suits in federal court).
426. As with any federal law, of course, there undoubtedly would be inter-
pretive variation in lower courts. In this case, the authoritative interpreters
would include not only lower federal courts but also state courts and discipli-
nary bodies. One serious practical concern over federalizing choice of law is
the ability of the Supreme Court to devote sufficient attention to resolving in-
terpretive conflicts. See Gottesman, supra note 422, at 37-41 (discussing po-
tential problems and concluding that if rules are sufficiently determinate,
added burden on Supreme Court would be minimal).
427. See supra Part II.A.
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transactions and hence foster interstate commerce.42 8 Moreover,
Gottesman and others have made a persuasive case that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause429 grants Congress the power to
enact preemptive choice-of-law rules.4 0 In particular, its sec-
ond sentence gives Congress the authority to prescribe "[the]
'effect' to be given in one state to the 'public Acts, records, and
judicial proceedings' of every other state.43'
The existence of congressional authority, of course, does
not render wise the exercise of such authority.4 2 If normative
diversity in attorney-conduct rules is worth preserving (to
promote individual preference satisfaction, interstate competi-
tion and innovation), is not normative variation in conflict
rules worth preserving for the same reasons? The answer is
"no." While state-based choice-of-law rules might better pro-
mote individual preference satisfaction than would a single
national rule, they are an ineffective way to resolve interstate
428. Gottesman questions the existence of Commerce Clause authority to
enact conflicts rules, contending that "there is something incongruous about
Congress declaring that a matter so affects commerce that it warrants con-
gressional attention, yet resolving it simply by refereeing among state-made
alternatives (and, quite likely, refereeing with a yardstick that does not pur-
port to search for the state law that best effectuates interstate commerce)."
Gottesman, supra note 422, at 23 (concluding that Commerce Clause author-
ity is "fairly debatable"). But the point of national conflicts rules is not to se-
lect the state substantive law that best promotes commerce; it is to promote
commerce by reducing the transaction costs generated by interstate conflicts.
429. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which
such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.").
430. See Gottesman, supra note 422, at 24-28; see also Donald T. Traut-
man, Toward Federalizing Choice of Law, 70 TEx L. REV. 1715, 1726 (1992)
(asserting that Congress has power to federalize choice of law under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause and under the Fourteenth Amendment).
431. Gottesman, supra note 422, at 24. Gottesman admits that his position is
not free from doubt, particularly when viewed from the perspective of original
intent. While there is general consensus that the framers intended to give
Congress the power to dictate when states must enforce the legislation of
other states, "[nlothing in the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention
indicates that the framers purposefully intended to empower Congress to
compel one state to apply the common law rulings of another...." Id. at 25-
26 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, I am confident that either under the
Commerce Clause or the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Congress could find
(and the Supreme Court would affirm) the authority to prescribe choice-of-law
rules to govern interstate conflicts of law, particularly since such authority
would allow Congress to fulfill one of the central roles of the national govern-
ment-umpiring interstate disputes.
432. See supra Part III (arguing that despite the existence of congressional
authority, federalization of attorney-conduct standards would be unwise).
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disputes and ignore the umpireal role of the national govern-
ment in the federal system. Perhaps the central difficulty in
choice of law is the lack of an "external point of reference from
which to judge one state right and the other wrong."433 At least
with respect to interstate conflicts, the national government
seems to be the obvious external reference point.
Federalism embodies more than just preserving state
authority. It also permits the national government to act when
national action is warranted.434  "To resolve squabbling be-
tween states over the primacy of their laws is a uniquely ap-
propriate federal role, and.., one that the framers envisioned
Congress would fill. 4 35 Both Hamilton and Madison spoke of
the need for a "superintending authority" to address interstate
conflicts, 436 and Madison referred to the national government
as a "disinterested umpire."437 The Supreme Court's more re-
cent observation that "[a] State cannot be its own ultimate
judge in a controversy with a sister State,"438 while made in the
context of interpreting an interstate compact, applies with
equal force to interstate choice of law. The normative diversity
and overlapping jurisdiction of our federal system inevitably
generate conflict between states over the reach of their laws. A
coherent legal system requires a consistent and predictable
method of resolving those disputes, something that the na-
tional government is in the best position to deliver, particularly
where collective action problems prevent states from resolving
them on their own. If the problems of uncertainty caused by
433. Kramer, supra note 1, at 2143; see also BRILMAYER, supra note 1, at 1
(describing the "fundamental and unavoidable problem of choice of law" as
deciding whether courts should decide choice-of-law questions based on some
external and objective perspective or on the internal perspective of one of the
involved states).
434- See Kramer, supra note 150, at 1502 (explaining that there are two
sides to federalism: preserving state authority and allowing the federal gov-
ernment to operate nationally when needed). The term federalism includes
not only the relationship between the states and the federal government, but
also the "interrelationships among the states." BLACICS LAW DICTIONARY 612
(6th ed. 1990).
435. Gottesman, supra note 422, at 32.
436. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 268 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.
1961) (describing the "necessity of a superintending authority" over interstate
conflicts); see also id. No. 80, at 477-78 (Alexander Hamilton) ("Whatever
practices may have a tendency to disturb the harmony between the states are
proper objects of federal superintendence and control.").
437. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMRIcAN REPUBLIc
1776-1787, 473 (1969).
438. West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22,28 (1951).
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inconsistent state choice-of-law rules are serious enough, then
the adoption of national choice-of-law rules makes perfect
sense.
In addition, a national choice-of-law rule is fundamentally
different from national standards of conduct in terms of intrusion
on state authority.439 A national choice-of-law rule, unlike na-
tional conduct standards, would allow states to retain complete
control over the law to be applied in matters entirely internal
to one state. In matters that are not entirely internal, the cur-
rent system of state-based choice-of-law rules already deprives
states of control over application of their law."0 Moreover, ob-
stacles to effective collective action prevent states from bar-
gaining their way to a uniform choice-of-law rule that would be
in their collective interest.441 The national government is the
actor perfectly (and designedly) positioned to remove those
barriers.
One forceful objection to a national choice-of-law rule, for
attorney-conduct standards or for anything else, is that neither
judges nor conflicts scholars have yet identified the "best"
choice-of-law rule. We ought to let state experimentation con-
tinue rather than prematurely freeze the law's development
with a single national rule. There are three related weak-
nesses in this position. First, generations worth of experimen-
tation apparently have not gotten us any closer to discovering
the "best" conflicts rule."2  Second, given the fundamentally
opposed conceptions of the right approach to choice of law (let
alone the right particulars), consensus in this lifetime appears
inconceivable." 3 Third, in the realm of choice of law, the bene-
fits of having one adequate rule (as opposed to a range of rules
both better and worse) are likely to outweigh the cost of subop-
timal results in occasional cases.'" In short, while perhaps we
cannot trust Congress to enact ideal choice-of-law rules
(whether governing attorney-conduct standards, products li-
ability, or anything else), a competent national rule might be
preferable to the current state of affairs.
439. See Gottesman, supra note 422, at 30-32 (asserting that a national
choice-of-law statute would not intrude on traditional state autonomy).
440. Id. at 31.
44L See supra Part IV.A; BRILMAYER, supra note 1, at 181-218.
442. See sources cited supra note 1 (describing the current disarray and
confusion in the realm of choice of law).
443. See Gottesman, supra note 422, at 33.
444. See id.
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I offer the argument for a national choice-of-law rule gov-
erning conflicts in attorney-conduct standards chiefly to sug-
gest that if Congress decides to address the problems associ-
ated with those standards, it does so through choice of law and
not a national code of conduct. I hasten to point out that the
case for national intervention in other areas-such as products
liability, mass torts, and toxic torts-is far stronger than it is
for lawyer conduct. If Congress ever gets into the business of
choice of law, which as an outsider to the field I am convinced
it should, then a rule addressing conflicts in lawyer-conduct
standards should be somewhere on its agenda. Lawyers would
do themselves and their clients a service by applying their
considerable lobbying skills to putting choice of law on the na-
tional agenda. If the legal profession believes its problems are
sufficiently severe to warrant being addressed first, perhaps it
can package its claim as volunteering to serve as experimental
guinea pig.
CONCLUSION
As Holmes observed, prediction is much of what lawyers
do. 5 Whether about the reach or meaning of a statute, the
import or efficacy of a clause in a document, the reaction or
plans of government regulators and investigators, or the reso-
lution of a conflict of laws, the ability to make reasonably accu-
rate predictions allows lawyers to make a living. The clients
who pay lawyers to make those predictions, often about law
that is inevitably indeterminate, may be surprised to learn
that their hired prognosticators are complaining now that that
indeterminacy has begun to affect them. In these difficult
times for the legal profession, a claimed need for special treat-
ment, in the form of uniform national lawyer-conduct stan-
dards, threatens to do fiurther damage to the already tarnished
public image of lawyers.
Lawyers better than anyone should appreciate that the
normative variation about which they complain is the inevitable
and beneficent product of the federal system. Federalism fos-
ters interstate diversity in legal standards, both to enhance
individual preference satisfaction and to enable valuable inter-
445. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457, 457 (1897) (stating that the business of lawyers "is prediction, the pre-
diction of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the
courts.").
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state competition. Admittedly, state-level norm setting does
often produce serious harms, such as pernicious norms and de-
structive competition, that warrant national intervention. But
lawyer discomfort over diverse conduct standards, like the
similar discomfort often felt by clients, is an inevitable and
hardly debilitating consequence of normative diversity. It does
not warrant the radical cure of national preemption of conduct
standards. States, as decentralized competitors and innova-
tors, are the appropriate vehicles for norm setting in the field
of legal ethics.
The diversity generated by state control of lawyer-conduct
norms, coupled with overlapping jurisdiction to discipline, cre-
ates conflicts and necessitates choice of law. The ABA's failure
to include a choice-of-law provision in the original Model Rules,
apparently premised on the belief that the Rules would be uni-
formly adopted, cost it an opportunity to control choice of law
in legal ethics. Amended Model Rule 8.5, representing a be-
lated recognition of the diversifying forces of the federal sys-
tem, is doomed to failure. Not only does the rule suffer from
significant substantive flaws, but obstacles to interstate com-
munication and bargaining would render even an ideal version
of the rule an unlikely candidate for widespread adoption.
One incidental benefit of the uncertainty generated by the
diversification of ethics standards and the growth of multistate
practice is that lawyers may now better understand the prob-
lems of their clients. Multistate actors have long had to cope
with diverse and sometimes inconsistent state standards, a
problem exacerbated by inconsistent state choice-of-law rules.
In recent years there have been renewed calls for national con-
trol of choice of law. Perhaps lawyers, newly educated about
the costs of inconsistent state approaches, will strike a blow for
their clients and themselves by supporting that effort.
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